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ABSTRACT  
Re-Constructing Revolution:  
The Mediation of the Political Meaning(s) of The Battle of Algiers  
in American Art-Cinema Markets  
Kaitlyn Zozula  
This study explores the American promotion and reception of The Battle of Algiers (1966, dir. 
Gillo Pontecorvo). By outlining the discourses which facilitated The Battle of Algiers’ circulation 
within American film-markets, this research outlines the distinct and varied ideological functions 
that the film has served in the United States. It focuses on three inter-related discursive issues 
which characterized the marketing campaigns and review journalism associated with the film. 
First, by de-emphasizing the roles that the Algerian state played in the film’s production, and 
labelling the film as a piece of Italian neorealism, American distributors and critics promoted it as 
a politically-neutral alternative to propaganda. In doing so, they effectively mediated the film’s 
anti-colonial politic, and carefully managed the imaged spectator’s identification with Algerian 
nationalism(s). This research then explores the film’s promotion as an (anti)colonial allegory for 
the Vietnam War and black-liberation movement. This discursive trend had varied results. At 
times it facilitated the articulation of anti-colonial critique within the American mainstream press. 
However, it more often worked to reify, obscure, and distort the on-the-ground realities of Third 
Worldist political organizing in ways which met, rather than resisted, the ideological imperatives 
of American imperialism. Ultimately, the film’s American circulation can be characterized as a 
site of persistent and ongoing struggle between two competing visions of humanism and 
globalism - defined by either the internationalist ethos of anti-colonialism, or the expansionist 
aspirations of liberal capitalism.  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On September 7th, 2003 the New York Times published an article by Michael Kaufman detailing a 
now-infamous screening of The Battle of Algiers (1966, dir. Gillo Pontecorvo) hosted by the 
Pentagon. Occurring nearly six months into the second American invasion of Iraq, the screening 
was organized by the Directorate for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a “civilian 
led group with ‘responsibility for thinking aggressively and creatively’ on issues of guerrilla 
war’” (Kaufman, WK3). According to the Pentagon, the event was meant to “prompt discussion” 
regarding the efficacy of counter-insurgency techniques used by the French military during the 
Algerian War of Independence, and more specifically, the use of torture as a method of 
interrogation (Kaufman, WK3).  
 The legacies of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay suggest the horrific extent to which 
spectators at the Pentagon ultimately identified with the methods used by French soldiers in the 
film. However, beyond its apparently technical function, the screening constituted an important 
ideological intervention. The event was promoted amongst intelligence officers and military 
personnel with a memo which read:  
  
 How to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas. Children shoot soldiers   
 at point-blank range. Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population   
 builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar? The French have a plan. It succeeds tactically,   
 but fails strategically. To understand why, come to a rare showing of this film. (in    
 Kaufman, WK3) 
Within the interpretive framework promoted by the Pentagon, the FLN and Algerian people so 
vividly depicted in The Battle of Algiers are effectively stripped of their historical specificity and 
anti-colonial aspirations. The film chronicles an early chapter of the Algerian revolutionary 
struggle against French colonial occupation in which the FLN attempted to seize control of 
Algiers through a campaign of urban guerrilla warfare between November of 1954 and December 
of 1957 and concludes at the moment in which Algeria gained independence. However, in the 
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context of the Pentagon screening, the film’s celebratory images of anti-colonial revolution were 
distorted into an ahistorical and Orientalist vision of the Arab world - yet another “Arab 
population” in “mad fervor” to be managed by empire.  
 This particular reconstruction of The Battle of Algiers was not limited to the Pentagon 
memo. The film was referenced in a US congressional hearing entitled “Preparing for the War on 
Terrorism”, wherein Christopher Harmon, a professor at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and 
Staff College claimed that al-Qaeda “use a cell structure that has never been better explained 
publicly than in the famous film The Battle of Algiers” (in Daulatzai, 11). In an interview with 
ABC News, Richard Clarke former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection 
and Counter-terrorism for the US government similarly asserted that, while The Battle of Algiers 
may have been set in the 1950s, “it’s all happening now in the 21st century” (in Daulatzai, 11).  
 Nicholas Harrison has furthermore outlined the extent to which the construction of The 
Battle of Algiers as an allegory for the growing War on Terror, was reproduced within the 
contexts of both film journalism and academic film studies. In a dossier on the film released in 
2004, Cahiers du cinéma claimed that The Battle of Algiers “attracts affectionate attention from 
supporters of radical Islam, who find in it, or believe they find in it, if not a set of instructions 
then at least some justification” (in Harrison, 23). Writing for The Boston Review, film critic Alan 
A. Stone suggested that “if Pontecorvo could now revisit his own film, he might recognize - as 
we can with the hindsight of 9/11 - the essential place of Islam in the film's setting and how that 
background context has now become its central message” (in Harrison, 25). B. Ruby Rich 
likewise claimed that “in today’s content The Battle of Algiers has begun to look like a recruiting 
film for Al-Qaeda” (in Harrison, 25). This specific reading of The Battle of Algiers was also 
promoted by the Criterion Collection, who included interviews with “US counterterrorism 
experts” on their special edition DVD/Blu-Ray re-release of the film, who discussed its relevance 
to the contemporaneous War on Terror.  
 For many film and media scholars, this specific mobilization of the film constituted a 
gross misappropriation of a piece of radical political cinema.  Directed by an outspoken leftist 1
 See: Baratieri, 2009; Chanan, 2007; Cló, 2008; Daulatzai, 2016; Dingeman, 2008; Gross, 2004; Haspel, 2006; 1
O’Riley, 2011; Rich, 2015; Reid, 2005; Riegler, 2008; Riegler, 2009; Slocum, 2005; and Whitfield, 2012.
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and produced with the financial and logistical support of the post-revolutionary Algerian state, 
the film was a product of Third Worldist internationalism, and an emblem of the global struggle 
for decolonization. Sohail Daulatzai perhaps offers the clearest articulation of the ideological 
conundrum posed by the Pentagon screening in his Fifty Years of the Battle of Algiers: Past as 
Prologue. Daulatzai asks:   
 How could a film that was so sympathetic to the Algerians - evocatively and poetically   
 showing them organizing, targeting French occupation forces, and planting bombs in   
 cafés and other public places - come to the service of the most powerful empire in the   
 history of the world fifty years after it was released? (12) 
For Daulatzai, and many other scholars who have attempted to account for the film’s complex 
political afterlife during the War on Terror, the answer was located in the film-text itself. The 
Battle of Algiers has been regularly described as a text which is open to multiple and conflicting 
political readings.  For Daulatzai, the film “has always been a battleground for competing ideas 2
about power and politics at different historical junctures and in varying places around the globe”, 
in part because of “the diverse sympathies it has engendered and the sheer range of interests that 
have identified with the film from across the political spectrum” (12)  
 This openness of the film text has furthermore routinely been understood as a product of 
the film’s unprecedented realism and the fact that its production occurred in such proximity to the 
historical realities of the Algerian war. The film was co-produced and co-written by Saadi Yacef 
who was an active member of the FLN during and after the revolution.  Shot on location in 3
Algiers only three years after the nation was liberated, and produced with the financial and 
logistical support of the post-revolutionary Algerian government, the film employed many non-
professional actors and production staff who had experienced the revolution first-hand. For many 
scholars, these qualities of the film’s production have imbued it with a heightened degree of 
 Caviglia, 2018; Chanan, 2007; Cilento, 2018; Haspel, 2006; O’Riley, 2011; Riegler, 2008; Riegler, 2009; Shohat 2
and Stam, 2014; and Virtue, 2014. 
 Saadi Yacef remains an active member of the Algerian government, as a senator in Algeria’s Council of the Nation. 3
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cinematic realism.  Indeed in her 1973, Filmguide to the Battle of Algiers, Joan Mellen suggested 4
that “perhaps no other film in the history of the art has shown so […] minutely the delicate 
workings of a revolutionary organization” (68).  
 Since the film’s Pentagon screening, many scholars have asserted the extent to which this 
pronounced sense of cinematic realism, has catalyzed a complex history of circulation, in which 
the film has been routinely used as a teaching tool within both the clandestine networks of 
revolutionary political organizations, and the military infrastructures of imperialist states. Several 
critics have claimed that the film has been studied by a range of militant anti-colonial political 
organizations, including the Black Panthers, the Weatherman, the Red Army Faction, the Tamil 
Tigers, the Irish Republican Army, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.  Furthermore, 5
alongside the Pentagon screening, several scholars have described the film’s mobilization by 
imperialist states in the context of the Vietnam War, the Dirty Wars, and the Israeli occupation of 
Palestine.  Indeed, this specific narrative regarding The Battle of Algiers’ global legacy, in which 6
the film is framed primarily in terms of its history of circulation within either the clandestine 
networks of revolutionary political organizations, or the intelligence infrastructures of state 
power, has been more or less cemented in the scholarly research produced on the film since the 
Pentagon screening. 
  It should be clearly stated that this specific history of circulation within both militant and 
military media networks is an important component of the film’s legacy - one which can indeed 
offer insight into its troubling uptake by the Pentagon in the context of the War of Terror. 
However, a survey of the scholarly work that has been produced on the film’s cultural and 
political history reveals some glaring omissions regarding its more banal, but undoubtedly still 
relevant, circulation within global art-cinema markets.  
  In the American context alone, The Battle of Algiers has received over four waves of 
 Bignardi, 2000; Baratieri, 2009; Chanan, 2007; Cilento, 2018; Daulatzai, 2016; Hediger, 2018; Riegler, 2008; 4
Riegler, 2009; Virtue, 2014; O’Leary and Srivastava, 2009; and Pauly, 1993.  
 Bignardi, 2000; Baratieri, 2009; Chanan, 2007; Cilento, 2018; Crowdus, 2004; Daulatzai, 2016 Hediger, 2018; 5
Riegler, 2008; Riegler, 2009; Virtue, 2014; O’Leary and Srivasatava, 2009; and Pauly, 1993.
 Chanan, 2007; Cilento, 2018; Daulatzai, 2016; Hediger, 2018; Riegler, 2008; Riegler 2009; Virtue, 2014; and 6
Whitfield, 2012. 
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nation-wide theatrical release, two rounds of distribution on pay-cable programming in 1980 and 
1981, and been bought and sold as part of a Criterion Collection DVD/Blu-Ray box set since 
2004. It has been nominated for three Academy Awards, and been recognized by the American 
Film Critics Society, the Independent Film Importers and Distributors of America, and the 
National Catholic Office for Motion Pictures. Indeed, The Battle of Algiers has perhaps been the 
most commercially-successful and widely-distributed film about anti-colonial revolution to be 
distributed in the United States.  
 This pronounced visibility of the film within Euro-American art-cinema markets has been 
noted by many scholars, including Mark Betz, who has labelled the film as the “key-reference 
text” on the Algerian War of Independence within Anglo-American film studies (107).   7
The film’s heightened visibility has moreover been problematized by some scholars of Algerian 
and other Arab-world cinemas.  In her survey of cinema from the Maghreb, Suzanne Gauch 8
noted that, “rather than representing the first step in the emergence of a national cinema, an 
international opening for Algerian filmmakers, as its producers had intended, Pontecorvo’s film 
was widely seen as the epitome of Algerian cinema”, one which was “fetishized as [the] national 
narrative” of Algeria on an international scale (4). For Kay Dickinson, this relative invisibility of 
Algerian cinema on in international scale is reflective of the global status of cinema from the 
Arab world. Dickinson writes: “there exists an absolute paucity of Arab films available to us in 
everyday screening spaces across the world or with subtitles in any other language” (6).  
 However, despite these important interventions, The Battle of Algiers’ lifecycle as a 
commodity circulating within American art-cinema markets, and the process by which it has 
become canonized within Euro-American film cultures, has been broadly overlooked within 
scholarly analyses of the film’s political legacy. If The Battle of Algiers is indeed open to 
multiple, and even diverging political readings, and furthermore if it stands as one of the most 
culturally visible films about anti-colonial revolution in the American context, how have 
American art-cinema industries, as representatives of a diverse range of institutional, cultural, and 
 See Aty, 2016; Boudjedra, 1995; Dickinson, 2018; Guy, 2012; Hafez, 1995; Hartog, et al, 1976; and Khanna, 1998. 7
 Rhanna Khanna concludes her analysis of the film with a post-script that problematizes the fact that the film 8
remains one of the “most easily available images of Algeria within the [United States]” alongside “colonialist 
cinema”, The Colonial Harem, and “news reports concerning Algerian Islamic fundamentalism” (29). 
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private-sector interests, mediated the film’s potential political meanings? And what can this 
history tell us about the film’s troubling afterlife in the context of the War on Terror?  
  
Literature Review: Third Cinema, Auteurism, and Textual Analysis  
In many ways, the scholarly consensus which frames the Pentagon screening primarily as an act 
of appropriation relies on the idea that the film initially functioned as a piece of what Fernando 
Solanas and Octavio Getino described as “Third Cinema”. Indeed, Fernando Solanas and Octavio 
Getino’s concept of “Third Cinema” has perhaps been the paradigmatic theoretical framework for 
English-language scholarship on The Battle of Algiers. The vast majority of academic writing that 
has been produced on the film has been dedicated measuring the degree to which The Battle of 
Algiers either subverts or affirms neocolonial logic, and thus serves either a liberatory or 
oppressive political function. In many instances, the film has been explicitly read according to the 
ideas in Fernando Solanas and Octavio Gentino’s “Towards a Third Cinema”.  In these texts, the 9
authors attempt to articulate the film’s relationship to the categories of First (commercial), 
Second (art-house and/or auteurist) and the notion of a resistant, anti-colonial, and anti-capitalist 
“Third Cinema”. While there is significant body of English-language scholarship on the film that 
does not explicitly engage with Solanas and Getino’s essay, the majority of this research also 
primarily hinges on an analysis of the film’s anti-colonial politic. As such it still speaks to the 
notion of Third Cinema on an implicit level.  
 In both bodies of work, the political meanings and functions of The Battle of Algiers are 
generally analyzed according to three interrelated forms of evidence. Namely, the film’s mode 
and contexts of production, the intentions of its various authors, and the aesthetic and narrative 
strategies of embedded within the film-text itself. On the level of textual analysis, the film has 
been read according to its: aesthetic and formal relationship to Italian neorealism (Bâ, 2012; 
Bondanella, 2009; Forgacs, 2007; Rich, 2015; and Virtue, 2014); representation of women (Aty, 
2016, Bâ, 2012; Baratieri, 2009; Khanna, 1998; Moore, 2003 Moruzzi, 1993; Roberts, 2007; and 
Shohat and Stam, 1994); use of music (Cilento, 2018; Daulauzai, 2016; Mellen, 1973; and 
 See: Bâ 2012; Baratieri, 2009; Daulatzai, 2016; Eid and Ghazel, 2009; Gikandi, et al, 2011; Khanna, 1998; 9
O’Riley, 2010; Virtue, 2014; Sainsbury, 1971; Shohat and Stam, 1994; and Wayne, 2001. 
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O’Shaghnessy, 2008); relationship to the ideas of Frantz Fanon (Cilento, 2018; Daulatzai, 2016; 
Eid and Ghazel, 2009; Moore, 2003; Moruzzi, 1993; O’Leary and Srivastava, 2009; Prochaska, 
2003; Rich, 2015; Shohat and Stam, 2014; Stam, 1975; Stam, 2003; and Srivastava, 2009); use of 
pseudo-documentary aesthetics (Bondanella, 2009; Cilento, 2018; Dowd, 1969; Harrison, 2007; 
Mellen, 1973; O’Leary, 2018; Orlando, 2000; Pauly, 1993; Rich, 2015; Riegler, 2009; Sainsbury, 
1971; Smith, 2005; and Virtue, 2014); relationship to post-colonial Algerian political history 
(Harrison, 2012; Prochaska, 2003; Smith, 2008); its politics of identification (Bâ, 2012; Caviglia, 
2018; Daulatzai, 2018; Haspel, 2006; Mellen, 1973; O’Leary and Srivastava, 2009; Shohat and 
Stam, 1994; Smith, 2005; Smith, 2008; Stam, 1975; and Stam, 2003); representation of the 
historical realities of the Algerian War of Independence (Cilento, 2018; Forgacs, 2007; Harrison, 
2007; Khanna, 1998; Mellen, 1973; Orlando, 2000; Rejali, 2012; Riegler, 2009; and Smith, 
2008). Several scholars have furthermore analyzed the film’s anti-colonial politic in relation to 
Pontecorvo’s personal history and contextualized it within his broader oeuvre (Celli, 2005; 
Ghirelli, 1979; O’Leary and Srivastava, 2009; Riegler, 2009; Srivastava, 2005; Virtue, 2014; and 
Wilson, 1971). Others have engaged in analyses of the film’s production history, and attempted to 
weigh the film’s “Italianness” against its “Algerianess” by analyzing the respective degrees of 
authorial agency relegated to Pontecrovo, its screenwriter Franco Solanis, and/or Saadi Yacef 
(Bignardi, 2000; Cló, 2008; Daulatzai, 2016; Forgacs, 2007; Mellen, 1973; Riegler, 2008; Shohat 
and Stam, 1994; Smith, 2005; and Whitfield, 2012)  
 These methods of analysis have undoubtedly made useful contributions to developing our 
shared understandings of the ways in which certain production methods or aesthetic, formal, or 
narrative strategies may work to subvert, or reproduce, imperialist ideologies. However, what has 
been broadly overlooked within the scholarly writing on The Battle of Algiers is the film’s actual 
conditions of distribution and exhibition, and how the various institutions that have facilitated the 
film’s global circulation have inflected The Battle of Algiers with specific, and indeed varied, 
meanings. Indeed, many scholars who have engaged in textual or auteurist analyses of the film 
have remarked upon the film’s complex and contradictory reception history. Ella Shohat and 
Robert Stam have asserted that “The Battle of Algiers offers a particularly vivid example of the 
ways that films are received differently over time as they are interpreted through different 
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national contexts and ideological grids” (404). Similarly, Michael Chanan has suggested that the 
film “will be read according to the political culture of the audience that watches it” (40). As such, 
perhaps one of the most valuable, and indeed under-studied, aspects of The Battle of Algiers is the 
knowledge its history of distribution, exhibition, and reception can provide about the ideological 
contours of the various culture industries in which it has circulated.  
 Specific aspects of the film’s reception history have of course been studied. As previously 
mentioned, several scholars have engaged in overviews of the film’s reception within both 
militant and military media networks (Chanan, 2007; Clò, 2008; Daulatzai, 2016; Gross, 2004; 
Hediger, 2018; Whitfield, 2012; Riegler, 2008; Riegler, 2009). The film’s French reception, and 
its relationship to broader social memories regarding the Algerian War, has also been extensively 
researched (Caillé, 2007; Cilento, 2018; Dine, 1994; Harries, 2007; Hugo, 2014; McCormack, 
2011; Orlando, 2000; Reid, 2005; Stora and Stevens, 2007). Many scholars have contextualized 
the film within Algerian national cinema and reflected on its cultural and social impacts in the 
Algerian context (Aty, 2016; Boudjedra, 1995; Dickinson, 2018; Guy, 2012; Hafez, 1995; 
Hartog, et al, 1976; Khanna, 1998). Furthermore, there have been several analyses dedicated to 
the film’s uptake as commentary on politicized Islam in the context of the War on Terror 
(Baratieri, 2009; Harrison, 2012; O’Riley, 2010; Slocum, 2005).  
 However, the film’s entrance into and construction within American art-cinema markets 
has remained virtually ignored within the body of academic scholarship that has been produced 
on the film. While scholars have routinely contextualized The Battle of Algiers as a piece of Third 
Cinema, or asserted the general significance of the film's political impact, they often provide little 
to no elaboration on, or evidence to support, these claims. For example, Francesco Caviglia 
introduces his textual analysis of the film by stating that it “was understood by left-wing militants 
in the late 1960s and 70s as a clear endorsement or even glorification of political violence” (1). 
Caviglia does not specify which political organizations he is referring to, or even where these 
groups were thought to be located. Similarly, while Paul B. Rich suggests that upon release the 
film became “essential viewing for all those interested in radical or underground cinema”, he 
does not elaborate on this specific aspect or the film’s reception and exhibition history, and 
provides no evidence to support this claim (659). Despite the large body of scholarship that has 
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been produced on the film, it is apparent that The Battle of Algiers’ global circulation remains 
under-historicized and subject to mystification.  
 
Methodology  
In order to address some of the gaps that currently exist in scholarship on The Battle of Algiers, I 
have elected to methodologically approach the film from the mode of reception studies employed 
by Barbara Klinger in Melodrama and Meaning. In this text, Barbara Klinger outlines the 
historical and social processes by which Douglas Sirk came to be “politically canonized” and 
historicized as a “subversive political auteur” working within the commercial system of 
Hollywood (Klinger, xiii). Klinger engages in detailed archival research, in which she performs 
comparative discourse analyses of large samples of marketing materials, and review journalism 
produced over the course of the American promotion of Sirk’s films in multiple historical periods. 
By comparing the different ways in which Sirk’s films have been constructed in institutional and 
commercial contexts, Klinger exposes the multiple and shifting “ideological identities” of Sirk’s 
films and the broader historical and social processes that these identities reflect (xiiii). Klinger 
asserts that the canonization of Sirk’s films as “politically subversive” by many academics and 
cultural critics relies on an altogether over-simplistic causal relationship between interpretations 
of a film’s textual politics and the meaning and political function of the film-text (xiii). Through 
archival research, Klinger “seeks to provide a stronger historical dimension to questions of the 
relationship between [film-text] and ideology” by “recognizing the role external social and 
historical factors play in negotiating the cultural politics of [a film]” and the historical 
“variability” of these political meanings (xii). Rather than attempting to discern the true 
ideological “meaning” of the text, or, inversely, conclude that the text has no coherent meaning or 
ideological function, Klinger seeks to outline the ways in which Sirk’s films “…have been 
subject at every cultural turn to the particular uses to which various institutions and social 
circumstances [have] put them” (159)  
 Following Klinger’s methodological impulses, this research will describe some of the 
different “ideological identities” that have been ascribed to The Battle of Algiers over the course 
of its circulation and “political canonization” within American art-cinema markets. Focusing on 
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the film’s initial waves of American release, I have collected a range of materials that buttressed 
its promotion and reception. These materials include: articles about the film which circulated in 
the American trade press; campaign manuals, press-releases, and posters produced by Allied 
Artists for the film’s American distribution; the screening notes for the film’s premiere at the 
1967 New York Film Festival; and a large sampling of reviews and advertisements for the film 
that were published in the American popular press. These materials have been analyzed in an 
effort to outline the means by which the film was introduced to and constructed for American 
audiences over the course of the film's American circulation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
  Through comparative discourse analysis of this large selection of promotional materials 
and review journalism, I have revealed that distributors and critics encouraged American 
spectators to read The Battle of Algiers according to a series of specific protocols of 
interpretation. I have organized my analysis of these protocols into three chapters, each of which 
deals with a specific discursive trend which characterized the film’s American promotion and 
reception. In each chapter, I have furthermore contextualized the discursive trends outlined within 
the contemporaneous American geopolitical landscape.  
  The first chapter explores the ways in which the film was initially promoted to American 
audiences as a piece of Italian neorealism. By de-emphasizing the Algerian involvement in the 
film’s production and promoting the film as an auteurist achievement of cinematic realism, 
American distributors positioned the film as an artful, and politically neutral alternative to 
political propaganda. This promotional strategy furthermore hinged on a protocol of 
interpretation which promoted readings of the film as an indictment of violence “on both sides” 
of the Algerian war. As such, American distributors and critics effectively mediated the film’s 
anti-colonial politic, and carefully managed the imagined American spectator’s relationship to 
Algerian nationalisms. I then contextualize these discourses within contemporaneous Algerian-
American relations, and the historical realities of the Algerian War of Independence.  
 My second and third chapters explore the ways in which American distributors and film 
critics encouraged American audiences to read The Battle of Algiers as an allegory for some of 
America’s own imperialist projects. The second chapter explores the film’s promotion and 
reception in the context of the Vietnam War. It is apparent that over the course of the film’s initial 
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waves of American circulation, distributors encouraged American audiences to understand the 
film as a dramatization of the American invasion of Vietnam. While this specific protocol of 
interpretation allowed some critics to voice opposition to the war, more often than not, the “on 
both sides” protocols of interpretation was extended from the Algerian War of Independence to 
the Vietnam War, effectively policing the American spectator’s ability to identify, or sympathize, 
with North Vietnamese nationalisms. I then contextualize these discursive trends within the 
broader American media landscape surrounding the Vietnam War itself and emphasize the extent 
to which The Battle of Algiers contributed to the ideological naturalization of the American 
invasion of Vietnam, and furthermore to the demonization of anti-war protest movements.  
 My third chapter explores the film’s promotion in the context of the FBI’s Counter-
Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), wherein the film was routinely constructed for American 
audiences as a source of knowledge on the contemporaneous black-liberation movement. Playing 
directly off of fears regarding a coming black-American insurrection, Allied Artists promoted the 
film as a “Blueprint for Revolution”, and asserted that the film had been studied by militant 
black-nationalist political organizations like the Black Panther Party. The chapter contextualizes 
this specific aspect of the film's promotion within the broader media offensive against the Black 
Panther Party, and other black-nationalist organizations organized as part of COINTELPRO, 
asserting that in many ways the American distribution and reception of The Battle of Algiers 
worked in support of, rather than resistance to, the counter-intelligence initiatives against 
contemporaneous anti-colonial political movements. This chapter furthermore reflects on some of 
the problematic ways in which academic scholarship on The Battle of Algiers has effectively 
reproduced the distorted vision of the Black Panther Party’s legacy, and the realities of the Third 
Worldist movement more broadly, that were promoted by the film’s American distributors.  
 It should be clearly stated that my analysis of the discursive trends which characterized 
The Battle of Algiers’ entry into, and initial waves of circulation within, American art-cinema 
markets does not necessarily tell us how American audiences reacted to or understood the film. 
Indeed, when possible I have attempted to describe how various political organizations engaged 
with and mobilized the film in ways which directly contradict some of the discursive trends that 
characterize the film’s promotion and critical reception. However, as Karl Schoonover suggests, 
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an analysis of how films were promoted and critically received provides insight into “how a 
periods dominant discourses imagine reception, anticipate engagement, and in doing so, 
condition the sociopolitical remunerations of filmgoing” (71). As such, an analysis of the 
American promotion and critical reception of The Battle of Algiers helps to reveal how American 
culture industries have engaged with and constructed the historical realities of decolonization for 
American audiences.  
 
Developing Third Cinema as a Critical Practice  
Ultimately, while this methodological framework seeks to counter many of the discursive 
tendencies that have characterized scholarly writing on The Battle of Algiers, it also marks a 
return to some of the same fundamental theoretical concepts: namely, the notion of Third Cinema. 
However, this research will not approach Third Cinema as a system of taxonomy and 
categorization of films purely based on production methods or textual politics. Instead, I will look 
to Solanas and Getino’s manifesto because it offers important theoretical insights into the 
potential geopolitical functions of art-cinema markets themselves. Rather than using this 
document to articulate a specific set of anti-imperialist textual politics, I will focus on some of the 
theoretical reflections it offers on issues of circulation, distribution, and exhibition, and how these 
forces may impact and shape a film’s political meanings.  
 In doing so, I hope to respond to Mike Wayne’s call to “develop” Third Cinema as a 
“critical practice” (2).Wayne suggests that “one of the curious deficiencies of Third cinema 
theory has been its underdevelopment vis-à-vis First cinema (dominant, mainstream) and Second 
(art, authorial) (2). For Wayne, “to develop Third cinema theory is to try and illuminate its 
relations with and what is at stake in the differences between First, Second, and Third Cinema” 
and their relationships to one another (2). However, while Wayne roots his contribution to this 
project in an attempt to “pinpoint” the interactions between these three categories of cinema in 
the film-text itself “at the level of textual analysis”, this research will attempt to articulate the 
relationships between these three categories on the levels of distribution and exhibition.  
 A historical analysis of The Battle of Algiers’ initial waves of American circulation, and 
the discourses that have been produced over the course of its promotion and reception in US art-
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cinema markets, helps to elaborate on some of the complex ways in which the categories of First, 
Second, and Third cinema overlap in the contexts of distribution and exhibition. While The Battle 
of Algiers was undoubtedly produced as an expression of Algerian nationalism and anti-colonial 
internationalism, the potential political meanings that are embedded within the film-text itself 
have been drastically mediated by the various actors who have been involved in its screening in 
grassroots, institutional, and commercial contexts. Thus, regardless of whether or not one may 
classify the film as First, Second, or Third Cinema based on its textual politic, over the course of 
its circulation, the film has been exhibited in activist, institutional, and commercial contexts, and 
instrumentalized in the service of both Third Worldist and (neo)imperialist political projects. 
While many scholars have discussed this phenomena in relation to the Pentagon screening and 
understood it as an issue of appropriation, I will approach the problem of the film’s political 
instrumentalization in the American context on a decidedly more structural level. By embracing 
the ethos of Third Cinema theory, I will analyze The Battle of Algiers’ legacy of problematic 
political instrumentalization as a phenomenon that has been facilitated by and through the film’s 
circulation and discursive construction within American art-cinema markets.  
 Many of the issues raised by The Battle of Algiers’ American circulation elaborate on 
aspects of film distribution and exhibition that are outlined in “Towards a Third Cinema”. On one 
hand, Solanas and Getino note the stakes of cross-cultural transfer and commodification. They 
write: 
 The differences that exist between one and another liberation process make it    
 impossible to lay down supposedly universal norms. A cinema which in the    
 consumer society does not attain the level of the reality in which it moves can    
 play a stimulating role in an underdeveloped country, just as a revolutionary    
 cinema in the neocolonial situation will not necessarily be revolutionary if it is    
 mechanically taken to the metropolitan country. (244) 
Here, Solanas and Getino emphasize the relationship between contextual and textual cinematic 
meaning. They highlight the degree to which commercial networks of distribution within 
different geopolitical contexts, and especially those within the “consumer society”, “metropolitan 
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country”, or imperial core, may work to de- or re-politicize texts which serve revolutionary 
functions in other national contexts (244).  
 This reflection is particularly important to an analysis of The Battle of Algiers’ American 
legacy. While the film was intended to generate solidarity with the post-revolutionary Algerian 
state on an international scale, the first chapter of this research reveals the extent to which 
American distributors and critics often constructed the film in terms which effectively distorted 
the realities of the Algerian War of Independence, marginalized issues of national sovereignty, 
and undermined the legitimacy of the post-revolutionary Algerian state. In order to enter 
American art-cinema markets, The Battle of Algiers’ anti-colonial politic had to be mediated in 
the ideological service of post-war American expansionism. This history reveals the legitimacy of 
Solanas and Getino’s hesitancy around establishing “universal norms” regarding a specific 
cinematic production’s political functions. It also works to affirm some of their suspicions 
regarding the potential impacts that commercial routes of distribution may have on a film’s 
ideological message.   
 Furthermore, in their theorization of the “film-act”, Solanas and Getino emphasize the 
significant role that contexts of exhibition play in shaping the political meanings of a given film-
text. They suggest that alongside “the ideological message” of the film-text itself, the political 
usefulness of the film-medium resides in its capacity to “offer an effective pretext for gathering 
an audience” (239). Here, the actual contexts of exhibition play an important role in shaping the 
spectator’s relationship to the film-text, and thus the film’s political meanings:  
 …each projection of a film-act presupposes a different setting, since the space    
 where it takes place, the materials that go to make it up (actors-participants), and  the   
 historic time in which it takes place are never the same. This means that the result of each  
 projection act will depend on those who organize it, on those who  participate in it, and   
 on the time and place; the possibility of introducing variations, additions, and changes is   
 unlimited. The screening of a film-act will always express in one way or another the   
 historical situation in which it takes place.. (249) 
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The political function of “third cinema”, then, is not wholly contained within the text itself or 
reducible to a particular set of aesthetic or narrative strategies. It is furthermore not exclusively 
tied to a particular mode of production. Alongside these criteria, the anti-imperialist function of 
Third Cinema is enacted by the particular ways in which the film-text is constructed for and 
presented to an audience of people, who function as the ultimate historical agents of revolution.  
Solanas and Getino’s theorization of distribution networks and the “film-act” thus open up the 
possibilities of a single film-text producing multiple, and even divergent, ideological meanings or 
political functions, within the same historical context.  
 This notion of the “film-act” will become particularly relevant in the second and third 
chapters of this research. These chapters reveal that the film was indeed mobilized by various 
sectors of the American Third Worldist left over the course of its initial waves of circulation for 
explicitly anti-imperialist purposes. For many community and political organizations, The Battle 
of Algiers served as a useful teaching tool for garnering support for both the anti-war and black-
liberation movements. However, over the course of this period, the film was simultaneously 
constructed by American distributors and film critics as a source of knowledge on these political 
movements themselves. Within its commercial contexts of exhibition, the film was promoted and 
reviewed in largely sensationalist and alarmist terms. These promotional strategies and protocols 
of interpretation resulted in the film functioning as a highly-visible cultural reference point which 
was routinely mobilized in the American news media’s attempts to construct domestic anti-
colonial and anti-imperialist political movements as alternately naive, irrational, and violence-
prone.  
 Solanas and Getino’s articulation of Third Cinema suggests that alongside textual politics, 
issues of film distribution, exhibition, and reception are integral to understanding a given film-
text’s ability to intervene in the ideological dynamics of imperialism. Indeed, it is not difficult to 
draw clear connections between the theoretical impulses of scholars like Barbara Klinger, who 
advocate for reception studies and more socio-historically situated modes of film and media 
studies, and Solanas and Getino’s emphasis on “the cine-act” as the process by which films come 
to make meaning. A historical analysis of the initial waves of The Battle of Algiers’ American 
distribution and reception will elaborate on Solanas and Getino’s claims about the potential 
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effects that the “time-less” and “history-less” worlds of commodification and “bourgeois” art 
may have on a given film’s anti-imperialist textual politic (241).  
 By outlining the discourses that have buttressed The Battle of Algiers’ entrance and 
circulation within American film-markets, and furthermore its political canonization within 
American film-culture, this research will outline the distinct and varied ideological functions that 
the film has served in the American context. The films’ initial waves of American distribution can 
be characterized by a persistent and ongoing struggle to define the film’s meaning, and, by 
extension, to either confront or naturalize the realities of American imperialism. The readings 
promoted by American distributors and film critics routinely conflicted with the uses that the film 
was put to by anti-colonial political organizations, community groups, and cultural centres, and 
as such the film functioned as a site of discursive contestation. This research positions the film’s 
American circulation as a site of struggle between two competing visions of humanism and 
globalism - one defined by internationalist ethos of anti-colonialism, and the other by the 
expansionist aspirations of liberal capitalism.  
 However, particular focus will be paid to the specific ways in which the film’s American 
distributors and critics sought to construct its anti-colonial politic. I will furthermore regularly 
situate these discourses within the often symbiotic relationship that exists between private-sector 
commerce, news media, and imperial state power. In doing so, this research will elaborate on 
some of the ideological contours and geopolitical functions that have historically characterized 
American art-cinema industries themselves. In this way, I hope to contribute to the broader 
scholarly effort to understand the geopolitical dimensions of global art-cinema industries.  As 10
transnational networks shaped by a mixture of commercial, institutional, and socio-cultural 
forces, art-cinema industries have played a significant role in facilitating the global circulation of 
images and ideas. However, it is simultaneously important to emphasize the degree to which the 
forms of inter-cultural exchange facilitated by global art-cinema industries have been shaped by 
the spatial, social, and economic power dynamics of both historical and contemporary 
imperialisms. As such, the analysis of the institutional, commercial, and cultural networks of 
 See, for instance, Andrew, 2013; Betz, 2009; Dennison and Lim, 2006; Dickinson, 2016; Galt and Schoonover, 10
2010; Giovacchini and Skylar, 1997; Kötzing and Moine, 2017; Schoonover, 2012; Segrave, 2014; Tweedie, 2013; 
Wasson, 2005. 
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global art-cinema industries can “[expose] the otherwise unseen geopolitical fault lines” of an 
increasingly globalized capitalism, and the various socio-cultural realities it has produced (Galt 
and Schoonover, 3). This research will contribute to this body of scholarship by analyzing the 
specific terms by which the American art-cinema industry his historically mediated images of 
anti-colonial nationalisms for American audiences, and thus attempted to shape popular opinion 
on the geopolitical process of decolonization itself.  
 At the core of this project is a desire to unpack the potential functions that art-cinema 
networks have historically served in facilitating maintenance of, or resistance to, American 
imperialism - both economically and ideologically. I aim to reveal the commercial, geopolitical, 
and social processes that dictate the contours of Euro-American cinephilic cultures, and to 
contextualize the means by which “foreign” media has been distributed, exhibited, constructed, 
and historicized in the American cultural context. In this way, I am also seeking to contribute to 
the body of scholarship which has sought to outline the roles that cinematic technologies have 
played in establishing and maintaining American military and economic power. Lee Grieveson’s 
Cinema and the Wealth of Nations: Media, Capital, and the Liberal World System stands as a 
significant example. In this text, Grieveson engages in in-depth historical research to analyze how 
film and media have been used by elite institutions to “establish and facilitate” a liberal and neo-
colonial global economic system (5). I am similarly inspired by the theoretical prompt outlined in 
the Grieveson and Haidee Wasson’s anthology Cinema’s Military Industrial Complex, which 
elaborates on the various roles that cinema technologies have played in the development and 
maintenance of American military hegemony (2018). Following the leads established by these 
scholars, this research aspires to develop their specific concerns regarding American economic 
and military power with specific regard to art-cinema industries. As a key industrial infrastructure 
involved in the import, promotion, and exhibition of “foreign” media in the American context, 
what roles have art-cinema networks played in the maintenance of a highly-militarized global 
liberal political economy on both an ideological and industrial level?  
 It should be clearly stated that this research is not attempting to in anyway undermine the 
important political intervention that The Battle of Algiers represented. It is moreover not an 
indictment of the political strategies pursued by the various creative forces behind the film’s 
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production, or an attempt to suggest that these actors should have done something differently. A 
great deal of criticism has already been produced which either implicitly or explicitly frames 
certain aspects of the film’s aesthetic or narrative strategies, its methods of production, or the 
decision to distribute the film commercially, as political mistakes or shortcomings. 
Notwithstanding the undoubtedly legitimate and politically useful reflections that have been 
generated by this kind of criticism, this research shifts the focus, and indeed the onus of 
responsibility, away from the film’s authorial agents, if only for a moment - be it Pontecorvo, 
Yacef, or the post-revolutionary Algerian state. As a vivid representation of colonial exploitation, 
anti-colonial resistance, organized political violence, and imperialist counter-insurgency, the 
American reception and promotion of The Battle of Algiers will function as a useful site of 
analysis for understanding the complex relationship between art-cinema industries, the cinephilic 
cultures they produce, and the ideological imperatives of either imperial state power or 
revolutionary dissent in different historical contexts. Ultimately this research will explore the 
questionable decisions, and indeed the social and political responsibilities, of the people who 
have imported, marketed, (re)-released, reviewed, researched, and historicized The Battle of 
Algiers, and thus substantially shaped the film’s global impact. 
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Chapter One: 
Propaganda or Neorealism? The Battle of Algiers’ American Distribution and the Question 
of Algerian Nationalism  
In this chapter, I will outline the discursive framework which buttressed The Battle of Algiers’ 
entrance into, and initial circulation within, American film markets. Within this initial period of 
circulation, a promotional template was established which carefully mediated the relationship 
between the film’s images of Algerian nationalism and the imagined American spectator. By 
framing the film as a piece of Italian neorealism, and actively distinguishing it as an artful, 
objective, and realistic alternative to political propaganda, American distributors and film critics 
established a set of promotional discourses and interpretive protocols which framed the film’s 
images of anti-colonial revolution as pleas for extra-national adjudication. Within this paradigm, 
The Battle of Algiers was not so much framed as a rallying cry for Third Worldist or anti-colonial 
solidarity, but as a prompt for the American spectator to take up a decidedly ambivalent position 
regarding Algerian nationalism. In many ways, these promotional strategies and interpretive 
protocols reflected the American government’s economic and diplomatic relationship with post-
revolutionary Algeria. As such, an analysis of the marketing campaigns and review journalism 
which buttressed the film during this initial period of American circulation can help to reveal 
some of the ideological contours of the contemporaneous American film culture.   
 
Algerian or Italian, Propaganda or Neorealism? 
The Battle of Algiers was first mentioned in the American trade press directly after it premiered, 
and received the Golden Lion, at the 1966 Venice Film Festival.  A review appearing in the 
September 7th, 1966 edition of Variety introduced the film to the American industry. As “the first 
feature film ever made in Algiers by Algerians”, The Battle of Algiers was framed as a kind of 
promotional conundrum (Hawk, 6). The author described the film as, “a very special item due to 
theme and treatment, its sales points are political (with leftwing backing assured because of its 
paean to revolutions and revolutionaries) […] but it will need plenty of sell to move it into ampler 
fields” (6). American distributors subsequently took on this very task of marketing the film to the 
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“ampler fields” of audiences located outside the ideological confines of the left. In large part, this 
meant that they had to find a way to properly manage the film’s relationship to Algerian 
nationalism, in terms of both the film’s production history and its representation of anti-colonial 
revolution.  
 In practice, the impulse to mediate the film’s images of and relationship to Algerian 
nationalism was articulated within the American trade press as a need to distance the film from 
the decidedly pejorative label of “propaganda”. A 1967 BoxOffice article clearly articulated the 
problem the film posed for its American distributors, noting that “the [category] of political 
propaganda […] [has] not been [a] strong [draw] in the past”, and as such, The Battle of Algiers 
has “a limited market and a severe obstacle to overcome” (“Foreign Language Feature Reviews”, 
10). Over the course of the film’s American circulation, a variety of discursive strategies would 
be developed to reconstruct The Battle of Algiers as an artful alternative to political propaganda. 
These discourses promoted protocols of spectatorship and interpretation which profoundly 
mediated the film’s anti-colonial politic for American audiences.  
 Perhaps the most straightforward way in which American distributors sought to 
distinguish the film from propaganda was by downplaying the roles that the Algerian state and 
co-producer and co-writer Saadi Yacef played in both the inception and production of the film.  
The aforementioned Variety and BoxOffice articles are some of the only references to The Battle 
of Algiers as an Algerian co-production in either the American trade or popular press until the 
mid-1970s.  While the film was credited as a co-production between Igor Films and Casbah 11
Films in the program for the New York Film Festival, where the film made its American premiere 
in September of 1967, over the course of its subsequent waves of theatrical release, the Algerian 
 There are only four other instances in which the film’s status as a co-production is discussed in the American trade 11
or popular press. One is an article in the December 28th, 1966 edition of Variety in which the author discusses the 
French delegations’ protest against film’s premiere at the Venice Film Festival (“Hateful to France,” 1966). The 
second appears in the August 30th, 1967 edition of Variety, in which the author notes that “although the credits in 
Venice called it the co-production of Musu’s Igor Films and the Algerian Casbah Films, Musu makes a fine 
distinction between co-participation and coproduction”, and that “at the time of filming [Musu] said Algeria had 
comparatively no film industry based on western standards.” (Frederick, 18). The last mention of Algerian 
involvement in the film’s production outside critic Howard Clurman’s review for The Nation in which he suggests 
that the film “creates the impression of total objectivity”, but asserts that “folks with a particular political bias will 
contradict this” before noting that “a partisan journalist told me that […] the Algerians had contributed not only their 
land but funds to the film’s making” (348). Pauline Kael also noted that the film was an Algerian co-production in 
her 1973 review of the film for The New Yorker (208).
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production company was left uncredited.  Saadi Yacef’s role in developing the film’s screenplay 12
was also ignored in American markets. Yacef did not receive a writing credit in either the 
program notes of the New York Film Festival, or the Allied Artists campaign manual for the film.  
 American distributors furthermore mitigated the propaganda label by promoting the film 
through a dual emphasis on auteurism and cinematic realism. While the film was initially 
introduced to the American industry as a “feature made in Algiers by Algerians,” over the course 
of its American circulation it was primarily constructed as the product of Pontecorvo’s artistic 
genius. Within this context, the Algerian contribution to the film’s production was primarily re-
cast as a product of Pontecorvo’s dedicated commitment to cinematic realism.  
 Indeed, the BoxOffice article anticipates the extent to which discourses of auteurism and 
cinematic realism could be used to effectively downplay the Algerianness of the film’s 
production. The article notes that American “distributors […] are playing up the fact that there is 
no newsreel footage at all in this impressive recreation of Algiers’ struggle for independence and 
that literally the whole city and its populace played themselves in the movie” (10).  While the 13
large-scale recreations of public bombings, demonstrations, and military operations featured in 
the film were primarily facilitated through the logistical and infrastructural support offered by the 
Algerian state (which was furthermore primarily coordinated through Casbah Films), the 
BoxOffice article attributes them primarily to Pontecorvo’s “masterful filmmaking”, and his 
 Casbah Films is not credited in the 1968 campaign manuals produced for the film by Allied Artists. They are 12
furthermore not mentioned in any of the promotional materials, press releases, review journalism, or academic film 
studies produced on the film from the period - as either a co-producer or “co-participant”. In his research on the 
film's production history, David Forgacs has asserted that “the American print [of The Battle of Algiers] did not even 
mention Casbah Films or give a production credit to Yacef” (355). Forgacs has furthermore outlined the economic 
dimensions of Casbah Film’s marginalization in the American distribution of the film. Forgacs outlines “a series of 
underhand moves by the US distributors and Igor Film” that took place over the course of The Battle of Algiers’ 
American circulation, “whereby they effectively appropriated the film for themselves and pocketed earnings that 
should have accrued to Casbah Films” (355). He goes on to note that “these operations were eventually stopped 
when Casbah Films took legal action, as a result of which it was granted, in 1998, world distribution rights for the 
film in all territories apart from Italy, where Igor Films retained the rights” (356). 
 Thus, the infamous and often-cited title card included in the film’s opening credits, which assures audiences that 13
“NOT ONE FOOT of newsreel or documentary film has been used” in the film’s depiction of anti-colonial 
revolution, was not added to the film out of necessity - as so many critics, cultural commentators, and film historians 
have suggested (see, for instance, Baratieri, 17; Bignardi, 20; Celli,: 52; Cliento, 80; Clò, 208; Daulatzai, 38; Dowd, 
26;  Moruzzi, 265; O’Leary, 18; Panchasi, 343; Pauly, 35; Rainer, 1; Riegler, 48; Slocum, 25; Stam, 10; Virtue, 323; 
and Whitfield, 251). It was instead an addition made to the film as part of a broader marketing strategy conceived of 
by American distributors who understood the potential commercial and critical appeal of claims to heightened 
cinematic realism.
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ability to achieve the “amazing feat of bringing to film a realistic and dramatic telling of actual 
events” (10).   14
 The Allied Artists’ campaign manual for the film similarly transmuted the Algerian 
participation in the film’s production into auteurist discourses of cinematic realism. The manual 
primarily framed the film as the product of “fifteen years of [Pontecorvo’s] film achievement”, 
wherein the “complete authenticity” of The Battle of Algiers’ recreation of the Algerian War of 
Independence was understood as part of the director’s career-long trajectory from political 
documentaries to feature-length productions (2). The manual furthermore emphasized the 
“extensive preparation” Pontecorvo undertook prior to shooting the film, and the years of 
research the director engaged in - in which “thousands of eye-witness accounts, documents, and 
photographs were gone over to produce an account, profuse with details of true incidents” which 
Pontecorvo and Franco Solanis then transformed into an “original and spectacular film story” (2). 
Saadi Yacef’s role in initiating the project, and writing the memoirs on which the film’s 
screenplay was largely based, were left undiscussed, as was the infrastructural and financial 
support offered to the production by the Algerian state.  
 Yacef did make an appearance in the Allied Artists campaign manual. A proposed review 
template featured in the manual is entitled “Actual Rebel Leader Has Key Role in ‘The Battle of 
Algiers’” (2). However, within Allied Artists’ vision of the film, Yacef’s participation in the 
production was understood as the result of Pontecorvo’s artistic decision to use non-professional 
actors - yet another testament to the director’s uncompromising commitment to authenticity (2).  
 While the film was undoubtedly in part the product of Pontecorvo’s artistic vision, the 
complete erasure of the Algerian role in initiating the project, developing the film’s screenplay, 
and facilitating the film’s production, is troubling. Within this discursive landscape, the film was 
no longer understood as a product of leftist internationalism between Pontecorvo’s team, Casbah 
Films, and the post-revolutionary Algerian state, but an act of individual artistic expression that 
was decidedly Italian. Following a neocolonial logic, American distributors reduced the various 
Algerian people and institutions who contributed to the film’s production to discoveries 
 In an interview with Nicholas Harrison for Interventions, Saadi Yacef estimated that the total financial value of the 14
equipment, props, and location rentals that the Algerian state offered the production “would come to millions of 
dollars” (406)
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unearthed by Pontecorvo in his quest for authentic cinematic realism. The emphasis on 
Pontecorvo-as-auteur thus effectively mitigated the supposedly potentially propagandistic 
qualities that the film retained as an expression of Algerian nationalism enacted by Algerian 
subjects and helped to facilitate the film’s entrance in American markets.  
 Despite the need to downplay the film’s material relationships to the FLN and the 
Algerian state, and thus distinguish the film from “propaganda”, the Box Office article concludes 
that the film’s sympathetic portrayal of the FLN is “one of the bones of controversy which might 
aid in the film’s promotional value” (10). Indeed, American distributors were keenly aware of the 
extent to which the film’s multi-dimensional depiction of Algerian revolutionaries would spark 
intrigue amongst American audiences. The Allied Artists’ campaign manual emphasized the fact 
that the film’s “authentic” depiction “of one of the most newsworthy and significant revolts of 
modern times, places the film in a unique category” (5). The manual goes on to instruct 
exhibitors to “capitalize in every way possible” on the film’s “hot and provocative” depiction of 
anti-colonial revolution (5).  
 Thus, from the onset the film was promoted according to a simultaneous emphasis and 
disavowal of its anti-colonial politic. Discourses of cinematic realism and Pontecorvo as auteur 
would function to distance the film from “propaganda” - a label which the Algerianness of the 
production, and proximity to the FLN apparently necessitated. However, the film’s engagement 
with the politics of decolonization, and its visualization of Algerian revolutionaries, would still 
function to generate controversy which, if correctly managed, could make the film commercially 
viable.  
 In practice, this promotional schema rooted in an emphasis on the film’s Italianness, 
auteurism, and pseudo-documentary realism resulted in The Battle of Algiers being routinely 
framed for American audiences as a piece of Italian neorealism. The screening notes which 
accompanied the film’s premiere at the New York Film Festival claimed that “The Battle of 
Algiers […] brings back to the cinema an epic quality one hasn't seen since the days of Open 
City” (15). The festival furthermore lauded Pontecorvo for his artistry and political commitment, 
claiming that with the Algerian revolution, the director had “found a subject big enough to 
recreate a neorealist cinema [freed] from all propaganda and sentimentality” (15). Assertions of 
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the film’s status as neorealist and direct comparisons to Rossellini’s Rome, Open City (1945) 
were frequent throughout the film’s initial waves of promotional and critical reception.  A 15
review published in The Guardian which rehearses the comparison to Rome Open City was 
furthermore reprinted in a 1968 Allied Artists press-release entitled, “Review Quotes: Critical 
Acclaim for ‘The Battle of Algiers’”. In this review, the author notes that while “one may have 
thought” that the “neorealist current” was “dead and buried”, The Battle of Algiers “proves that it 
was only biding its time, waiting for a subject big enough to revive it” (2).  
 The film’s immediate association with Italian neorealism is significant. While the specific 
breed of institutionalized film culture that characterized post-war America was dependent on the 
domestic distribution of films from many Western European nations and Japan, the import of 
Italian neorealism remains one of the most significant contributions to the American art-cinema 
markets for foreign films (Balio, 2010; Brennan 2011; Schoonover, 2012; Sklar, 2011; Willinsky, 
2000). By referencing a film cycle that had already been embraced by American markets, 
distributors could lean on an established framework of promotional and critical protocols in order 
to render The Battle of Algiers’ images of anti-colonial revolution legible and familiar to 
audiences. The category of neorealism allowed distributors to effectively meet the criteria 
necessary to make the film commercially viable. It distinguished the film from the dubious 
category of political propaganda by emphasizing the film’s Italianness, its cinematic realism, and 
its status as the product of individual and masterful artistic expression.  
  
The “Two-Pronged” Approach to Marketing Neorealism  
In order to further unpack the significance of The Battle of Algiers’ categorization as neorealist 
within American film markets, I will look to Karl Schoonover’s Brutal Vision: The Neorealist 
Body in Postwar Italian Cinema. This is because of the extent to which Schoonover’s text clearly 
prioritizes the geopolitical dimensions of this specific moment of inter-cultural and economic 
exchange. Schoonover describes how the discourses that were used to promote Italian neorealism 
within post-war American markets were structured by an ideological imperative to normalize the 
 See Crowther, 1967; Crowther, 1967; Dorn, 1967; Gardiner, 1967; Kauffman, 1967; Knight, 1967; Morgenstern 15
1967; and Simon, 1967.
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new economic arrangements of the American economy and North Atlantic community. The 
central problematic of Schoonover’s analysis is the way in which these discourses positioned 
Italian public life as a virtual geopolitical space under the “far reaching subjective authority” of 
the post-war American subject, and effectively marginalized issues of national sovereignty and 
normalized an increasingly interventionist American foreign policy (xvii).  
 Schoonover’s emphasis on issues of national sovereignty and foreign intervention allow 
his text to function as a useful tool for unpacking the ideological and geopolitical implications of 
marketing The Battle of Algiers’ images of anti-colonial revolution according to the promotional 
template of Italian neorealism. Indeed, while Schoonover’s text focuses on the ideological 
dimensions of the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he emphasizes the 
extent to which “European reconstruction was used as a template for the later large-scale 
humanitarian aid structures of neocolonialism” (xviii). He positions “the culture of humanitarian 
charity” established in post-war America as a direct precursor to the ideological mechanisms that 
would later normalize the neocolonial trade agreements, transnational NGOs, and military 
interventions that would come to structure the nation’s relationship with much of the world over 
the course of the late twentieth-century and beyond (xxv). As one of the first cinematic depictions 
of anti-colonial revolution to circulate in post-war American markets, and moreover one that was 
explicitly constructed as a continuation of the neorealist tradition, the promotion and reception of 
The Battle of Algiers can provide insight into how the institutionalized cultures of American post-
war liberal humanism responded to the period of decolonization, and the rise of Third Worldist 
nationalisms.  
 Indeed, in many respects the promotion and critical reception of The Battle of Algiers 
closely mimicked the dynamics of the post-war American import of Italian neorealism, as 
described by Schoonover. Schoonover outlines a “two-pronged” promotional strategy which 
characterizes the American distribution of Italian neorealism (81). On one hand, American 
distributors of Italian neorealism emphasized the films’ artistic and social significance. As 
Schoonover notes, publicity campaigns for neorealist films regularly constructed them as “artistic 
achievements” which illustrated both the “beauty of aesthetic classicism, and the redeeming 
social function of cinema” (84).  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 The Allied Artists campaign manual for the film places a similar emphasis on The Battle 
of Algiers’ artistic, cultural, and social merit. A reprint of a Variety article entitled “Year-End 
‘Best Pictures’ Picks” featured on the first page of the manual emphasizes the extent of the film’s 
critical acclaim in the American context (see Fig. 1). A review template included in the manual 
furthermore outlines a description of the film primarily based on recounting the numerous awards 
“garnered by the internationally-honoured film” (2).  
 Allied Artists’ posters and advertisements for the film furthermore emphasized the film’s 
artistry and social significance. Advertisement templates included in the campaign manual 
highlight the film’s Academy Award nominations and feature pull-quotes which describe the film 
as “the most […] meaningful […] film in years”, “the best of its kind”, both “important” and 
“beautiful” (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 3). An advertisement in the Nov 12th, 1967 edition of the New 
York Times, amongst other publications, similarly exclaims that the film is “so important it was 
selected to open the 1967 New York Film Festival”, and “the most universally acclaimed motion 
picture of the year!” (see Fig. 4). This general emphasis on The Battle of Algiers’ artistic, and 
social significance was reinforced in much of the review journalism produced on the film. 
Charles Champlin of the Los Angeles Times suggested that the film showed the extent to which 
“film can be a force in society” (59). R.H. Gardiner asserted that the film’s pronounced “artistic 
significance” “distinguishes it from any other” (95). Norman K. Dorn of The San Francisco 
Examiner similarly claimed that the film was “being hailed as among cinema’s 
masterpieces” (142).  
 More often than not, the artistic and social significance of The Battle of Algiers was 
articulated in terms of its ability to offer audiences access to historical knowledge and a 
cosmopolitan awareness of world events. This aspect of the film’s American distribution also 
parallels that of the American import of Italian neorealism. Schoonover emphasizes the extent to 
which American distributors engaged in a concerted effort to endow the act of watching Italian 
neorealist films with a pronounced “geopolitical weight” (103). Building off of discourses 
regarding film’s supposedly universal legibility that had circulated extensively in post-war 
American film culture, American distributors attempted to posit Italian neorealist films as a 
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central mechanism through which American spectators could exercise the humanitarian and 
cosmopolitan sensibilities central to post-war globalism (Schoonover, 103). 
  For Schoonover, the specific protocols of spectatorship imagined by the American 
distributors who oversaw the circulation of Italian neorealist films in American markets 
fundamentally reflected the liberal humanist ideologies that supported post-war American 
expansionism. Enacted through the large-scale aid represented by the Marshall Plan, and the 
establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other transnational NGOs, the 
emergence and expansion of what Victoria de Grazia has termed the “market empire” of 
commodity capitalism required a level of foreign intervention that was historically unprecedented 
(Grazia, 3; Schoonover, xvii). This period marked not only a dramatic shift in American foreign 
policy, but a fundamental reorganization of Euro-American economies into a North Atlantic 
community (Schoonover, xvii). Such a large-scale geopolitical and economic transition contained 
a corresponding ideological project, one which called “for a new way of knowing the world that 
more accurately [mirrored] its global character” (Schoonover, xviii).  
 Thus, the institutionalization of an American film culture organized around the import and 
exhibition of foreign films was undergirded by an ideological imperative to normalize the new 
economic arrangements of the American economy and North Atlantic community (Schoonover, 
xviii). In the immediate postwar period, a diverse range of “Hollywood lobbyists, policy makers, 
fledgling film society organizers, industry journalists, independent exhibitors, educators” and 
theatre owners, organized their distinct professional and financial investments in the American 
import and export of films around a unified set of discursive strategies (29). From their respective 
commercial and institutional contexts, these actors “argued that cinema’s cross-cultural 
comprehensibility, ease of circulation through existing global networks of exchange, and essential 
realism ensured its status as the medium best able to expand world understanding” (94) Cinema 
was positioned as the ideal ideological and cultural tool for the “reimagining [of] transnational 
interdependencies” necessitated by post-war economics (94).  
 American distributors sought to position Italian neorealism as an important contribution to 
this process. They routinely emphasized the act of spectating neorealist films as not only an 
intellectual and socially-redeeming pursuit, but furthermore an inherently cosmopolitan 
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endeavour which marked the fulfillment of a new geopolitical responsibility of the “emblematic 
postwar humanist” (Schoonover, xvii).  
 Several aspects of the American distribution and reception of The Battle of Algiers can be 
seen as a direct continuation of this attempt to emphasize film-going as an intellectual pursuit 
with specifically geopolitical consequences. New York Times critic Bosley Crowther opened his 
review of the film by suggesting that “recent history is groaning with material that is begging to 
be pictorially analyzed”, and that “the public, more visually oriented than it has been […] is avid 
to be enlightened and informed” (15). He asserted that The Battle of Algiers meets this specific 
demand for historical enlightenment, and that the film is “powerful” in its ability to “tautly 
[involve] the audience in a sense of kinship with contemporary events” (15). Crowther concluded 
his article by asserting that the film was a must-see for any viewers with “humanitarian 
sympathies” (15). In his Life magazine article, which was furthermore re-printed in the Allied 
Artists campaign manual, Maurice Rapf emphasized that the “subject” of The Battle of Algiers 
was “history, not movie stars”, and the “[pertinence]” of the film’s “examination of violence” to 
the contemporary moment (6). Harold Clurman of The Nation similarly highlighted the film’s 
status as a source of historical and cosmopolitan knowledge, claiming that it was a “masterpiece” 
that was “much more an expression of our day than most of the plays we see in the 
theatre” (348). Stanley Eichelbaum of The San Francisco Examiner furthermore suggested that 
“there has never been a more astonishing film record of history than The Battle of Algiers” (37). 
Arthur Knight of the Saturday Review similarly claimed that “in Pontecorvo, the screen has 
discovered an exciting new historian”, a review which Allied Artists later incorporated into an 
official press release on the film (75)  
 The status of The Battle of Algiers as a potential source of historical knowledge which 
would appeal to the cosmopolitan sensibilities of American audiences was furthermore directly 
emphasized in the Allied Artists campaign manual. The manual constructs the film as a source of 
knowledge on “one of the most newsworthy and significant revolts of modern times”, and that as 
such, the film “is a history lesson in itself” (5). It furthermore advocates for exhibitors to market 
the film in ways which amplify its historical and geopolitical significance. The manual suggests 
that theatre-owners, “work with a local authority, such as a well known professor of political 
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science, to appear on appropriate [radio and TV] programs to discuss or debate the struggle for 
independence that is so effectively dramatized in the film” (5). It also instructed exhibitors to 
“invite department heads of local colleges and high schools to special screenings “in an effort to 
“encourage classroom discussion and lectures on” the film (5).  
 The urgency with which watching the film was constructed as a geopolitical responsibility 
of the American spectator is furthermore exhibited by Allied Artists’ claim that “the happenings 
in The Battle of Algiers, in many ways parallel events taking place in the world today, in our 
country, and very possibility in your city as well” (5). This specific aspect of the film’s 
distribution history will be discussed at length in the following chapters, but for now it is 
important to emphasize the extent to which Allied Artists sought to construct the film as a means 
by which American audiences could, and indeed should, expand their understandings of world 
history and current events.  
 On the other hand, while watching The Battle of Algiers was promoted as a decidedly 
serious, and socially-redeeming pursuit, American distributors simultaneously emphasized the 
extent to which the film offered spectators graphic and disturbing images of violence. This aspect 
of the film’s legacy again mirrors the dynamics outlined by Schoonover. Schoonover notes that, 
while American distributors framed Italian neorealism in terms of its relevance to “humanitarian 
concerns” and “global communalism”, they simultaneously emphasized the “salacious character 
of these imported films”, and the “shocking” images of “imperiled bodies” and infrastructural 
destruction they offered American spectators (71).  
 The American distribution and critical reception of The Battle of Algiers recreates this 
discursive dynamic, as the film’s supposedly exceptional mode of cinematic realism was 
routinely constructed in terms that emphasized the shocking and violent nature of its imagery. As 
The Baltimore Sun phrased it, the “nuclear blast” of The Battle of Algiers made “Roberto 
Rossellini’s ‘Open City’ [seem like] mere T.N.T.” (Gardiner, 95).  
 Indeed, while the Allied Artists campaign manual dedicated a significant amount of space 
to asserting the film’s artistic and historical significance, it furthermore featured an abundance of 
graphic descriptions of the film’s more violent sequences. The synopsis provided for the film 
highlights sequences in which “bombs are exploded in bars, airports, and nightclubs killing many 
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civilians” and French soldiers “explode a bomb in the Arab quarter, destroying a number of 
houses and killing men, women, and children” (1). Furthermore, a still featured in the manual 
which depicts a French soldier torturing an Algerian man is accompanied by a tagline which 
promises that “information is needed quickly in The Battle of Algiers, and at times, French 
paratroopers resort to the most terrible of means” (see Fig. 5). A section entitled “‘Battle of 
Algiers’ Recreates Stirring Revolt” similarly highlighted that film “graphically [recreates]” the 
“manhunt” that was conducted by French paratroopers “without pity” (2).  
 This emphasis on the films graphic depictions of violence and shock-value were 
furthermore rehearsed in much of the review journalism on the film. The review by Maurice Rapf 
for Life, that was later re-printed in the Allied Artists campaign manual, asserted that, despite not 
using “one frame of actual documentary film footage”, the film was “explosively real” (4). Time 
magazine similarly asserted that the film had “the impact of a bombe plastique” (104). This quote 
was subsequently transformed into a tag-line for the film in the magazine’s movie listings, 
wherein the film was described as having “the brutal impact of a bombe plastique” (“Time 
Listings” 4).  
 Proclamations about the film’s shock-value were often accompanied by detailed 
descriptions of its graphic depictions of political violence and torture. Writing for New Republic, 
Stanley Kauffman produced an involved description of the film’s brutality, noting that “bombings 
and killing are easy to control with sleight-of-eye” and that violent sequences are composed of 
“razor-thin editing that stops just before you see what you think you see - and then snaps on the 
dead bodies so swiftly that you are convinced you saw them shattered” (19). Bosley Crowther 
asserted that the film’s scenes of torture were “as pictorially authentic and dramatically 
convincing as anyone could wish” (15). Writing for TakeOne, Patrick Macfadden asserted that 
“the screen almost bursts into flame” when depicting the “particularly horrible atrocities” and 
“mangled [bodies]” produced by the war. (25-26). Brendan Gill of the New Yorker suggested that 
the film “[achieved] miracles of verisimilitude” in its depiction of, “dust and heat and violent 
death” (93). Kevin Thomas of the Los Angeles Times similarly applauded the film’s “flawless 
simulation of bombings, mass rioting, and incidental street fighting” as “awesome” (65).  
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 The allure of the films’ realistic depiction of revolutionary and military violence was 
furthermore emphasized in the visual materials produced by Allied Artists to promote the film. A 
selection of poster and advertisement templates included in the Allied Artists campaign manual 
hinge on various versions of an image of a mass of protestors charging into a battalion of French 
soldiers (see Fig. 6). Several posters include a photographic still of an aerial shot which details 
many protestors that have been killed or wounded. The presence of a tank suggests that this is 
only the beginning of what will undoubtedly be a highly destructive and violent conflict, as the 
tagline promises the American spectator an inside look at “The Revolt that Stirred the 
World!” (see Fig. 6).  
 An insert included in many of the poster templates which highlights the key figures of the 
film’s narrative, similarly promises an array of violent imagery. An image of Colonel Mathieu 
(Jean Martin) is introduced as, “The French Colonel, who was forced even to torture!” (see Fig.
6). An image of Fathia (Samia Kerbash) the woman who is most extensively depicted in the oft-
cited sequence in which Algerian women plant bombs in the French quarters of Algiers, is 
accompanied by a tagline which warns American audiences that she is “one of many women who 
stopped at nothing to win!” (Fig. 6).  
 Thus, while American distributors sought to frame The Battle of Algiers in terms of its 
social, artistic, and cultural value, they simultaneously engaged in a method of promotion more 
firmly rooted in a more exploitative emphasis on its violent imagery. In many ways this 
promotional strategy parallels those used to promote Italian neorealism amongst American 
audiences. Indeed, many scholars have outlined the extent to which Italian neorealism, amongst 
other European film cycles, was often marketed on the basis of its sexually explicit and violent 
imagery, rather than its artistic or cultural merit (Balio, 2010; Betz, 2003; Brennan, 2011; 
Elsaesser, 1994; Ray, 1985; Schoonover, 2012; Wilinsky, 2000). However, in his specific account 
of this phenomenon, Schoonover asserts that, in the context of the American import of Italian 
neorealism, these two seemingly contradictory frameworks for film promotion are most usefully 
considered as part of a single “two-pronged” marketing approach (72).  
 For Schoonover, over the course of the American import of Italian neorealism, distributors 
“relied on the term realism and its associations to commingle what had previously been assumed 
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to be distinct, inflexible, and opposing categories of spectatorial engagement” (72). American 
distributors developed promotional campaigns which knowingly, “[invited] two gazes at once”, a 
mix of “the socially concerned contemplative gaze of art cinema and the sensationalist 
voyeuristic gaze of exploitation cinema” (71). Within this paradigm, the titillation offered by 
neorealism’s sexually-explicit and violent imagery combines with the discursive emphasis on the 
film’s historical and social significance, and is translated as a sense of historical immediacy 
(Schoonover, 72). For Schoonover, the American import of Italian neorealism produced 
marketing discourses which promoted a “new politics of engagement”, whereby “neorealism’s 
spectacular displays of violence were figured as productive sites where Americans could glimpse 
their own widening moral responsibilities for the North Atlantic community” (72). In practice, 
this dual emphasis on both the intellectual and titillating qualities of neorealist filmmaking 
resulted in marketing campaigns and review journalism which constructed the films as texts 
which offered American spectators previously unseen and “eyewitness” perspectives on world 
events (Schoonover, 72)  
 Following the trends outlined by Schoonover, in much of the marketing and review 
journalism which surrounded The Battle of Algiers’ initial waves of American release, the film’s 
graphic depictions of violence were understood as a central component of its heightened 
cinematic realism. This realism was furthermore constructed as the basis of the film's pronounced 
historical and artistic significance. Writing for the New Yorker, Brendan Gill emphasized The 
Battle of Algiers as “a chronicle of murder, torture, betrayal, and retribution”, but asserted that 
“beneath and beyond its continuous squalid violence we perceive a redeeming purity of intention 
on the part of the chronicler” who has “sought to do justice […] to the facts of history […] as the 
basis of his work of art” (93). Harold Clurman of The Nation similarly asserted that “even in its 
most violent scenes the film indulges in neither sentimentality not delight in cruelty”, and 
“contains none of the sadism common to so many pictures presented as entertainment” (348). In 
his celebratory review of the film for The Baltimore Sun, R.H. Gardiner distinguished the film 
from “selective” art, wherein viewers are presented “an arranged or edited version of life” (95). 
For Gardiner, spectators of The Battle of Algiers were given the impression that they were 
witnessing “the thing itself”, precisely because in this film “buildings blow up, bodies are 
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removed from debris, and children cry in the streets…” (Gardiner, 95). This dual emphasis on 
titillation and contemplation was encapsulated by Maurice Rapf’s exclamation that The Battle of 
Algiers was “the most exciting - and meaningful - film in years”, a quote which was featured in 
almost all of Allied Artists’ promotional materials on the film.  
  Gardiner’s review also hints to the extent to which, like its neorealist predecessors, The 
Battle of Algiers was constructed as an “eyewitness” view of historical events. American critics 
routinely constructed the cinematic realism of The Battle of Algiers as an inherently innovative 
spectatorial experience that provided American audiences with a previously unseen and decidedly 
experiential perspective on the historical realities of the Algerian War of Independence. As 
Sandra Saunders of the Philadelphia Daily News phrased it, The Battle of Algiers provided the 
American spectator with an educational opportunity that was “infinitely more effective than all 
the miles of state newsreel clips usually seen in movies about historical events” (18). Harold 
Clurman of The Nation claimed that as “a masterpiece of epic realism” the film “creates the 
impression of total objectivity” and provides its spectators with “the sense that one is there in the 
midst of the moment” (348). Bosley Crowther suggested that the Algerian non-professional actors 
who play the “assorted bomb-throwers and terrorists”, “make you believe that you are seeing the 
actual participants” of the FLN-led insurgency (1). Writing for the Daily News, Kathleen Carroll 
described the film as “relentlessly realistic”, suggesting that it “gives you the sense of being [in 
the Casbah]” (768). Carroll went as far to suggest that the film’s re-construction of the FLN’s 
attempts to seize control of Algiers is so realistic that spectators had to “constantly remind 
[themselves] that [they] are the viewer of an extraordinary film, not an eyewitness to 
revolutionary ferment” (768). Similarly, writing for The Washington Post, Richard L. Coe 
claimed that “Pontecorvo […] has found a camera style - and thousands of cooperative Algerians 
- to suggest that this is the real thing” (D10).  
 Film critics’ assertions of The Battle of Algiers’ objectivity, and supposed ability to allow 
the American spectator to bear witness to the historical realities of the Algerian revolution are, of 
course, troubling. Coe’s description of the Algerian people as “cooperative” participants in the 
recreation of their own history points to some of the more problematic power-dynamics inherent 
to the specific epistemological functions that the film served in the American context.  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 Indeed, for Schoonover, similar power dynamics characterized the American import of 
Italian neorealism. Schoonover suggests that the promotional discourses which framed Italian 
neorealist films as “eyewitness” perspectives on the historical realities of post-war Italy, worked 
to “both make the stakes of geopolitical interdependencies urgently palpable for Americans” and 
“refine [the American subject’s] agency of the world” (xvii). By providing American spectators 
with the “fantasy of limited involvement” in post-war Italian public life, neorealist films were 
constructed as “the ultimate manifestation of a postwar cinematic politics of the image that 
authorizes the foreign gaze to adjudicate local politics” (xvii). Schoonover emphasizes the extent 
to which neorealism’s shocking images of violence and infrastructural decay were constructed as 
pleas for humanitarian concern, and part of an explicit project to “redeem Italians as 
[Americans’] counterparts” (88). However, this process of redemption still involved a certain 
emphasis on geopolitical differentiation, as it relied on the violent subjugation of both Italian 
bodies and body politic (88). Schoonover suggests that Italian neorealist films were marketed in 
ways which both stoked humanitarian concern and provided American viewers “grounds on 
which they [could] see themselves as more advanced citizens of the world community” (88). By 
positioning American spectators as “a bystanding world citizen who is compelled to watch but 
remains at the periphery” of Italian national life, the films mimicked the “subjective affinities of 
liberal humanism”, and compelled the American spectator to weigh the legitimacy of the Italian 
public from an all-knowing, yet distanced vantage point (73).  
  The supposedly “eyewitness” perspective to history that The Battle of Algiers offered 
similarly imbued many American critics, and by extension, American spectators, with a sense of 
authority over Algerian public life. Again mimicking the dynamics of its neorealist predecessors, 
the emphasis on the film’s experiential quality resulted in a wave of critical reception which 
overtly positioned the film as a plea for extra-national adjudication.  
 However, the specifics of this adjudicatory process, and the corresponding spectatorial 
protocols envisioned for American spectators of The Battle of Algiers, were, of course, distinct 
from those of Italian neorealism in many respects. Within postwar American film culture, images 
of Algerian nationalism required an altogether distinct mode of ideological management than 
those of the Italian resistance or post-fascist nationalisms. While, like the specific vision of Italy 
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constructed during the US promotion of Italian neorealism, the Algerian national context was 
clearly constructed as a geopolitical location under the “far-reaching subjective authority” of the 
American spectator, the historical actors visualized in The Battle of Algiers remains outside the 
clear jurisdiction of the more fraternal dimensions of liberal humanism (Schoonover, 94). If the 
neorealist image of post-war Italian life worked to elicit a particular mode of humanist globalism 
which “redeemed Italians as [Americans’] counterparts” within the dynamics of the new 
economic and political structures of NATO, the images of the Algerian people provided by The 
Battle of Algiers - and the politics of decolonization and national sovereignty they symbolized - 
remained comparatively suspect (Schoonover, 94).  
 
The “On Both Sides” Protocol of Interpretation  
The suspicion that Algerian revolutionaries engendered within post-war American film culture 
resulted in a discursive tendency to emphasize the film as a condemnation of violence “on both 
sides” of the Algerian War of Independence.  Distributors promoted this particular reading of the 16
film over the course of its initial waves of theatrical release. The film synopsis included in the 
Allied Artists’ campaign manual emphasized the “endless grief and losses on both sides” of the 
war (1). The review by Rapf re-printed in the campaign manual also asserted that “what the film 
says to you will likely depend on what you already believe - about violence, colonialism, Arabs, 
or even the French…”, but “Mr. Pontecorvo will wreak havoc on your convictions along the 
way” by emphasizing the “ruthless antagonists on either side of the social struggle” (Fig. 7). An 
Allied Artists press release included a pull-quote from a review by Louis Botto of Look Magazine 
which claimed that the film was “banned in France and Algeria because it shows atrocities 
  The “on both sides” framework is virtually ubiquitous throughout the review journalism that accompanied the 16
films initial waves of American release. See: Adams, 1968; Cedrone, 1969; Carroll, 1967; Clurman, 1967; Dawson, 
1971; Dorn, 1968; Ebert, 1968; Ebert, 1968; Ebert, 1969; Eichelbaum, 1968;  Gardiner, 1967; Gardiner, 1969; Gill, 
1967; Guerink, 1969; Kauffman, 1967; Kaufman, 1970;  Kern, 1968; Knight, 1967; Kozloff, et al, 1967; Mootz, 
1968; Morgenstern, 1967; Rapf, 1967; Saunders, 1967; Standish, 1968; Terry, 1968; Wilson, 1967; Wilson, 1968; 
“Battle of Algiers”, 1975; “French Dislike Italian War Film”, 1966; “Screen: The Battle of Algiers”, 1968. 
Furthermore, in March of 1968, the film won the joint Protestant-Catholic award from the National Catholic Office 
for Motion Pictures. The office credit the film “for confronting viewers with a recreation of a struggle for 
independence that evokes agony and understanding for both sides” (“‘Bonnie’ Gets Catholic Vote”, 51). 
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committed by both countries” (“Review Quotes”, 1).   17
 Within this discursive landscape, critical consensus was organized around a liberal logic 
which promoted the film as a pacifist meditation on the meaninglessness of violence, rather than 
a testament to the necessity of decolonization. This protocol of interpretation effectively 
marginalized, or altogether erased, questions of national sovereignty in the film’s American 
promotion and reception.  For example, R.H. Gardiner of The Baltimore Sun emphasized that 18
the film was “in no way slanted to make either side appear absolutely right or absolutely 
wrong” (95). Gardner went on to conclude that the “real subject matter of the picture” was “the 
horror of civil violence”, and that the “responsibility for such violence is attributed as much to 
one side as another” (95). Writing for the New Yorker, Brendan Gill likewise eclipsed the issue of 
national sovereignty in his conclusion that Pontecorvo sought to tell “his tragic story” in a 
decidedly “ambiguous [light]”, in an effort to illustrate the extent to which “evil men and good 
are alike in their capacity to discover things in life worth killing and being killed for” (93). Film 
Quarterly, similarly suggested that while the film was “political exposure”, it was “not 
necessarily, by virtue of the fact, a partisan cry to arms” (26). The review concludes that, while 
Pontecorvo “is obviously in great sympathy with the rebels”, he “seems to be telling us that both 
parties to an injustice - the givers and the receivers - are hooked into a merciless circuit of 
 The film was never banned in Algeria. Indeed, in a 1972 interview with Joan Mellen for Film Quarterly, 17
Pontecorvo claimed that the film “was the greatest box-office success” in Algerian history (5). In his interview with 
Nicholas Harrison for Interventions, Yacef similarly claimed that when the film was first released in Algeria “there 
were vast queues a kilometre long outside the cinemas” (413). He furthermore asserted that the Algerian state 
currently owns rights to screen the film, and that it “has sometimes been shown on official holidays” (413). 
 Over the course of my research, I have only come across five reviews in the American popular press which either 18
prioritized issues of national sovereignty or remained largely sympathetic to the cause of Algerian independence. 
Two of these reviews primarily discuss the film as an allegory for the Vietnam War, and will be discussed at length in 
the following chapter (see: Ditlea, 1967; and “The Battle of Vietnam”, 1967). Kevin Thomas’ 1968 review of the 
film for the Los Angeles Times, concludes that the film “drives home the truth that the more people are repressed, the 
more unquenchable their thirst for freedom becomes” (65). However, Smith’s conclusion is drawn in light of his 
decision to frame the film as an allegory to “the Negroes struggle for civil rights and equality” in the American 
context, and as such, his review only ambiguous touches on the question of national sovereignty (65). Smith’s review 
will be discussed in detail in my third chapter. Simon Fox’s review of the film for the Los Angeles Times labelled the 
violence of both the French military and the FLN as “unacceptable”, however, he clearly asserted that the French are 
the film’s “villains”, whose “mistake was in not being able, or not caring to read the messages in what Harold 
MacMillan called ‘the winds of change blowing through Africa’” (198). Susan Stark’s review of the film for the 
Detroit Free Press similarly suggested that while the film humanizes the French, it simultaneously “wipes out all 
thoughts and feelings save those of the revolutionary cause” - a cause which “is as noble as it is inevitable” (1968: 
36). However, Stark still displayed a certain level of skepticism towards anti-colonial nationalisms, as she opened her 
review by claiming that “even though Arab zealots and Negro militants have adopted The Battle of Algiers as their 
own, this remarkable film really belongs to everyone who cares about freedom” (36). 
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brutalization” (26). Maurice Rapf echoed these sentiments in her review of the film, wherein she 
proclaimed that if “[The Battle of Algiers] implies that violence is necessary to call attention to 
people's struggles for their rights, Pontecorvo also makes clear that violence leads to 
violence” (16). Harold Clurman furthermore asserted that the film “has classic and tragic 
dimensions beyond politics” and, despite the fact that it depicts the Algerian nation gaining 
independence, he suggested that it illustrates that wars “rarely achieve the benefits that both sides 
sincerely claim they are battling to bring about” (348). Thus, within the American popular press, 
The Battle of Algiers was not so much framed as a rallying cry for Third Worldist or anti-colonial 
solidarity, but as an urgent prompt for the American spectator to condemn the means by which 
Algeria gained independence.  
 Discourses of cinematic realism were central to the establishment of this protocol - the 
film’s “realism”, the quality which effectively distinguished it from propaganda and thus gave it 
ethical and artistic validity, was articulated primarily in terms of Pontecorvo’s ability to correctly 
manage his sympathies for the Algerian people. For example, Harold Clurman claimed that the 
film “creates the impression of total objectivity” in so far as “we take little satisfaction at the 
‘triumph’ or one side or the other in the mutual slaughter” (348). Sandra Saunders similarly 
celebrated the film for its “admirably objective” depiction of the war, noting that “it is to the 
film’s credit that it doesn’t take sides” (18). Writing for the for the Boston Globe, Marjory Adams 
likewise pronounced that the film “bears every mark of authenticity” and constituted "much more 
than propaganda for a rebellious minority” precisely because the film created the impression that 
“the cruel terrorism of the Arabs and the ruthless torture of the French military men proved 
nothing, accomplished nothing, toward making Algeria a better place to live” (19). George 
McKinnon of The Boston Globe suggested that “instead of playing God and judging right or 
wrong, Pontecorvo and his associates have chosen the […] role of recording angel” (125). For 
McKinnon, while Pontecorvo’s “sympathy [was] plainly with the rebels, [his] allegiance [was] 
plainly to the truth”, in his decision to portray the violence of the war as “indiscriminately terrible 
for French and Moslem alike” (125).  
  Thus, over the course of The Battle of Algiers’ American reception, discourses of 
cinematic realism were mobilized in a way which regularly affirmed and empowered liberal 
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humanism in the face of an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist politic. According to this discursive 
framework, the artistic merit and cultural value of The Battle of Algiers was firmly rooted in its 
exceptional realism, a quality which was in turn dependent on the film’s ability to render 
colonization and anti-colonial revolution as equally-destructive examples of ideological 
extremism. This ideological equivocation is clearly articulated in Maurice Rapf’s review of the 
film, in which he suggested that the pivotal question Pontecorvo sought to pose to American 
audiences was “if you have to choose sides, does it really matter who struck first”, “or do you just 
play follow the leader, whoever the leader may be?” (16).  
 
Other Discursive Trends: Sensationalism, Racism, and Juxtaposition 
These discursive attempts to ideologically equate colonial and anti-colonial violence become less 
clearly balanced when one considers the distinct ways in which the Algerians and the French 
were described. While the film itself was constructed as a significant source of historical 
knowledge, film critics and distributors remained consistently vague or in their descriptions of 
what exactly American spectators were supposed to have learned about the FLN. Indeed, in the 
Allied Artists campaign manual, the organization was repeatedly and incorrectly referred to as 
either the “NFL” or the “National Liberal Front”, mistakes which were reproduced in review 
journalism on the film (8).  Throughout the initial waves of the film’s American promotion and 19
critical reception, the FLN were repeatedly rendered as abstract signifiers - as a veritable mob of 
“assorted bomb-throwers and terrorists” as Crowther so crassly put it - rather than a political 
organization composed of active political subjects (1).  
 Furthermore, decidedly sensationalist and often racist descriptions of both the FLN and 
the Algerian public at large abounded. Time magazine described the “Algerians” as “intense, 
fierce-eyed men and women, cold-blooded enough to blow up a restaurant full of innocents to 
prove a point” (4). Several other critics reproduced this specific description, or very similar 
characterizations, the film’s Algerian characters as “fierce-eyed”.  Furthermore, several critics 20
 See Carrol, 1967; Champlin, 1967; Knight, 1967; and Saunders, 196719
 See Geertsema, 1968; Adam, 1967; Saunders, 1967; “Festival Action”, 1967; and Thomas, 1968, wherein Thomas 20
refers to Ali La Pointe as the “hot-eyed leader of the National Liberation Front” (65). 
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constructed the nationalist movement as one motivated by either the fanaticism, hatred, or 
intrinsically violent nature of the Algerian participants.  21
 This sensationalism was also regularly extended to descriptions of the Casbah itself, 
promising American spectators a glimpse into the supposedly disturbing realities of Algerian 
public life. The Allied Artists campaign manual described the Casbah as the “den of the 
international underworld”, home to “prostitutes, drug addicts and suppliers, spies, and racketeers 
of all kinds” (1). Marjory Adams of The Boston Globe similarly referred to the Casbah as “the 
underworld” (19). William Mootz of the Courier Journal emphasized that the film “all but 
[recreates] the […] fetid smells of the Casbah” (8). Kathleen Carrol furthermore opened her 
review of the film for the Daily News by asserting that the “eerie sounds” and “piercing cries” 
which “echo in the cavernous streets of the Casbah” would “chill” American spectators “to the 
bone” (86).   22
 These dehumanizing and exoticizing descriptions of the Algerian people were often 
accompanied by characterizations of Jean Martin’s Colonel Mathieu which emphasized both his 
intelligence and compassion. Thus, while established protocols of interpretation promoted 
readings of the film as a condemnation of violence on both sides of the Algerian War, the French 
were more regularly constructed for American audiences as characters with familiar and 
redeemable qualities.  
 Where Bosley Crowther described the performances of the “rebel leaders” of the FLN as 
marked with “ferocity” and “fervor”, he emphasized the Colonel’s “fairness and even respect for 
 Susan Saunders remarked that the Algerian rebels depicted in the film were as “fanatical” as “the real freedom-21
fighters must have [been]” (18). Time magazine similarly suggested that Brahim Haggiag’s Ali La Pointe “displays 
the fanatic intensity that the FLN must have had” (4). T. Geertsema of the Kingston Daily described the Algerian 
people as “intense […] men and women of cold blood and courage who see their fanaticism pay off” (29). Myles 
Standish furthermore described Ali La Pointe as one of several “fanatic Algerian leaders” (45). Barbara Wilson 
emphasized the “brooding hatred of the illiterate Ali La Pointe” (25). Norman K. Dorn remarked that the Algerian 
War of Independence was fuelled by the Algerian people’s “vast hatred and bitterness against the French” (142). Film 
Quarterly described Ali La Ponte as “a man whose very face is lethal” (Kozloff et al, 26).  Susan Stark similarly 
described La Pointe as “a ragged, illiterate, ragingly hostile young man spawned by the Casbah” (36)
 Many critics focused specifically on the film’s depiction of women ululating during mass demonstrations in their 22
alarmist descriptions of the Algerian public. Martin Levine remarked that the film was full of “alien sounds, like the 
voiced gutturals of Arab speech” (K3). Barbara L Wilson similarly highlighted the “eerie cry that erupts from the 
throats of the Arabs” as a particularly disturbing element of the film (25). The News Journal described the Algerian 
population as composed of “large Muslim mobs with [an] eerie whistling wail” (“Battle of Algiers Was First”, 24)
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the resistance leaders” and suggested that he makes “one [feel] as though one is truly watching 
the spectacular and compassionate Massu” (56). After describing the Colonel as a 
“compassionate but implacable paratrooper”, Martin Levine of The Washington Post labelled “the 
voiced gutturals of Arab speech” as “alien sounds” (K3). Susan Saunders described the Colonel 
as “a man of grace and wit” whose intention to “restore order and put an end to the terrorist 
bombings and killings” was “understandable” (18). She then goes on to assert that “there is a 
beauty amidst the ugliness and horror in the expressive faces of the Algerians” who she described 
as “fierce-eyed and fanatical” (18).  Stanley Kauffman went as far as to assert that “the French 23
people - including teen-agers and babies who are blown up by Arab terrorist are considerably 
more attractive to our eyes than the natives” (29).  
The Battle of Algiers and the Limits of Post-War Liberal Humanism   
The discursive trends that characterized The Battle of Algiers’ initial waves of American 
distribution and reception both parallel and diverge from those outlined by Schoonover. While the 
film was routinely framed as a piece of neorealism, and largely promoted according to the same 
template that American distributors had used for the Italian film cycle, it sat precariously at the 
limits of the post-war liberal humanism that Schoonover describes. Distributors and critics 
carefully mediated the imagined American spectator’s relationship to the film’s images of 
Algerian nationalism and anti-colonial revolution. By framing the film as a condemnation of 
violence “on both sides” of the Algerian war and constructing the Algerian people in largely 
sensationalist and racist terms, film critics and distributors established clear boundaries regarding 
American audiences’ potential identifications with Algerian nationalisms. In doing so, they 
engaged in the difficult project of appropriating the film’s imagery in the name of post-war liberal 
 This kind of juxtaposition occurred in more several reviews. Time magazine wrote: “An illiterate, rebel leader, 23
Brahim Haggiag displays the fanatic intensity that the [FLN] must had had, and Jean Martin as the French colonel 
supplies an intelligence and wit that are not written into his role” (“Festival Attraction” 7). Myles Standish described 
the Colonel as a “cool, jaunty fellow, who was once a member of the French resistance” who faced-off against the 
“fiery” and “fanatic Algerian leaders” (45). After detailing sequences in which the FLN “attack its own people”, 
Clifford Terry described the Colonel as “professionally tough but honourably fair” (49). Where Barbara Wilson 
constructed the Colonel as “a calm, intelligent soldier, determined to fulfill his mission, and yet revealing a certain 
compassion for the people he must bring to heel” she labelled Ali La Pointe as an “illiterate” motivated by a 
“brooding hatred” (25). 
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humanisms.  
 The fact that The Battle of Algiers required a different mode of ideological management 
than its neorealist precursors is perhaps unsurprising given that the film is a visualization of anti-
colonial revolution. Indeed, many anti-colonial intellectuals have described decolonization as a 
political project which fundamentally destabilized the philosophical tradition of humanism as it 
had been defined by, and institutionalized within, imperialist culture. In Wretched of the Earth, 
Frantz Fanon describes the “colonial world” as “Manichean”, and noted that often this 
“Manichaeanism reaches its logical conclusion and dehumanizes the colonized subject” (6-7). 
For Fanon, “decolonization” was not only a judicial and economic project, but one of complete 
social and philosophical reorganization - which “[infused] a new rhythm, specific to a new 
generation of men, with a new language and a new humanity” (2).  
 In his Discourse on Colonialism, Aimé Césaire similarly emphasizes the “hypocrisy” of 
humanisms developed in imperialist cultural contexts (31). Labelling the European humanist 
philosophical tradition as “pseudo-humanism”, he contended that “for far too long it has 
diminished the rights of man, that its concept of those rights has been - and still is - narrow and 
fragmentary, incomplete and biased, and all things considered, sordidly racist” (31). Césaire 
firmly rooted his analysis in a comparison of colonialism to Nazism. He contended that “before 
[Europeans] were its victims, they were its accomplices”, “they tolerated that Nazism before it 
was inflicted on them, […] they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimize it, because, until then, 
it had been applied onto non-European peoples” (36). For Césaire, what liberal Europeans 
“[could not] forgive Hitler for [was] not the crime in itself, the crime against man, it [was] not 
the humiliation of man as such”, but the “crime against the white man” and the “[application] to 
Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusive for” colonized 
peoples, including “the Arabs of Algeria” (31).  
 The specific arguments Césaire uses in his efforts to reveal the hypocrisy of colonial 
humanisms were reflected in The Battle of Algiers itself. In a sequence depicting a press 
conference held by Colonial Mathieu, a reporter accuses the French military of employing fascist 
techniques in their counter-insurgency operations. Mathieu responds by stating:  
  
 !41
 We aren’t madmen or sadists, gentlemen. Those who call us Fascists today, forget the   
 contribution that many of us made to the Resistance. Those who call us Nazis, don’t   
 know that among us there are survivors of Dachau and Buchenwald. We are soldiers and   
 our only duty is to win.  
Pontecorvo has stated that his intention behind this sequence, and his broader depiction of the 
French military was to reveal the “logic of colonialism” (in Mellen, 4). He asserted that he and 
Franco Solanis, the film’s co-writer, “didn’t care if you could find sadistic people among the 
paratroopers”, and instead found it “much more interesting” to focus on “a colonel who is 
completely normal and obliged by the historical context to do something”, as this would reveal 
the “logic of colonialism” as one which is “confused” (4). Here, Pontecorvo echoes Césaire’s 
sentiments regarding the hypocrisy of a humanism which seeks to simultaneously condemn 
Nazism and endorse colonial rule.  
 However, in the context of the film’s initial waves of American critical reception, the 
meaning of this sequence was subject to mixed interpretation. Out of the eight reviews I have 
come across which discuss this specific sequence, only three interpret Mathieu’s statements as an 
attempt to comment on the hypocrisy of the French military.  The rest understand this sequence 24
less as a moment of ironic commentary, and more as a straightforward attempt on the part of 
Pontecorvo to humanize the French and thus forward the “both sides” interpretive paradigm.   25
 Indeed, many film critics were quick to rationalize French military violence. Harold 
Clurman claimed that the French had a significant amount of “justification for the repression of 
 Kozloff, et al, described this moment as “ironic”, however, their interpretation of the sequence also worked to 24
equate colonial and anti-colonial violence in certain respects. They claim that “The Battle of Algiers is merely one 
instalment in a sequence of chronically switched roles”, in which “the compatriots of those French railroad workers 
murdered in their struggle against the Germans are shown, ten years later, to play the part of those very Germans in 
Algiers; meanwhile, the Algerians have enthusiastically endorsed an Arab ‘Holy War’ against Israel, while the Jews, 
classic victims of the Nazis, are now illegally arresting, without trial, Arabs in the old city of Jerusalem.” (28). Roger 
Ebert criticized the Colonel’s logic, noting that “there was a time when he did not need to ask himself why the Nazis 
did not belong in France” (2). However, Ebert still claims that “the strength of the film, I think, comes because it is 
both passionate and neutral, concerned with both sides” (2). Simon Fox was decidedly the most astute in his reading 
of the sequence as a criticism of colonial logic, stating that “with sickening irony we see these men set about visiting 
all the horrors which they sugared under Nazi rule upon their prisoners” (198). 
 See Clurman, 1967; Rapf 1967; Mootz, 1967; Standish, 1968; Stark 1968. 25
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the Algerian revolt”, as “they had been in Algeria for 130 years, had developed the country, and 
given full rights of citizenship to the Algerians” (348). Maurice Rapf furthermore contended that, 
while Pontecorvo was sympathetic to the cause of Algerian independence, he also “understands - 
and is willing to show - why the [French] army will, or must, try” to retain control over the 
colony (16).  
 This rationalization of French military violence was furthermore regularly extended to the 
film’s depiction of the use of torture against the Algerian population. Torture was routinely 
constructed as an efficient and necessary method by which the French military sought to contain 
the FLN-led insurgency. Clurman described the French military’s use of torture as a technique 
enacted “with quiet and deadly efficiency” that allowed them to “round up the leaders of one of 
the most active of the terrorist units” (348). Norman Dorn similarly claimed that Colonel Mathieu 
“performed the ordered elimination of FLN groups, chiefly through the incitement of betrayal 
through torture” (142).  
 The tendency to frame the French military’s use of torture as both efficient and effective 
was furthermore regularly accompanied by suggestions that the soldiers who engaged in it did so 
unwillingly and out of necessity.  Norman Dorn described the French Colonel as “agonized by 
fulfilling his duty” (142). Roger Ebert claimed that while the Colonel “respects his opponents” he 
believes “correctly, no doubt […] that ruthless methods are necessary” (2). June McDonald of the 
Ithaca Journal proclaimed that “though intellectually and emotionally opposed to these methods, 
the French colonel in charge pursues them methodically in the line of duty” (30). In yet another 
celebration of the real-life General Massu, Bosley Crowther asserted that Jean Martin’s Colonel 
Mathieu “is so impressive and his attitude of regard for the cause and bravery of the rebels is so 
sure, even though he has to torture and kill some of them, that he does full credit to the character 
of General Massu” (15). After noting that the French paratroopers were in an “impossible 
situation”, John Simon suggested that they “conduct their mandatory brutality not without some 
regret [and] some immanent sympathy for their victims” (374). Similarly, Brendan Gill asserted 
that Martin “conveys superb the toughness and intelligence of the military careerist, who, 
knowing precisely how distasteful the performance of his duty may be, never flinches from the 
necessity of performing it” (93). In the posters and campaign manual produced for the film, 
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Allied Artists furthermore endorsed this particular understanding of torture as a necessity which 
French soldiers were either “forced” to engage in or “resorted” to (see Fig. 5 and 6).  
 It is important to emphasize the extent to which American critics and distributors’ 
attempts to make quantitative equivocations of the French and Algerian experiences of the war 
significantly diverge from historical reality. Alistair Horne has outlined that, while the French 
military authorities counted their losses at 26,000, estimates of Algerian casualties have ranged 
from 350,000 (from a French official source) to 1.5 million (from the FLN) (538).  
 Furthermore, the specific constructions regarding the French military’s use of torture that 
circulated in conjunction with The Battle of Algiers’ initial waves of American distribution also 
distorted the historical realities of the Algerian War of Independence. As Nicholas Harrison has 
noted, many historians and war correspondents have emphasized the degree to which the French 
military’s use of torture was neither systematic nor controlled (399). Former member of the 
Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne, Mohamed Lebjauoi, has asserted that the events 
which took place in Algiers between 1954 and 1957 were not so much a “battle” between two 
militant forces, but were instead a “giant terror operation inflicted on the capital’s Muslim 
population” by the French military (in Harrison, 397). Labor historian Donald Reid has echoed 
this sentiment, writing: 
  
 Edward Behr estimates that during the Battle of Algiers, thirty to forty percent of adult   
 males in the casbah were arrested for questioning; all arrested, male and female, were   
 tortured, wrote [Germain Tillion], unless saved by the rapid intervention of a powerful   
 protector … [M]ost of the torture carried out by the French army was done to humiliate   
 and terrorize the [Algerian] population […] [and was not part of a specific] police   
 strategy to purge the casbah of the FLN. (in Harrison, 399) 
Frantz Fanon similarly emphasized the extent to which torture was enacted on the Algerian public 
at large in an article for the FLN’s journal El Moudjahid published in September of 1957. In this 
article, Fanon described torture not as a military technique but a “way of life” for French 
colonists, something which was “‘inherent’ in colonialism” (Fanon in Harrison, 399).  
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 Here, Fanon echoes the more general description of colonialism he provided in Wretched 
of the Earth. Fanon asserts the distinct ways in which imperial power is enacted in capitalist and 
colonial contexts. Where “in capitalist countries a multitude of sermonizers, counselors, and 
‘confusion-mongers’ intervene between the exploited and the authorities”, in “colonial regions”, 
the “police and military ensure the colonized are kept under close scrutiny, and contained by rifle 
butts and napalm” (1961: 4). For Fanon, “in the colonies the economic infrastructure is also a 
superstructure”, in which colonial power asserts itself in “the language of pure violence” (1961: 
4-5). Indeed, this inherently violent quality of colonization was perhaps the aspect of the Algerian 
situation that became the most clearly distorted over the course of the film’s initial waves of 
American distribution and critical reception.  
 
Contextualizing the Film’s Promotion and Reception Within American-Algerian Relations  
Just as the American distributors of Italian neorealism framed those films in terms which met the 
ideological imperatives of the then newly established North Atlantic community, the discourses 
and protocols of interpretation promoted over the course of The Battle of Algiers’ early years of 
American circulation in many ways reflect the dynamics of contemporaneous Algerian-American 
relations. The “on both sides” interpretive framework reflected the ambiguous economic and 
diplomatic investment the American government had in the project of national liberation.  
 While Kennedy officially congratulated Algeria after it gained independence, the 
American position towards Algerian sovereignty was laced with suspicion and ambivalence. 
Fanon noted that, within the context of the Algerian War, Americans had “no qualms officially 
declaring they are the defenders of the right to people’s self-determination” (38). However, while 
official French colonialism could easily be criticized, the notion of sovereignty remained 
acceptable in so far as newly independent nations were willing to economically facilitate post-
war American expansionism. As Fanon asserted, within the “new context” of the growing 
decolonization movement, “Americans [took] their role as the barons of international capitalism 
very seriously” (38).  
  Indeed, historian David Byrne has outlined the extent to which, within context of the 
Cold War, the FLN’s willingness to engage in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union over the 
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course of the war “provoked consternation in Washington” (95). In a memo written in October of 
1960, the head of the State Department’s Africa desk warned that “if Algeria gained its 
independence as a result of Soviet assistance, Washington should expect to see - ‘as a minimum’ - 
the creation […] of ‘a vigorous, dynamic state whose national policies would be somewhat 
comparable to those of Yugoslavia after World War II” (in Byrne, 95).  
 This trepidation regarding Algerian’s economic and diplomatic policies developed 
throughout the post-independence era. The Algerian government would become a key figure of 
the Non-Aligned Movement and remain technically detached from either the Soviet or Western 
blocs (Dickinson, 53). However, even this policy of detachment provoked suspicion from the 
United States government. The United States had condemned the policy of non-alignment as 
early as 1956, when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles famously described the policy of non-
alignment as an “immoral and short-sighted” approach to foreign policy (in Byrne, 7). Moreover, 
as the Non-Aligned Movement pursued more clearly economically leftist policies regarding 
international trade over the course of the Cold War, the United States government became more 
decidedly invested in its containment and/or dismantling.  26
 The policies of economic nationalization that Algeria pursued post-independence 
explicitly undermined the American government’s avid pursuit of the expansion of free-market 
economies in the post-war period. Indeed, even the specific expansionist desires of the American 
film industry were curtailed by the Algerian government. In 1969, after the Algerian government 
attempted to “curb the inflows of foreign product” into their national film industry through the 
establishment of domestic quotas, the Motion Pictures Export Association of America (MPEAA) 
initiated a boycott against film trade with the nation until 1974 (Khanna, 28; Dickinson, 72).  
 American distributors and critics who promoted The Battle of Algiers to American 
audiences rehearsed discourses which met the ideological imperatives of America’s ambivalent 
relationship to Algerian nationalisms. The violence of the French military who attempted to retain 
control over the nation could be criticized in the name of an abstract notion of freedom. However, 
Algerian nationalists also needed to be met with a certain degree of skepticism, as the Algerian 
 For fuller accounts of the shifts in American foreign policy that occurred in response to developments 26
within the Non-Aligned movements see: Byrne, 2016; Malloy, 2017; and Prashad, 2007. 
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national sovereignty constituted a threat to America’s contemporaneous neo-colonial economic 
projects.  
Conclusion  
Ultimately, the distinction between neorealism and political propaganda which characterized the 
discursive foundations of The Battle of Algiers’ entrance into American markets reveals some of 
the ideological contours of American art-cinema industries themselves. The film’s relationship to 
the Algerian state and proximity to the FLN constituted a fundamental problem to be overcome. 
While images of anti-colonial revolution were deemed potentially marketable and thus 
acceptable, anti-colonial revolutionaries themselves, and the institutions they created, remained 
suspect. For the post-war American film industry, American audiences were prepared to engage 
with images of the Algerian revolution in so far as they were constructed as products of 
Pontecorvo’s artistic investment in cinematic realism. Within this configuration, the Algerian 
public was constructed primarily as Pontecorvo’s discovery, rather than historical actors or 
political subjects in their own right. This unwillingness to engage with the film as an expression 
of Algerian nationalism enacted by Algerian people and institutions, was perhaps one of the key 
factors which opened the film up to readings that so overtly eschewed issues of national 




Chapter Two:  
The Battle of Algiers, (Anti)Colonial Allegories, and the Vietnam-Era American Media 
Landscape  
Over the following two chapters, I will explore how, over the course of The Battle of Algiers’ 
American circulation, the film was read in relation to America’s own imperialist projects and 
histories. From the moment the film premiered at the New York Film Festival in September of 
1967, many American critics framed it as an analogy for either the Vietnam War, or 
contemporaneous race-relations in the United States. The tendency amongst film critics to read 
the film as an allegory for either the Vietnam War or the black-liberation movement was 
undoubtedly in part a reaction to the anti-colonial politics embedded within the film-text itself. 
The film was intended to function as a contribution to the increasingly internationalist network of 
anti-colonial political movements that had taken shape over the course of the post-war period. 
Pontecorvo himself asserted that with The Battle of Algiers, “[he] was mainly interested in 
showing [the] unstoppable process of liberation” occurring “not only in Algeria, but throughout 
the entire world” (Pontecorvo in Said, 24). The film’s production and distribution moreover 
represented a “forebear” of the post-revolutionary Algerian state’s broad and extensive 
contributions to the mechanics of Third Worldist and anti-colonial internationalism, which sought 
to develop “a self-reliant third world infrastructure” operating in resistance to the neo-colonial 
flows of global capital (Dickinson, 51). Thus, for the diverse range of actors involved in the 
film’s production, the film was always intended to be read by international audiences in relation 
to their own experiences of, and struggles against, imperialism and colonialism.  
 However, within the context of The Battle of Algiers’ circulation within American art-
cinema markets, the potential allegorical functions of the film were mobilized by a vast range of 
actors located across the political spectrum. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
supposedly “eyewitness” perspective of political revolution that The Battle of Algiers offered the 
American spectator was increasingly framed as a source of knowledge on the realities of the 
Vietnam War or American race politics. While the film was regularly screened for leftist, Third 
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Worldist, and/or anti-racist purposes in both grassroots and institutional contexts in the United 
States, within the American popular press, the film became a useful and virtually ubiquitous 
reference point for stoking anxieties regarding either Vietnamese or Black-American 
nationalisms. This more sensationalist, and often quite reactionary, interpretation of the film’s 
allegorical capacity was furthermore both catalyzed and institutionalized by the shifting 
promotional campaigns developed by Allied Artists throughout the period.  
 The next two chapters will outline the general trends of this particular aspect of The Battle 
of Algiers’ American legacy. I will reveal the films’ initial waves of American distribution to be a 
period characterized by a persistent and ongoing struggle to define the film’s meaning, and, by 
extension, to either confront or naturalize the realities of American imperialism. This chapter will 
focus specifically on the film’s uptake as an analogy for the Vietnam War in the American 
context, and the following chapter will look at the film’s promotion in relation to black-American 
political organizing.  27
 
Filling a Gap: The Battle of Algiers as a Dramatization of the Vietnam War  
The Battle of Algiers was constructed as an allegory for the Vietnam War within some of the 
earliest reviews of the film in the American press. Within the coverage of the film’s premiere at 
the New York Film Festival, many critics detailed the audience’s reaction to the film, and 
emphasized the film’s relevance to contemporaneous American foreign policy.  Both Charles 28
Champlin of the Los Angeles Times and Margot Hentoff of the Village Voice noted that after the 
sequence in which a series of bombs are set off in the French quarters of Algiers, one attendee 
shouted “Saigon is next!”, and evoked a mixed response of applause and boos from the rest of the 
 As two central fixtures of the broadly-defined American Third Worldist movement, there was, of course, extensive 27
overlap between the anti-war and black-liberation movements. As such, there will be a certain amount of overlap 
between this chapter and the proceeding one, in terms of both the issues that will be raised and the primary sources 
that will be discussed. When possible, I have attempted to flag these moments of cross-over and draw connections 
across chapters. This has been done both for the sake of clarity and organization, and, more importantly, in an effort 
to emphasize both the existence of currents of solidarity with black-liberation within the political organizations that 
have been most routinely characterized as the epicentre of anti-Vietnam War activism, as well as the indispensable 
contributions that the various sectors of the black-liberation movement made to the implementation, development, 
and maintenance of the anti-war movement.
 See: Champlin, 1967; Clurman, 1967; Crowther, 1967; Crowther, 1967; Crowther 1967; Ditlea, 1967; Hentoff, 28
1967; and Morgenstern, 1967.  
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audience (Champlin, 59; Hentoff, 36). After describing the screening as “uncustomarily 
tumultuous”, Champlin concluded that the “loud reactions sharply revealed the wide and perhaps 
widening division in attitudes here toward Vietnam” (74). Steve Ditlea of The Barnard Bulletin 
similarly asserted that “it is inevitable that The Battle of Algiers will be viewed in light of current 
events in Vietnam”, noting that “when a newsman [referred] to Sartre’s opposition to the war” the 
audience “translated [it] as the liberal’s opposition [to Vietnam]” and “when one of the rebels 
[denounced] the napalming of Algerian villages, the audience [reacted] with applause” (2).  
 The audience’s divided reaction to the film’s premiere, as well as the tendency amongst 
film critics to highlight and emphasize it, can in part be attributed to the contemporaneous 
American media landscape’s responses to the Vietnam War. The Battle of Algiers premiered at the 
New York Film Festival in September of 1967, several years into a period of escalation in the war 
enacted by Lyndon Johnson’s administration. Furthermore, the film’s release was shortly 
followed by the Tet Offensive in January of 1968, in which North Vietnamese forces attacked 
several American-occupied military centres, including the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. For many 
scholars, the Tet Offensive marked an important turning point in media representations of the war 
(Hallin, 1986; Hammond, 1988; Knightely, 2004; Spencer, 2005). The attacks launched against 
the American military undermined the Johnson administration’s attempts to construct American 
military operations in terms of a narrative of progress (Hallin, 9; Hammond, 7; Spencer, 57). As 
information released by the American government increasingly conflicted with accounts of the 
war provided by American war correspondents, mainstream news media began to regard the 
administration with increased suspicion and, by extension, compound the divisions that had 
already characterized public opinion regarding the war (Hallin, 9; Hammond, 7; Spencer, 57).  
 Furthermore, many scholars have emphasized the cultural, social, and political 
significance of the extent to which the Vietnam War was televised (Anderegg, 2008).  
For Michael Anderegg, the Vietnam War was “the most visually represented war in [American] 
history” (2). Anderegg notes that developments in camera technology and “one day relay of film 
and other forms of rapid dissemination” facilitated the transformation of the war into a 
“television event” (2). Within this media landscape, Americans were presented with images 
which contained an “immediacy never before experienced in the history of warfare” (2).  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 However, despite the heightened visibility of the war facilitated through American news 
media, Anderegg notes that the period was simultaneously marked by a pronounced absence of 
fiction films or American popular cultural productions which provided direct commentary on the 
war itself (Anderegg, 2). Where both World War II and the Korean War were accompanied by a 
significant output of American studio productions which functioned as morale boosting wartime 
propaganda, Anderegg notes that the American studios “had little interest in the Vietnam War as 
such” (15). Indeed, John Wayne’s Green Berets (1968) was the only film released in America 
over the course of the Vietnam War which took combat in Southeast Asia as its primary subject 
(Anderegg, 15).  
 The tension between both the pronounced visuality of the Vietnam War through television 
news media, and the lack of popular cultural works which provided commentary on the war itself, 
is directly articulated in Bosley Crowther’s review of the 1967 New York Film Festival for The 
New York Times. Crowther opened his article by asserting:  
  
 What with so much engrossing drama happening all over the world - and with bits of it   
 swiftly transmitted in newsreel style to the home screen audience via television shows -   
 the chance for theatrical motion pictures to keep up with and do much in a journalistic   
 war of visualizing current events for the public is ever more slim and remote. But the   
 chance for theatrical motion pictures to be used to reenact real-life events and, at the   
 same time, interpret or endow them with implications after the fact has never been   
 better or more inviting than it is right now. The public - more visually oriented than it has  
 been - and getting more so every day by virtue of our picture-plastered culture - is avid   
 to be enlightened and informed. Recent history is groaning with material that is begging   
 to be pictorially analyzed. (15) 
For Crowther, The Battle of Algiers directly met the American public’s desire to be historically 
“enlightened” (15). He went on to suggest that what was “powerful” about the film was its ability 
to “tautly [involve] the audience in a sense of kinship with contemporary events”, and that 
“viewers with partisan feelings and humanitarian sympathies [will] readily see in the endeavors 
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of the Algerians to free themselves […] a parallel to what is happening in Vietnam.” (15). 
Crowther even went as far as to claim that “what we have in this picture […] is a virtually 
contemporary précis of the waging and the drama of civil war in an environment as convincing as 
that of Saigon”, and that American viewers will “become almost as much involved in its waging, 
as we would if we were seeing a drama of the war in Vietnam today” (15).  
 Crowther was not alone in his assertion that the film functioned as a veritable 
dramatization of the Vietnam War. Nor was he the only critic to read the film against a lack of 
cinematic visualizations of the war within contemporaneous American film-markets. In his 
review for Film Quarterly, Max Kozloff noted that The Battle of Algiers “has been banned in 
France, where its content would be almost as troubling as would a similar account of the Vietnam 
war here” (28). Kozloff went on to frame the film as a welcome relief to the Vietnam-era 
American media landscape. He suggested that “Hollywood may yet give us its version of the 
Vietnam War, if John Wayne has his way, but it cannot be reasonable expected to abandon its 
well-known equation of glamour with gore” (28). Furthermore, he contended that “on-the-spot 
film reporting of the war, despite its undoubted veracity, has already shown itself uninvolving”, 
as "the strictly factual recording of violence has a numbing effect” (28). For Kozloff, The Battle 
of Algiers addresses the shortcomings of both of the cinematic modes through which the Vietnam 
War had been, or would be, visualized for the American public, as the film “combines the clip, 
the grabbed quality, and the authenticity of reportage, with the calculated omniscience of a 
dramatist’s eye” (28).  
 Writing for The San Francisco Examiner, film critic Norman K. Dorn framed the film in 
similar terms as Kozloff and Crowther’s. He concluded his review by asserting that “while it may 
be easy to assume lofty attitude toward France’s protest and embargo of The Battle of Algiers, 
there are nagging secondary questions”, namely “what will be official response when 
independence - or even major - studios of the United States attempt to uncover the tragedy of this 
country's involvement in Vietnam?” (142). Rob Guerink of The Atlanta Constitution similarly 
contended that “some American film-maker is going to make an American political film like [The 
Battle of Algiers]”, and that if “a whole lot of [films] like this start heading this way” American 
audiences may begin to “hanker for the good old days and nice, safe pictures like [Russ Meyer’s 
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X-rated] Vixen [(1968)]” (17).  
 Thus, for many film critics, The Battle of Algiers addressed an important gap in 
contemporaneous American-film markets. Within a news media landscape flooded with graphic 
images of the on-the-ground violence of the war, and often contradictory journalistic accounts of 
the status of the war itself, the need for cinematic representations which could narrativize and 
thus help make sense of the war for American audiences, became pressing. With its neorealistic 
blend of pseudo-documentary aesthetics and melodramatic rendition, and its vivid representation 
of military violence and guerrilla warfare, The Battle of Algiers could function as a useful stand-
in for a cinematic dramatization of the Vietnam War.  
 
Allied Artists’ Promotion of the Film as an (Anti)Colonial Allegory  
Importantly, this potential allegorical function of The Battle of Algiers was embraced and 
promoted by the film’s American distributors. The Allied Artists campaign manual directly 
emphasized the film as pseudo-commentary on current events. In a section entitled “These Ideas 
Will Sell Tickets!”, the manual asserted that “the happenings in The Battle of Algiers, in many 
ways parallel the events taking place in the world today, in our country, and very possibly in your 
city as well” (Fig. 8). Exhibitors were instructed to “capitalize in every way possible on the fact 
that The Battle of Algiers is as hot and provocative as today’s headlines”, noting that the film 
“provides the perfect subject matter for radio/TV forums and talk shows” (5). 
 Allied Artists furthermore endorsed reviews of the film which emphasized its allegorical 
capacity. An Allied Artists press release featured a pull-quote from Normin Corwin, who asserted 
that the film “has profound things to say about the morality of our time and our world” (“Review 
Quotes”, 2). The Life magazine review by Maurice Rapf which was re-printed in the campaign 
manual also emphasized “how pertinent [the film’s] examination of violence and the ‘acceptance 
of its consequences’ can be for the rest of us” (16).  
 While Allied Artists regularly remained vague about to which specific world events the 
film was meant to be read in relation, one can assume that, in 1968, many of the “hot and 
provocative” contemporaneous news headlines that the distributor referenced would be related to 
the war. Indeed, regardless of whether or not Allied Artists explicitly endorsed readings of the 
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film as an analogy for the Vietnam War specifically, the promotional framework resulted in a 
wave of critical reception during the period of circulation which emphasized the film’s relevance 
to the American invasion.  Following the logic outlined in the campaign manual, many 29
American exhibitors were also quick to embrace the allegorical function of the film specifically 
in relation to the Vietnam War. Crowther’s construction of the film as “a virtually contemporary 
précis of the waging and the drama of civil war in an environment as convincing as that of 
Saigon”, was included in a series of advertisements for the film at New York City’s Beekman 
Theatre (Fig. 4 and Fig. 9).  
 
The Battle of Algiers as a Vehicle for Anti-Imperialist Critique of American Foreign Policy  
Within the context of the film’s initial waves of American circulation, this interpretive protocol 
had varied effects. In some instances, it provided film critics operating within the mainstream 
American press an opportunity to voice anti-war sentiments which emphasized the neo-colonial 
nature of the American invasion of Vietnam. Steve Ditlea of the Barnard Bulletin labelled the 
film as “one of the most effective statements against United States involvement in Vietnam”, 
noting that “the outcome of the film, overthrow of foreign rule despite military victory, can only 
be seen as a lesson for our own time” (2). The News Journal in Wilmington Delaware 
emphasized that the film’s local premiere “coincided with the October Moratorium, and some 
members of the audience arrived wearing armbands following the evening demonstration”, 
before concluding the “to them, the film about Algerian revolution with its grim reconstruction of 
mass and individual death was perhaps even more relevant than for others in the 
audience” (Kaplan, et al, 24). 
  However, the review which perhaps most clearly read the film as an indictment of the 
American invasion of Vietnam came from The Gazette and Daily in York, Pennsylvania. In this 
review, the author asserted that the film “makes crystal clear the nature of the fundamental error 
in thinking an in policy which these days has brought about and continue to bring so much grief 
into the world”, suggesting that the film could have alternatively been called “The Battle of 
 See: Adams, 1968; “Battle of Algiers”, 1968; Dorn, 1968; Ebert, 1968; Ebert, 1969; Ebert, 1969; Geurnik, 1970; 29
Kaplan, et al, 1969; Kaufman, 1970; Mootz, 1968; “Movies”, 1968; “Screen”, 1968; Terry, 1968; and Wilson, 1968. 
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Vietnam” or “The Battle of Saigon” (16). The reviewer furthermore clearly articulated their anti-
war analysis of the film in terms which emphasize the issue of national sovereignty and position 
the American military as a neo-colonial presence in both Southeast Asia and beyond, writing: 
 What the revolutionaries of Algiers knew was that there was no French solution possible   
 for the situation in Algeria. There was only possible an Algerian solution. And the French  
 in moving from efforts to impose a political solution to efforts, ruthless and brutal, to   
 impose a military solution, where wrong, not because of strategy tactics, or whatever   
 but because they took so terribly long to realize that any French solution, no matter   
 what, was impossible […] The tragedy of Vietnam has been and still is the conviction on   
 the part of the Johnson Administration and many leaders of public opinion that a United   
 States solution is still possible in Vietnam. The tragedy of U.S. foreign policy for the   
 past twenty years at least has been compounded from that one basic error in thinking:   
 That there is possible a US solution to the situation in Brazil, the Congo, Thailand, or   
 where have you. (16) 
The author concluded their review by framing the film as an indictment of “misconceived US 
foreign policy”, and asserted that it proved that “only the Algerians themselves, with all their 
differences, could work out the future of their country”, before questioning “how much suffering, 
how many catastrophes […] might be avoided if only this idea could suddenly illuminate minds 
which are now so powerfully dark” (16)  
 These reviews suggest that, to a certain extent, the potential for The Battle of Algiers to 
function as an allegory for the Vietnam War provided critics operating within the mainstream 
press with a platform to critique American foreign policy in explicitly anti-colonial terms.  
 The ability for the film to function as an anti-war statement is furthermore evidenced by 
the fact that it was screened by many community organizations operating in both grassroots and 
institutional contexts. The film’s premiere at the Los Feliz theatre in Los Angeles on April, 11th, 
1968 was a benefit screening for the Committee for the Protection of the Bill of Rights (“Benefit 
Premiere Slated for ‘Algiers’”, 88). Its Detroit premiere at the Studio I Theatre in October of 
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1968 was similarly part of a two-day fundraiser for the GI Civil Liberties Defense Committee 
(and the Huey Newton Defense Committee) organized by the Organization of Arab Students at 
Wayne University in collaboration with local chapters of the Young Socialists Alliance, the Black 
Panthers, People Against Racism, and the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (Stark, 36; and 
Stark, 3). The Berkley chapter of the Organization of Arab Students similarly organized a 
screening of the film as part of a Third Worldist film festival “which showed films about popular 
struggles in Angola, Vietnam, and Palestine”, and which was publicized with the tagline “Algiers, 
Vietnam, Palestine, Angola! Dig! Come and Relive the Battle!” (in Daulatzai, 60; and Pennock, 
65). A benefit screening for the Free the Army and GI Coffeehouse in Muldraugh, Kentucky was 
held in February of 1970 at the University of Louisville, which was organized by Committee for 
Survival, “a student group that grew out of Moratorium Day activities” at the university (“U of L 
Bars Fund”, 4). The film was furthermore screened alongside anti-war films during the UCLA 
student strikes in May of 1970, including No Vietnamese Ever Called Me Nigger (1968) and 
People’s War (1970), a film produced by Newsreel in collaboration with the National Liberation 
Front (Murphy, 63-17). In June of 1970, the film was shown by the Claremont Movement 
Against the War’s Liberation School, at the Garrison theatre in Los Angeles, as part of a broader 
“program of films, classes, lectures, and workshops on the war and its effects on democratic 
institutions” (“Event Listings”, 457). In August of 1970, the film was included in the 
programming of the Rutgers Summer Mobilization, a program aimed at high school students in 
New Jersey, which included a lecture on “The Vietnam War and American Foreign 
Policy” (“Peace Program Set”, 13). The Valley State College Lectures and Science Committee 
organized a screening of the film alongside People’s War as part of their anti-war activism in 
December of 1970 (“Battle of Algiers”, 283). The Long Beach Citizens for Peace also organized 
a public showing of the film at the Congregational Church in Long Beach, California in March of 
1971 (“Advertisement”, 15).  
 
The “On Both Sides” Interpretive Protocol and the Vietnam War 
However, in the vast majority of reviews on the film within either the mainstream press or film 
journalism, the tendency to read it as an allegory for the war generated commentary that was 
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decidedly ambivalent about America’s presence in Vietnam. Often critics simply rehearsed the 
terms set by the film’s promotional mandate and emphasized its relevance to the war, without 
providing commentary on the war itself. Moreover, claims that The Battle of Algiers was 
particularly relevant to the Vietnam War were routinely coupled with readings of the film which 
followed the “on both sides” interpretive protocol. Within this discursive landscape, critics often 
promoted understandings of the Vietnam War which also equated American military violence 
with the violence of North Vietnamese forces. While the “on both sides” protocol permitted 
critics to condemn the violence of the American military to an extent, it simultaneously allowed 
them to routinely remain vague about issues of national sovereignty, and inherently skeptical of 
North Vietnamese nationalisms.  
 Joseph Morgenstern of Newsweek asserted that the film was “irresistibly interesting in the 
analogies it offers to Vietnam”, before emphasizing that the “terror” of the war was 
“indiscriminately terrible for French and Moslem alike” (102). Writing for Film Quarterly, Max 
Kozloff opened his review of the film by declaring that a “similar account of the Vietnam war” in 
American would be “troubling” (28). However, Kozloff clearly identified the limited extent to 
which he saw the film as a disruption to American nationalism by noting the film was “political 
exposure, but [..] not necessarily, by virtue of the fact, a partisan cry to arms” (28). Kozloff 
suggested that the film revealed the “resonance of anguish” in “human mutual destruction” and 
told audiences that “both parties to an injustice […] are hooked into a merciless circuit of 
brutalization” (28). After highlighting the film’s relevance to the Vietnam War, Harold Clurman 
of The Nation suggested that the film sought to show its audiences that “wars are as unreasonable 
as they are terrible” because “they rarely achieve the benefits that both sides sincerely claim they 
are battling to bring about” (348). Writing for The Boston Globe, Marjory Adams similarly 
emphasized the film’s relevance to the Vietnam war and claimed that The Battle of Algiers was “a 
view of troubled times the world over”, before asserting that it revealed that both the Algerian 
nationalists and the French military “proved nothing, accomplished nothing, toward making 
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Algeria a better place to live in and served only to keep hatreds alive” (19).   30
 Many reviewers who emphasized The Battle of Algiers’ allegorical function in the context 
of the Vietnam War also constructed the film in terms which effectively naturalized the America’s 
presence within the region. While Harold Clurman of The Nation suggested that “the French had 
much more justification for the repression of the Algerian revolt than we have in intervening in 
Southeast Asia”, he concluded that the picture’s “true import”, was that wars are “all too 
human” (348). Furthermore, despite claiming that war is “unreasonable”, he closed his review by 
asserting their inevitability. He suggested that while the American audiences of The Battle of 
Algiers “[may] pray and plan to avoid” wars, “from time immemorial they have not been 
avoided” (348). Clurman’s attempts to naturalize and normalize war were compounded by his 
claim that “understanding and wisdom are impossible without an initial recognition of [the] tragic 
fact” of war’s supposedly inherently human quality (348). Clurman went on to implicitly 
critiqued anti-war activism (an issue which will be discussed at length later in the chapter), by 
asserting that audiences “can accept” the “tragic fact” of war’s inevitability “without condemning 
[themselves] to hopelessness, to an impotent fatalism or to a hawkish militarism” (348).   
 Paralleling Clurman's analysis, Max Kozloff emphasized the war as both unavoidable and 
obligatory, noting that both sides were “caught by the implacable logic of their situation” (28). 
After emphasizing the films relevance to the American invasion of Vietnam, Kozloff  suggested 
that the actors of the Algerian revolution, and, by extension, the Vietnam War, were obliged to 
participate by emphasizing their involvement as a reluctant duty. Kozloff described the film as 
revealing the fact that “both sides commit atrocities against each other, out of all promotion to 
 Several other reviews follow this interpretive framework. After questioning what an “official response” would be 30
if a similar film were made about “this country’s involvement in Vietnam”, Norman K. Dorn of the San Francisco 
Examiner asserted that “Pontecorvo presents both sides as caught in a brutalizing rise of violence” in which “the 
mounting atrocities - perpetrated by both sides - pile casual horror upon casual horror” (142). In another review 
published in the San Francisco Examiner, the author introduced the film by suggesting that its “parallels with the 
American activity in Vietnam [were] irresistible”, before concluding that “the viciousness - on both sides - of 
guerrilla warfare is stressed” (“Screen”, 177). Bob Guerink of The Atlanta Constitution declared that “some 
American film-maker is going to make an American political film like it” in response to the Vietnam War, before 
suggesting that the film makes it impossible to distinguish “good guys from bad, fascism from democracy” (17). 
Roger Ebert similarly opened his review of the film by asserting that “it is about the Algerian war, but those not 
interested in Algeria may substitute another war” as The Battle of Algiers has a “universal frame of 
reference” (“Battle of Algiers”). He then went on to suggest that “Pontecorvo has taken his stance somewhere 
between the FLN and the French”, and that the director was “neutral”, “concerned with both sides”, and “aware” of 
the fact that “bombs cannot choose their victims” and that “everyone fighting a war can supply rational arguments to 
prove he is on the side of morality” (“Battle of Algiers”).
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their instincts in any other context” (28). John Simon similarly emphasized that the film was 
“particularly meaningful for the United States today” before constructing the French paratroopers 
as figures who were stuck “in an impossible situation”, “[conducting] their mandatory brutality 
not without some regret” (374).  
 Kozloff and Simon's description of French military forces as reluctant participants in the 
Algerian war points to another problematic ramification of the critical tendency to read The 
Battle of Algiers as an allegory for the American invasion Vietnam. Coupled with the promotional 
template which emphasized the film’s allegorical functions, the tendency amongst American 
distributors and critics to humanize and identify with the French that was outlined in the previous 
chapter effectively became endorsements of the American military by proxy. For example, Bosley 
Crowther’s assertion that audiences would “become almost as much involved” in the film’s 
depiction of the Algerian revolution “as [they] would if [they] were seeing a drama of the war in 
Vietnam today”, was coupled with an interpretation of the film which emphasized the heroism 
and compassion of the Colonel Mathieu (Jean Martin) - in which Crowther described him as “so 
impressive and his attitude of regard for the cause and bravery of the rebels is so sure, even 
though he has to torture and kill some of them, that he does full credit to the character of 
Massu” (15). Several other reviews followed a similar rhetorical structure.  31
 Furthermore, within the film-as-allegory interpretive protocol, the tendency amongst 
American distributors and critics to construct the FLN in sensationalist and racist terms became 
an implicit characterization of the National Liberation Front.  T. Geersema of The Kingston 32
Daily asserted that “to a new generation of film fans” the film “must remind them of their own 
views on Vietnam”, before describing the Algerians as “fierce-eyed men and women of cold 
blood and courage, who see their fanaticism pay off” (29). Wayne Wilson of the Van Nuys News 
likewise suggested that “there is an unmistakable parallel to the plight of Algiers reported in 
every edition of todays’ newspapers” from “the jungles of Vietnam”, before emphasizing the 
 See: Adams, 1968; Crowther, 1967; Crowther, 1967; Dorn, 1967; Geertsema, 1968; Geurnik, 1970; and “Screen”, 31
1968.
 Outside of the specific examples that will be discussed, see: Adams, 1967; Dorn, 1967; Clurman, 1967; Kozloff, et 32
al, 1967; and Morgenstern, 1967. 
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“monstrous” violence of the FLN. Wilson also interestingly makes no mention of French military 
violence in his review of the film.  
 Indeed, within the context of review journalism produced over the course of The Battle of 
Algiers’ initial waves of American circulation, there were clear limitations on the extent to which 
audiences were permitted to either critique American foreign policy or identify with North 
Vietnamese nationalisms. Crowther’s coverage of the 1967 New York Film Festival exemplifies 
these discursive limitations. Crowther described The Battle of Algiers as “strong” and “artful”, 
noting that “these are times when the motion picture can do much to shed strong light upon 
events [and] help put them in historical perspective” and asserting that the Pontecorvo “does this 
in a generally accurate and responsible way (X1). In comparison, Crowther labelled the omnibus 
film Far from Vietnam (1967, dir. Jean-Luc Godard, Chris Marker, Alain Resnais, Angès Varda, 
William Klein, Joris Ivens, and Claude Lelouch), which also made its American premiere at the 
festival, as “a rash polemic” and a “hodgepodge of propaganda” (X1). While Crowther partially 
articulated his disdain for Far from Vietnam in aesthetic and formal terms, his arguments against 
the film were firmly rooted in its overtly critical stance towards the American military, and its 
explicit endorsement of Vietnamese nationalisms. Crowther condemned the film for “brutally 
[blasting] the United States as a world power bent on discrediting forever the uprising of ‘the 
poor’ by its involvement in Vietnam” (X1). He furthermore dismissed the film for “[elevating] 
Ho Chi Minh” as “honorable and reasonable” (X1). Ultimately, Crowther concluded his 
discussion of the film by asserting that it was “without logic or persuasiveness” and that it would 
only be appreciated by sections of the American public who were “already emotionally inflamed 
against our policy in Vietnam” (X1).  33
 Thus, within the context of the Vietnam War, the “on both sides” interpretive protocol 
worked to forward understandings of the war which naturalized and humanized the American 
invasion of Vietnam, while simultaneously de-humanizing and abstracting North Vietnamese 
nationalisms. Over the course of its American circulation, while The Battle of Algiers was 
 Max Kozloff echoed some of Crowther’s sentiments in his review of Far from Vietnam, which was published 33
alongside his review of The Battle of Algiers in the Winter 67/68 edition of Film Quarterly. Where Kozloff 
applauded the fact that The Battle of Algiers was not a “partisan cry to arms”, he suggested that Far from Vietnam’s 
inclusion of interview footage with Ho Chi Minh was “problematical” and “extraneous” (30)
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mobilized as a clear indictment of American imperialism by some, it also regularly functioned as 
a vehicle through which various actors could narrativize the Vietnam War in terms which 
normalized the presence and violence of the American military in several Southeast Asian 
nations.  
 
Contextualizing the Film's Promotion and Reception within the Vietnam-Era News Media 
Landscape  
In many ways, the discourses about the Vietnam War that were produced over the course of The 
Battle of Algiers’ American promotion and critical reception mirror the broader rhetorical trends 
that characterized American news media coverage of the war. While both Lyndon Johnson and 
Richard Nixon claimed that negative news coverage was largely responsible for shaping public 
opinion in opposition to the war, and despite the now-infamous publication of the Pentagon 
Papers, many media scholars have asserted that the American press remained consistently pro-
war throughout the period (Berry, 1990; Gitlin, 1980; Knightley, 2004; Hammond, 1988; Hallin, 
1986; Spencer, 2006; and Wyatt, 1995). For Daniel Hallin, American journalists were indeed 
afforded an “extraordinary” level of freedom to “report the war in Vietnam without direct 
government control”, noting that “it was the first war in which reporters were routinely accredited 
to accompany military forces, yet not subject to censorship” (7). However, Hallin simultaneously 
emphasizes the extent to which these shifts in war-time media policies constituted the official 
integration of news media outlets into the processes of the American state, wherein media became 
labelled the “fourth branch of government” (8). For many scholars, by the time American news 
media began to routinely circulate negative coverage of the war itself, American military 
operations in Vietnam had proven to be ineffective for years, and significant opposition to the war 
had already developed within both the leadership of the American military and Congress (Hallin, 
1986; Hammond, 1988; Spencer, 2005).  
 Many scholars have outlined the extent to which the American news media remained 
consistently and vocally supportive of the rationale behind the American intervention in Vietnam 
(Hammond, 1988; Hallin 1986; Knightley, 2004; Spencer, 2006; Wyatt, 1995). The Vietnam War 
was initiated out of a desire to “contain the possible dangers of communism” and thus safeguard 
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the economic interests of “the Western alliance and Japan” in Southeast Asia (Spencer, 56). While 
American correspondents indeed criticized certain aspects of American military and 
governmental policy over the course of the War, and especially after the 1968 Tet Offensive, 
domestic news media remained consistent in their endorsement of the fundamental rationale 
behind the American invasion (Hammond, 1988; Hallin, 1986; Knightley, 2004; Spencer, 2006; 
Wyatt, 1995). As Phillip Knightley has noted, American war correspondents: 
  
  …were not questioning the American intervention itself, but only its effectiveness. Most   
 correspondents, despite what Washington thought about them, were just as interested   
 in seeing the United States win the war as the Pentagon. What the correspondents    
 questioned was not American policy, but the tactics used to implement that policy.   
 (Knightley in Spencer, 59)  
Indeed, Hallin asserts that the American news media remained “deeply committed to the ‘national 
security’ consensus that had dominated American politics since the onset of the Cold War, and 
acted as ‘responsible’ advocates of that consensus” (9).  
 In large part, the discourses about Vietnam that were circulated over the course of The 
Battle of Algiers’ American promotion and reception thus parallel the broader trends of 
contemporaneous mainstream news media coverage of the war. Critics who framed the film as an 
analogy for the Vietnam War routinely voiced criticisms of French military violence, or the use of 
specific tactics they mobilized, such as the use of torture. However, in general, critics remained 
relatively sympathetic to the French position, and were equally, if not more aggressively, vocal in 
their condemnations of the FLN and Algerian nationalism. Furthermore, the tendency of many 
critics to either naturalize military violence as a timeless component of humanity, or the 
fulfillment of a reluctant, but mandatory duty, functions to both normalize and legitimize the 
American military’s presence in multiple sovereign nations in Southeast Asia.  
  
The Battle of Algiers and Broader Media Representations of the Anti-War Movement  
Several scholars have furthermore emphasized the extent to which the American mainstream 
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media represented the domestic anti-war movement in explicitly negative terms (Gitlin, 1980; 
Spencer, 2006). The Battle of Algiers’ initial waves of release corresponded with the veritable 
peak of anti-war activism in the United States, and indeed the film was often implicated in the 
American mainstream media’s representations of the anti-war movement. While the issue of the 
film’s both real and imagined relationships to leftist political organizations will be discussed at 
length in the following chapter on black-American radicalism, here it is important to emphasize 
the extent to which the film was regularly mobilized as a cultural reference point in the 
mainstream media’s attempts to shape popular opinion on the anti-war movement.  
 While the previously discussed review of The Battle of Algiers published in Wilmington 
Delaware’s News Journal highlighted that the film’s local premiere coincided with the 
Moratorium to End the War In Vietnam, in October of 1969, and constructed anti-war 
demonstrators in relatively sympathetic terms (Kaplan, et al, 24), the film was often evoked in 
critics and journalists’ attempts to portray the anti-war movement in defamatory terms.  
 Media theorist Todd Gitlin provides a useful theoretical framework for unpacking the role 
The Battle of Algiers played in this discursive landscape. Gitlin suggests the negative 
representations of the anti-war movement that were circulating in the mainstream press at the 
time of The Battle of Algiers’ initial waves of American release were part of a broader and 
“systematic denigration of the New Left” which characterized the contemporaneous media 
landscape (Gitlin in Spencer, 63). Gitlin outlines several discursive trends within American news 
media representations of the New Left, many of which are relevant to the specific construction of 
the anti-war movement, and The Battle of Algiers’ implication within these discourses.  
 On one hand, Gitlin, emphasizes the extent to which American news media engaged in a 
“trivialization” of the anti-war movement. Here, Gitlin describes how the American press 
routinely attempted to “make light of the anti-war movement’s language, sense of dress, values, 
aims, and age” (Spencer, 63). On the other hand, Gitlin outlines the discursive trend of 
“polarization”, in which the anti-war movement was constructed as threatening and 
“extremist” (Gitlin in Spencer, 63).  
 The Battle of Algiers was often implicated in both of these discursive projects. In several 
instances, journalists referenced the film in their attempts to construct anti-war demonstrators as 
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naive and impressionable, asserting that they had become radicalized due to an over-
identification with the film. Furthermore, by articulating the protestor’s radicalization in terms of 
a specific identification with the FLN, and playing on popular anxieties regarding anti-colonial 
revolution, journalists were simultaneously able to construct protestors as fanatical and violence-
prone.   
 For example, in his November, 1969 coverage of an anti-war demonstration organized by 
the New Mobilization Committee to End the War In Vietnam in Washington D.C. for The New 
York Times, John Kifner asserted that the “violent” and “radicalized contingent” of the protestors 
“[gave] the ululating war whoop of the Algerian rebel women, which [they] had learned from the 
movie The Battle of Algiers” (60). Kifner goes on to repeatedly highlight the fact that protestors 
identified with North Vietnamese nationalism, noting that some participants wore Vietcong 
patches, and attempted to run Vietcong flags on flagpoles throughout the city (Kifner, 60). Here, 
the demonstrators’ open identification with Vietnamese nationalism was in part explained as a 
product of their naiveté. Kifner’s emphasis that protestors had “learned” about Algerian 
nationalism “from a movie”, and indeed identified with The Battle of Algiers to the extent that 
they sought to recreate its specific representation of revolutionary dissent, helps to frame their 
open support for the Vietcong as a form of irrational over-identification with a film-text, rather 
than a legitimate expression of political solidarity.  
 In a rare example of journalism which remained relatively sympathetic to anti-war 
activism, college-student Rob Schorman opened his editorial on “violent” student-protestors in 
the Warren Times Mirror and Observer by asking:  
  
 Why do students feel they must resort to confrontation politics in their protests? Are   
 they just letting off steam? […] Have they all been hoodwinked by a few radical (and   
 probably professional) leaders? Are they […] just a bunch of kids who have been overly   
 influenced by […] the movie The Battle of Algiers? (1).  
While Schorman ultimately concluded that the increase in confrontational tactics in campus-
based protests had occurred for more complex reasons, his introduction points to the extent to 
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which the mainstream press attempted to construct the tactics of civil disobedience used by 
certain contingents of the anti-war movement as the result of their over-identification with The 
Battle of Algiers.  
 Similar assertions that anti-war protestors had become radicalized from watching the film 
were made in editorials about specific political organizations involved in the anti-war movement. 
The Black Panther Party, was undoubtedly the political organization that was the most routinely 
subject to these claims, however this issue will be explored at length in the following chapter. 
Outside of the Black Panther Party, the Weatherman (also known as the Weather Underground or 
Weathermen) were furthermore routinely subjected to these claims in news coverage and 
editorials on anti-war activism.  
 A splinter-organization of Students For a Democratic Society, the Weatherman advocated 
for the radicalization of the white-American left, and an engagement in anti-imperialist 
revolutionary praxis in solidarity with colonized peoples (Daulatzai, 58). Within the American 
mainstream press, the Weatherman’s anti-colonial politic, and anti-war activism, was regularly 
understood as the product of a naive and fanatical over-identification with the Third World - one 
which was often described as having been facilitated by The Battle of Algiers. Richard Starnes of 
the El Paso Herald, claimed that the Weatherman were “violence-prone marxists” whose politics 
were deeply “influenced” by The Battle of Algiers (30). The reporter went as far as to claim that 
members of the Weatherman were “said to have sat in hypnotic fashion through dozens of 
showings” of the film (30). Time magazine similarly reported that after watching the film 
“Weatherman leader Mark Rudd ordered his troops to go underground and wage their own ‘Battle 
of Algiers’” in the United States (“Rise of the Dynamite Radicals”, 17). In an editorial on 
Weatherman member Bern Dohrn, Saul Friedman of The Akron Beach Journal claimed that the 
organization was organized “into tiny groups of three to five”, a strategy they modelled after the 
"revolutionaries in the film The Battle of Algiers” (10).  
 It is important to emphasize the extent to which the film’s distributors both endorsed and 
knowingly played on these broader characterizations of the anti-war movement over the course of 
The Battle of Algiers’ American promotion. The full extent of Allied Artists’ attempts to promote 
the film by engaging with sensationalist and alarmist popular discourses regarding the American 
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Third Worldist left will be explored more fully in the following chapter. However, it is 
furthermore apparent that, in part, Allied Artists’ promotional campaigns for the film directly 
evoked the mainstream media’s construction of anti-war activism.  
 A 1970 press release from Allied Artists entitled “Getting Bigger! Book It Now!” features 
a reprinted version of a New York Times article on the film by Michael Kaufman (see Fig. 10). In 
this article, Kaufman describes a screening of the film in New York which was attended by “a 
mostly youthful audience that has made [The Battle of Algiers] something of a cult fetish” (22). 
He furthermore noted that these “young” and “callous” attendees “[laughed] and [applauded] 
when bombs planted by Algerian women destroyed restaurants frequented by the French” (22).  
 Kaufman’s depiction of the audience of the screening as young, fanatical (in their 
embrace of the film as a “cult fetish”), and violence-prone parallels the discursive trends outlined 
by Gitlin. Indeed, Kaufman went on to directly extend this characterization to the anti-war 
movement itself, asserting that “the banshee-like cries of the Algerian women have been copied 
at mass demonstrations throughout the country” (22). He furthermore claimed that Mark Rudd, 
“one of the founders of the Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society, once 
cited the film as a rationale for his politics” (22).  
Conclusion  
As a pseudo-dramatization of the Vietnam War, The Battle of Algiers filled an important gap 
within the Vietnam War-era media scape. Within this context, the specific protocols of 
interpretation that were endorsed by Allied Artists had multiple and varied effects. In some 
instances, they created space for film critics to articulate anti-colonial critiques of the American 
invasion of Vietnam within the mainstream press. The significance of this aspect of the film’s 
legacy of distribution within American film-markets should not be understated, as many media 
scholars have suggested that there was little to no room for this kind of critique to be made within 
the contemporaneous American mainstream mediascape. Furthermore, the film was mobilized by 
a variety of anti-war activists operating in both grassroots and institutional contexts. Thus, to a 
certain extent, the film was mobilized according to the intentions of its various creators, who had 
hoped that the film would be use to garner internationalist solidarity in the global struggle against 
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imperialism.   
 On the other hand, in many instances, the specific promotional strategies and protocols of 
interpretation that were promoted over the course of the film’s initial waves of American 
circulation worked to naturalize and rationalize the American invasion of Vietnam. By 
positioning the film as an allegory for the Vietnam War, many critics extended the “on both sides” 
interpretive framework for understanding the film’s images of anti-colonial revolution to 
contemporaneous American foreign policy. This discursive strategy resulted in many reviews of 
the film which worked to humanize American military violence, while abstracting and 
demonizing North Vietnamese forces. In this way, the “on both sides” interpretive framework 
functioned to malign questions of national sovereignty in relation to the Vietnam War, and 
effectively police the extent to which American spectators were permitted to identify with 
Vietnamese nationalisms. The film’s evocation by many journalists in the context of news 
coverage of anti-war demonstrations, and editorials on anti-war activism, similarly worked to 
position an identification with anti-colonial nationalisms as fanatical and irrational. Thus, many 
of the discourses that were used to promote The Battle of Algiers to American audiences neatly 
coincided with the broader pro-war rhetoric that characterized the Vietnam War-era mainstream 
American mediascape. 
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Chapter Three:  
Fear of a Black Spectator: The Promotion and Reception of The Battle of Algiers in the Era 
of COINTELPRO  
It has become somewhat commonplace for scholars and critics to emphasize the fact that The 
Battle of Algiers’ initial release coincided with a particularly turbulent period in America’s 
domestic political history. The film is often framed in terms of its embrace by various factions 
that composed the so-called “radical left” of the 1960s and 70s, and explicitly associated with 
anti-colonial political organizations operating in the American context, such as the Weatherman 
and the Black Panther Party. What has been largely left out of scholarship on the film, is any 
analysis of the film’s relationship to the large-scale counter-intelligence initiatives that were 
being enacted by various bodies of the American government throughout the period. 
  In this chapter, I will explore the ways in which the film’s American release coincided 
with the FBI’s Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO)’s initiative to shape popular 
understandings of various sectors of the U.S.-based Third World left. I will outline how the 
marketing strategies employed by Allied Artists directly played on the sensationalist anti-leftist 
discourses that were endorsed and promoted by COINTELPRO. Throughout the films’ initial 
waves of American circulation, distributors and critics increasingly framed the film as a 
“blueprint for revolution” and a source of knowledge regarding the supposed threat that leftist-
inspired acts of domestic terrorism posed to the American public. 
 I have elected to organize my analysis of this particular aspect of the film’s American 
legacy around the Black Panther Party for two inter-related reasons. First, the Black Panther Party 
was perhaps the domestic political organization that was most intensely subjected to the FBI’s 
Counter-Intelligence operations. For Ward Churchill, while COINTELPRO initiatives targeted 
“every dissident group in the United States” during the period, the offensive against the party 
constituted, “a campaign of political repression that in terms of its sheer viciousness has few 
parallels in American history” (78). The second reason that I have elected to focus on the Black 
Panther Party is related to the legacy of The Battle of Algiers itself. While the film has been 
routinely associated with several anti-colonial political organizations, the Black Panther Party has 
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perhaps remained the most consistent reference point in the journalism, cultural criticism, and 
scholarly research that has been produced over the course of the film’s American circulation. 
Claims that the Panthers “studied” the film in the development of party directives regarding 
urban guerrilla warfare have been regularly mobilized by distributors, critics, and scholars alike, 
in an effort to account for the film’s cultural and historical significance. In this chapter, I will 
illustrate the ways in which discourses produced over the course of The Battle of Algiers’ 
American circulation have often worked to forward a vision of the party that ultimately affirms 
much of the anti-Panther rhetoric generated over the course of the COINTELPRO-BPP initiative. 
I will furthermore reflect on the methodological implications this legacy holds for media scholars 
who are attempting to conduct research that must engage with the intersections between 
commodity-culture and revolutionary praxis.   
 
COINTELPRO-BPP  
The Battle of Algiers’ American release coincided with the veritable peak of the FBI’s Counter-
Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO). Initiated in 1956, with the initial aim of containing the 
growth of the US Communist Party, over the course of the 1960s the COINTELPRO project 
would expand to target wide spectrum of political organizations who composed the “New 
Left” (Churchill, 80).  Within this expansive counter-intelligence project, individuals and 
organizations associated with either the civil rights movement or black-nationalisms were subject 
to heightened surveillance and intervention (Churchill, 80). Churchill notes that, Martin Luther 
King Jr, Elijah Muhammad, Stokely Carmichael, Chandler Owen, Jesse Owens, and A. Phillip 
Randolph, amongst others, had been “subjected to the attentions of the FBI simply because they 
were deemed ‘defiantly assertive [about] the Negro’s fitness for self-governance” (FBI in 
Churchill, 79). By 1968, a specific initiative entitled “COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist Hate 
Groups” had been “expanded to include all forty-one FBI field offices”, investigating “all black-
owned newspapers” and “racial advancement groups” including the National Negro Congress, 
the NAACP, the Congress of Racial Equality, the SCLC, the SNCC, Revolutionary Action 
Movement, and the Nation of Islam (81).  
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 However, for Churchill, the Black Panther Party was the organization most routinely and 
intensely subjected to FBI counter-intelligence operations. Churchill asserts that the offensive 
against the party constituted, “a campaign of political repression that in terms of its sheer 
viciousness has few parallels in American history” (78). He notes that out “of the 295 
counterintelligence operations the bureau has admitted conducting against black activists and 
organizations [during the late 1960s], a staggering 233, the majority of them in 1969, were aimed 
at the Panthers” (82). Indeed, in November of 1968, F.B.I director J. Edgar Hoover ordered the 
initiation of “imaginative and hard-hitting [counter]intelligence measures” that were specifically 
“designed to cripple the BPP” (Hoover in Churchill, 82). Furthermore, in January of 1969, 
Hoover initiated a “considerable expansion and intensification” of the department’s efforts to 
“destroy what the BPP stands for” (Hoover in Churchill, 83).  
 Churchill outlines the extensive range of initiatives that the FBI undertook as part of 
COINTELPRO-BPP, including, but not limited to: routine raids of party chapters across the 
country; the sabotaging of the party’s various community-based “survival programs”; mass 
infiltration of party chapters with the explicit intent to “exacerbate intergroup tensions” and 
prevent the development of coalitions”; the active pursuit of fraudulent prosecutions against party 
members; and the assassination of party members (101-106). However, perhaps the most relevant 
aspect of the COINTELPRO-BPP initiative to the distribution and reception of The Battle of 
Algiers is the extensive “media offensive” that the FBI engaged in over the course of the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Churchill outlines the “developed network” of over 300 “cooperative 
journalists” that the FBI enlisted in their attempts to circulate anti-Panther propaganda within 
print, television, and radio-based American news media (84). According to Churchill the explicit 
aims of the FBI’s media offensive was to circulate disinformation that would “discredit the 
Panthers before the public both personally and organizationally” and thus “[isolate] them from 
potential support” (78). The FBI’s media offensive against the party was organized around the 
circulation of three “primary themes”: that the party was “violence-prone”, that they were 
primarily a criminal rather than political organization, and that “those associated with it were of a 
uniformly ‘low moral caliber’” (FBI in Churchill, 84).  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Promoting The Battle of Algiers as a “Blueprint for Revolution” 
In many ways, the American promotion and reception of The Battle of Algiers became effectively 
interlaced in the broader media offensive against the Black Panther Party, and the broader black-
liberation and New Left political movements. In part, The Battle of Algiers’ affiliation with the 
black-liberation movement is the result of its actual uptake by political organizations and 
initiatives like the Black Panther Party (an aspect of the film’s American legacy that will be 
discussed at length later in the chapter) and the internationalist anti-colonial politic that is 
undoubtedly imbedded within the film-text itself.). However, it is simultaneously important to 
emphasize the extent to which the film’s American distributors encouraged and knowingly played 
on its anti-colonial vernacular in ways which served multiple, and often conflicting, political 
agendas. While the film was indeed mobilized by the Black Panther Party and other sectors of the 
American Third World left, in many ways, the promotional strategies pursued by the film’s 
American distributors constructed the film in terms which contributed to the ideological projects 
of COINTELPRO-BPP.  
 Indeed, the 1968 Allied Artists campaign manual explicitly encouraged exhibitors to 
market the film to black-Americans, and other racialized communities (see Fig. 8). In the section 
entitled “These Ideas Will Sell Tickets!” the manual notes that:  
  
 In addition to the broad appeal of The Battle of Algiers, its story of one of the most   
 newsworthy and significant revolts of modern times places the film in a unique category.   
 It makes The Battle of Algiers of special particular interest to minority groups and the   
 organizations involved with their objectives and concerns. (5)  
As such, the manual instructed exhibits to “schedule ads and hand-plant stories in local Negro 
publications and foreign-language newspapers”, and to pursue “advertising and promotions on 
Negro and Spanish-speaking radio stations” (5). The manual furthermore instructed exhibitors to 
screen the film to stakeholders who are “diversified as to background and affiliation”, including 
the “heads of local political organizations” (5).  
 Over the course of The Battle of Algiers’ American circulation, this initial prompt to 
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promote the film in black-American, and other racialized communities, developed into a 
promotional strategy that more overtly played on popular anxieties regarding the black-American 
nationalisms, and other domestic Third Worldist movements. Indeed, much of the discourse 
generated over the course of The Battle of Algiers’ initial waves of American distribution and 
critical reception neatly fit into the ideological imperatives of COINTELPRO.  
 After acquiring the American distribution rights for the film, Allied Artists initially 
pursued an advertising campaign which promoted the film with the tagline “the revolt that stirred 
the world!” (see Figs. 3 and 6). Accompanied by images of a face-off between a tank and an 
anonymous crowd, the advertisements evoked the possibility of pending revolution. However, by 
1969, Allied Artists began to advertise the film in a way which more directly played off of 
popular anxieties surrounding black-American militancy. In October of 1969, advertisements 
appeared in multiple newspapers including The Arizona Republic, The Petaluma Argus-Courier, 
and The Press Democrat with a tagline which framed the film as a “Blueprint for 
Revolution” (see Figs. 11 , 12, 13, and 14).  
 The “Blueprint for Revolution” tagline can, in part, be understood as a response to 
American film critics’ initial reactions to The Battle of Algiers. After the film’s US premiere at 
the New York Film Festival on September 20th, 1967, many critics promoted readings of the film 
as an analogy for contemporaneous American race-politics. Writing for the Los Angeles Times, 
Charles Champlin asserted that the film contained a strong “metaphoric relevance to the racial 
disorders in the United States” (59). Joseph Morgenstern of Newsweek described the film as 
“irresistibly interesting in the analogies it offers to […] America’s racial strife” (102). Noting that 
the subtitles at the New York Film Festival screening translated “Casbah” into “ghetto”, a 
Barnard Bulletin film critic suggested that metaphorical readings of the film in relation to 
American race-politics were “inevitable” (2). Max Kozloff of Film Quarterly endorsed a similar 
analogy, describing Algiers as “a densely populated city even more rigidly segregated than most 
any American metropolis”, and that in its “filth, poverty, and overcrowdedness” the Casbah 
constituted a “slum, about as exotic and glamorous as Harlem” (65).  
 In many instances, the connections critics drew between the film and contemporaneous 
American race politics moved beyond the simple observation of the parallels between the 
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material conditions of black-Americans and the film’s depictions of the Algerian people living 
under French colonial occupation. Critics responding to the film’s American premiere were quick 
to construct the film as a kind of pseudo-prophecy of an impending black-American insurrection. 
Many reviewers directly referenced the film’s relevance to the uprisings which had taken place in 
primarily black-American neighbourhoods in Detroit and Newark over the summer of 1967.  34
Indeed, in his review of the film for The Harpers Monthly, Robert Kotlowitz argued that The 
Battle of Algiers reveals that “the tactics of terrorism […] are standard”, and that “having also 
seen the violence of our own 1967 summer of film” American audiences “are learning to believe 
it” (133). Film Quarterly’s reviewers made a similarly ominous conclusion, writing, “who is to 
say that The Battle of Algiers will not provide a cinematic primer for what is to happen in 
American cities in the near future?” (Kozloff et al, 28).  
  It is apparent that The Battle of Algiers’ images of anti-colonial revolt triggered many 
film critics’ anxieties around American race-relations. These anxious reactions to The Battle of 
Algiers were furthermore routinely articulated in terms of the films’ imagined capacity to 
influence and provoke black-American audiences. Newsweek critic Joseph Morgenstern 
concluded that the film evoked “frightening [responses]” from “many young Negroes” who 
attended the New York Film Festival premiere, who “cheered or laughed knowingly during each 
terrorist attack on the French, as if The Battle of Algiers were a textbook and a prophecy of urban 
guerrilla warfare to come” (102). Morgenstern was by no means alone in his rather sensationalist 
conclusion that the film could be studied by would-be insurgents. Writing for the San Francisco 
Examiner, critic Normal K. Dorn asserted that The Battle of Algiers “might be a handy-dandy size 
text on guerrilla warfare” (142). Time magazine suggested that the film “could serve today as a 
blueprint for revolutionists” (“Festival Attraction, Side-Show Action”, 4). T. Geersema of The 
Kingston Daily corroborated Time magazine’s claim, but elaborated on the film’s potential to 
function as a “blueprint” in ways which reproduce the explicitly racialized dimensions of 
Morgenstern’s review (29). The paper claimed that “during the film’s lengthy run in Manhattan, it 
played to constantly full houses with the majority of the audience always black”, for whom the 
film’s depictions of “rebels shooting police, police retaliating with arrests and executions, and 
 See, for instance: Crowther, 1967; Crowther, 1967; Geertsema, 1968; and “The Battle of Vietnam”, 1967. 34
 !73
individual acts of violence supplemented by bombings, in which women joined” must have 
seemed like “their own lives recreated and their own fates forecast” (29). The review concluded 
by suggesting that the film “sums up [the] epoch - an epoch lived by intense, fierce-eyed men and 
women of cold blood and courage, who see their fanaticism pay off” (29). Roger Ebert 
furthermore emphasized that he “[shared] Morgenstern’s concern” regarding black-American 
spectatorship of the film (32).  
 These reviews anticipate the “blueprint for revolution” tagline, and as such they help to 
uncover some of the ideological roots of the marketing strategy. Furthermore, an Allied Artists 
poster for The Battle of Algiers reveals the extent to which the “Blueprint for Revolution” 
promotional campaign specifically hinged on anxieties around black-American spectatorship of 
the film (see Fig. 15). Sourced from the Criterion Collection’s DVD box-set of the film, the date 
of the poster is unknown. However, the poster’s direct references to Eldridge Cleaver and 
Timothy Leary suggest that it was produced after Leary escaped from a California prison and 
arrived in Algiers under Cleaver’s sponsorship in September of 1970. The poster is organized 
around an image of a black-man’s face. The reflective lenses of his sunglasses reveal the object of 
his gaze as Ali La Pointe, gun in hand and immersed in flame. This imagery directly evokes film 
critics’ alarmist rhetoric surrounding black-American identification with the film’s images of 
anti-colonial violence, and the possibility of the film to function as a “blueprint” for a coming 
black-American insurrection. Moreover, the poster’s tagline, which interpellates potential 
audiences with the provocation, “Eldridge Cleaver has seen it - have you?”, works to directly 
associate this anonymous black-American figure with the Black Panther Party.  
 Furthermore, the posters’ evocations of J. Edgar Hoover works to firmly situate the film 
within the discursive landscape of the COINTELPRO-era.  Circulating in a social and political 35
context in which Hoover had publicly declared the Panthers to be “the greatest threat to internal 
security of the country”, the Allied Artist’s “blueprint for revolution” promotional campaign 
sought to directly play on anxieties regarding the supposed threat that black-American 
nationalisms posed to the security and well-being of the American public (Churchill, 81. Indeed, 
 The tagline “J. Edgar Hoover has seen it - have you?” was also used in a series of advertisements for the film in 35
the The San Francisco Examiner in September, 1971 (see Figs. 16 and 17)
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a 1970 Allied Artists press release entitled “Getting Bigger! Book It Now” (see Fig. 10) features a 
re-print of an article about the film originally published in the New York Times. In this article, 
Michael Kaufman emphasizes the fact that the film “has been adopted by certain radical groups 
in this country as a model- if not of urban guerrilla theory, then at least of revolutionary élan”, 
and that “both the FBI and the Army have shown the film to intelligence operatives” (22). 
Kaufman furthermore emphasizes the threat of insurrection by noting that “there was laughter 
and applause when bombs planted by Algerian women destroyed restaurants frequented by the 
French” and that “at one point a cry of ‘The United States is next!’ rang through the small movies 
house” (22). It is clear that throughout the film’s initial waves of American circulation, film 
critics, distributors, and theatre-owners capitalized on the promotional potential of framing the 
film in terms around anxieties around black-American political organizing that were 
institutionalized and promoted throughout the COINTELPRO-era.  Indeed, the direct 36
relationship between this particular aspect of the film’s political mythologization and its 
exchange value is expressed in the Kaufman review which was re-printed in an Allied Artists 
press release. Kaufman concluded his review by suggesting that while the film initially “drew 
moderate audiences”, its uptake as a “textbook” by militant groups had “steadily [improved]” the 
film’s financial records over final years of the 1960s (22). Kaufman concluded his article by 
remarking that, “now [The Battle of Algiers] is almost always being shown somewhere” (22).  
 
The Battle of Algiers in COINTELPRO-era News Media  
Within the context of COINTELPRO, the sensationalist rhetoric which characterized The Battle 
of Algiers’ American promotion and critical reception had significant social and political impacts. 
Following the logic outlined in the Allied Artists campaign manual, which encouraged exhibitors 
to “capitalize in every way possible on the fact that [the film] is as hot and provocative as today's 
headlines” and pursue cross-promotional potential with local news media (5), over the course of 
 Alongside Allied Artists’ “blueprint for revolution” tagline, Los Angeles Times critic Kevin Thomas’ claims that 36
The Battle of Algiers “offers both an inspiration and a warning to American audiences”, became a popular pull-quote 
in the film’s promotion. Originally accompanied by Thomas’ assertion that if handled incorrectly, “[riots]” in black-
American neighbourhoods could transform into “all-out guerrilla warfare”, Thomas’ claims were regularly mobilized 
as a tagline for the film in the Los Angeles Times movie listings throughout 1968, and were furthermore incorporated 
into a series of advertisements for the film’s run at the Los Feliz theatre in December of 1969 (see Fig. 18)
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late 1960s and early 1970s, the film’s mythology made its way out of the specific realms of film 
promotion and criticism and into several news reports and editorials on either the Black Panthers 
specifically, or the American Third Worldist movement more broadly. Within the mainstream 
American press, The Battle of Algiers functioned as a highly visible cultural reference point that 
commentators could evoke in order to forward a vision of the contemporaneous political 
landscape as one plagued by a growing threat of domestic terrorism and insurrection.  
 On July 26th, 1968, New York Magazine writer Jimmy Breslin appeared on ABC News to 
report on the “Glenville Shoot-Out”. During this incident, which had occurred only three days 
before Breslin’s appearance, Cleveland police raided the headquarters of The Black Nationalists 
of New Libya. The raid escalated into an armed confrontation, in which three police officers and 
three suspects were killed (Miller and Wheeler, 196). The raid and “shoot-out” triggered an 
uprising within the predominantly black-American neighbourhood of Glenville, an event which 
was commonly referred to in the American poplar press as the “Glenville Riots” (Miller and 
Wheeler, 196).  
 In this televised news report, Breslin echoed many of the anxieties that had previously 
been expressed by critics who attended the film’s American premiere. Breslin suggested that The 
Battle of Algiers was being “studied” by black-Americans en masse, and as such, it was 
contributing to the rise of black-American militancy - a phenomena which was furthermore 
constructed as a growing threat to American national security. He began his segment by noting 
that in order to see the film he “had to stand in a long line of people, most of them black” (in 
Shippy, 8). Breslin’s anxiety around these black-American spectators stemmed from his belief 
that “the black people in the audience didn't watch the film [-] they studied it” (in Shippy, 8). 
Breslin noted that the Continental Art Theatre, where he viewed the film was only “six blocks 
away from the place where police men were killed in an ambush” carried out by “guerrilla 
snipers, not kids looting television sets” (8). The commentator’s fears regarding a supposedly 
increasingly militarized black-American public culminated in his concluding remarks, which 
amounted to a warning explicitly directed at white-America:  
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 If this is the turn that violence in urban ghettos is taking then there's no way to    
 measure the trouble we are in […] All the warnings we've had may be materializing.   
 We've ignored all the writings and speeches and Kerner Reports. In the meantime, fiery   
 people in the ghettos were studying The Battle of Algiers. (8)  
Echoing Breslin’s concern, Philadelphia Daily News reporter Pete Hamill asserted that armed 
confrontations between civilians and individuals in “Philadelphia, Chicago, and half a dozen 
other American towns" prove that “guerrilla warfare is [now] a reality” in the United States (18). 
While it is unclear to which other locations or events Hamill was referring, his editorial was 
likely written in response to the Philadelphia shootings which took place in August of 1970, in 
which a group of people reportedly linked to the Black Unity Council shot four police officers, 
injuring three and killing Sgt. Frank Von Colln. Furthermore, the Chicago events Hamill 
referenced were likely those which took place over the course of the summer of 1970, in which 
several armed confrontations occurred between police and residents of the Cabini-Green housing 
projects during a period of heightened police surveillance and raids in the area. Despite the fact 
that these events were in no way tied to a specific political organization or movement, Hamill 
suggested that they constitute the initiation of “The Battle of Algiers, American-style” (18).  
 Leyor F. Aarons articulated a similar vision in his coverage of the Marin County 
Courthouse shootings for the Washington Post, reprinted in the August, 17th, 1970 edition of the 
Democrat and Chronicle. Aaron’s article details the armed confrontation in which Jonathon 
Jackson attempted to free George L. Jackson, Fleeta Drumgo, and John Wesley Clutchette from 
police custody, who were popularly referred to as the “Soledad Brothers”. By the time of the 
shooting, a large-scale campaign had been organized by several political organizations to free the 
three men, who many believed had been framed for the murder of a guard in Soledad prison.  37
Aarons described the shootings in explicitly cinematic terms, arguing that while "the bloody 
escape at the Marin County courthouse [initially] seemed like a daring, movie land-style prison 
Several digitized documents produced by the Soledad Brothers Defense Committee have been made available by 37
the Freedom Archives. The Marin County Courthouse shootings were furthermore the events that led to Angela 
Davis’ later arrest and trial, as Jackson used a gun which Davis had purchased. Davis was eventually acquitted of all 
charges. These events are discussed at length in both Min S. Yee’s The Melancholy History of Soledad Prison: In 
Which a Utopian Scheme Turns Bedlam, and Davis’ Angela Davis: An Autobiography. 
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break with no more political significance than a Humphrey Bogart film”, the events have since 
become “a watershed in America’s progress toward its own Battle of Algiers” (4).  
 Published during the veritable peak of the COINTELPRO project, these articles point to 
the extent to which The Battle of Algiers’ entry into American markets coincided with a period of 
pronounced cultural, social, and political anxiety around the supposed threat that black-
nationalisms posed to American national security. Allied Artists’ promotional campaigns worked 
to position The Battle of Algiers as a frame through which the American public could understand 
certain sectors of the black-nationalist and black-liberation movements’ decisions to engage in 
armed confrontation with the police. However, within the popular press, the film was rarely, if 
ever evoked in an effort to forward an anti-colonial critique of the American state. Instead, it 
functioned as a vessel through which a handful of actions that were either specifically aimed at 
police, or other legal institutions of the United States, could be translated into attacks on the 
American public at large, and reconstructed as the inaugural events of an impending race-war. 
These fearful premonitions proved politically useful in their ability to legitimize the large-scale 
police and state repression of both black-American political organizations, and the black-
American public more broadly.  
 Indeed, the film was furthermore evoked in several right-wing editorials which advocated 
for various forms of government action in the wake of the supposedly growing threat of 
insurrection. Writing for The Daily Chronicle, Paul Scott argued that sectors of the American 
congress who advocated for the scaling-back of the “federal government’s internal security 
surveillance operations” should instead be supporting their escalation due to the continued threat 
of a “new breed” of radical leftist terrorist (6). Scott’s article outlines an elaborate “four phase” 
plan for insurrection developed by an unspecified network of “radical groups”, based on “inside 
information” presented to the California State legislature by the Attorney General’s office (6). 
Scott suggested that readers watch “the widely distributed film entitled The Battle of Algiers”, as 
the film “[spells] out” a “timetable” similar to the one outlined by the Attorney General (1975: 6).  
 Writing for the Colorado Spring Gazette-Telegraph, columnist H.L. Hunt mobilized the 
film as a rationalization for the large-scale de-funding of public services in response to the 
American government's supposed “financing [of] revolutionaries” (6).  Hunt’s editorial describes 
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a then recent State Internal Subcommittee hearing, in which Sgt. Robert Thomas of the Los 
Angeles Police Department “explained how the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare [(HEW)], and the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development have given financial aid to militant groups and individuals” (30). Hunt 
emphasized the systemic nature of the relationship between public funding and armed 
insurrection, claiming that over “$600000 in federal funds have gone to revolutionary groups in 
Southern California alone” (6). In order to support this claim, Hunt primarily discussed an 
instance in which a “HEW grant of $50,000 went to a ‘student leadership program’ at the 
University of California at Los Angeles”, in which participants apparently “received training in 
terrorism and violence” (6). Hunt draws this conclusion from the fact that the program organized 
public lectures by Herbert Marcuse and Sal Castro, and a screening of The Battle of Algiers, 
which “[describes] the terrorist tactics used against the French in Algeria” (6).  
 Thus, once reconstructed as a “blueprint for revolution”, The Battle of Algiers became a 
useful tool with which journalists and cultural commentary could catalyze reactionary fears 
regarding a leftist or black-American led insurgency, and promote a culture of securitization. 
Each of these ideological ramifications of Allied Artists’ promotional strategy neatly coincided 
with the objectives of Hoover’s COINTELPRO initiatives.  
 
Psychoanalyzing Dissent: Naive Mis-Readings and Over-Idenitifications  
The film, and specifically the Allied Artists-endorsed “blueprint” mythology, was furthermore 
routinely evoked by the American popular press in order to forward defamatory characterizations 
of both the Black Panther Party and their supporters. Paralleling the ways in which the film was 
mobilized in mainstream media news coverage of the anti-war movement outlined in the previous 
chapter, claims that the Panthers had studied the film were often mobilized as evidence of the 
party’s illegitimacy. Here, the Black Panthers revolutionary anti-colonial politic and endorsement 
of armed struggle was constructed as the product of a naive over-identification with the film.  
 Writing for the New York Times, Martin Arnold claimed that The Battle of Algiers had 
become “the party’s training film” (D-6). Arnold then goes on to assert that the fact that “Panthers 
and would-be Panthers” were “encouraged to see and study” the film, exposed the degree to 
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which “the party remains an organization committed to a rather simplified version of Marxism, in 
which the Panthers, as poor blacks, or ‘lumpens’ find an explanation of the ghetto conditions they 
know” (D-6). Arnold then concludes his article by assuring his readers that the Panthers “have 
not [been] very successful” as either a “revolutionary party” or in their efforts “to [run] a small 
thing such as a free breakfast program for children” (D-6). George Weller similarly claimed that 
“the best living manual of action to many Black Panthers is not any book by Che Guevara or 
Fidel Castro, but a movie, The Battle of Algiers” (35). Writing for the Chicago Daily News 
Service, Weller asserted that the film has become a “Panther guideline for urban guerrillas” 
precisely because it depicts “the tactics of street fighting [and] torture” which Weller’s imaginary 
version of the party had fully-embraced (35).  
 The tendency to mobilize the film in an effort to perform large-scale psychoanalytic 
assessments of the Black Panther Party was furthermore routinely extended to elements of the 
radical left who supported the party or embraced similar political platforms. A particularly 
alarmist editorial published in the September 2rd, 1970 edition of Time magazine entitled 
“Bombing: A Way of Protest and Death”, outlines a supposed upsurge in “a fearsome new brand 
of terrorism” across the nation (10). While the author primarily discusses incidents with no direct 
connection to leftist political organizations (outside of the Panther 21 trial, which is discussed in 
detail below), they nevertheless contend that leftists “have begun using explosives to produce 
sound effects and shock waves in their campaign to unnerve a society that they regard as corrupt 
and doomed” (10). Without providing any specific examples, the author asserts that “schools, 
department stores, office buildings, police stations, military facilities, [and] private homes [have 
all] become targets” (10). Furthermore, despite the fact that the author concedes that “fatalities 
have been relatively few”, they assert that “one small slip [ —] or one bloodthirsty bomber — 
could run up a death toll that could easily rival a week’s total in Viet Nam” (10). The article’s 
sensationalist and alarmist rhetoric about the supposedly growing threat of leftist terrorism aimed 
at the American public, is rationalized through a lengthy discussion of the psychological profiles 
of the “whites and blacks of the lunatic left” (10). The author asserts that “the most frightening 
aspect of the political bomb-throwing is the cool acceptance of terror as a tactic by […] mainly 
young, often college-educated” people, many of whom “are guilt-ridden offspring of middle-class 
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affluence (10). Lead by “black militants” who have been “devoured by despair”, these two 
contingents of the radicalized left are imagined as sharing “an apocalyptic and conspiratorial 
view of society and an arrogant, elitist conviction that only they know how to reform the 
world” (10). The author supports these claims by characterizing the radical left as “young people” 
who have been overly-influenced by “examples of glamorous, if not always successful 
revolutionaries”, and asserting that “cops in San Francisco and New York City both say that the 
movie The Battle of Algiers has influenced much of the bombing surge” (10). Writing for The 
Washington Post, Stanley Karnow similarly claimed that The Battle of Algiers “is widely 
regarded by radicals as well as law enforcement specialists […] as a guide to urban insurgency”, 
a fact which can be understood as “a symptom of the ignorance” that plagues the left (A21).  
 The Battle of Algiers thus functioned as a useful reference point in mainstream 
journalism’s attempts to account for and discredit those sectors of the American public that were 
either participating in, or supportive of, the various acts of civil disobedience, armed or 
otherwise, that were occurring throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. The frequency with 
which The Battle of Algiers was referenced in mainstream media coverage of the activities of The 
Black Panther Party, or the broader American Third Worldist left, suggests the extent to which the 
film functioned as a highly visible cultural reference point, one which could be mobilized in an 
attempt to shape popular opinion about anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist political 
movements.  
 This discursive phenomenon was in part facilitated by the specific readings promoted 
over the film’s initial waves of distribution and critical reception. The Allied Artists campaign 
manual clearly encouraged exhibitors to emphasize the extent to which the film “paralleled” 
contemporary world events (5). It furthermore noted that “these events, and the story behind 
them, can be discussed from a political point-of-view, in addition to psychologically” (5). It is 
apparent that many film critics, and indeed journalists, followed through on Allied Artists’ prompt 
to use the film as a springboard for assessing the psychoanalytic dimensions of civil 
disobedience.  
 Furthermore, within the context of the “blueprint for revolution” marketing campaign, the 
“on both sides” protocol of interpretation outlined in the previous chapters functioned as a useful 
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means by which one could discredit the radical leftist organizations who had apparently “studied” 
the film, by suggesting that they simultaneously mis-read or mis-understood the text. After 
claiming that The Battle of Algiers was a “prophecy of urban guerrilla warfare to come”, Joseph 
Morgenstern of Newsweek asserted that the film’s “obvious intent was illumination, not 
incitement to riot” and that Pontecorvo “could not be blamed” if black-Americans were “on a 
short fuse” (102). Rogert Ebert echoed Morgenstern’s sentiments in a review entitled “Violence-
Lovers May Have Missed Message of Movie” (32). After noting that “it is always interesting […] 
when an audience takes a movie the ‘wrong way’”, Ebert concluded that he “[shared] 
Morgenstern’s concern” regarding black-American spectatorship of the film (32). Ebert claimed 
that the attendees who applauded the FLN’s acts of political violence were plagued by an 
“overdeveloped sense of romanticism”, and asserted that “the real message of The Battle of 
Algiers” was that the “bloodshed might have been avoided through negotiations” and was 
“unnecessary” (32). Similarly, in his New York Times review that was later re-printed in an Allied 
Artists press release for the film, Michael Kaufman notes that “the apparent callousness of one 
segment of the movie’s audience has drawn the condemnation of such disciples of non-
violence” (22). Kaufman goes on to quote a Playboy interview with folk singer Joan Baez, who 
had asserted that “there were people in this country who saw [The Battle of Algiers] as a 
handbook for revolution”, and that “in their terms, the most revolutionary act anybody can 
perform is to be able to blow up a roomful of people after having seen children in it” (22).  
 Thus, for many film critics, scholars, and journalists, The Battle of Algiers functioned as a 
useful means by which one could manage the ideological threat posed by anti-colonial political 
movements. In the context of its initial waves of American promotion, The Battle of Algiers’ 
images of anti-colonial revolution were primarily constructed as a pacifist statement. By 
suggesting that radical political organizations had “studied” the film before engaging in various 
forms of political militancy, film critics, scholars, and journalists could delegitimize these 
organizations on psychoanalytic grounds - suggesting that their praxis stemmed from a naive 
over-identification with, and/or mis-reading of, the film-text itself.  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The Panther 21 Trial 
However, perhaps the most significant repercussion of the “blueprint” mythology was the film’s 
mobilization during the infamous Panther 21 trail. On April 2nd, 1969, the homes and offices of 
the Harlem chapter of the Black Panther Party were raided by the New York Police Department. 
Twenty-one party members were arrested and charged with “186 counts of attempted arson, 
attempted murder, and conspiracy” to commit acts of domestic terrorism (Wahad et al, 23). Of the 
initial twenty-one members arrested, thirteen stood trial. Adrienne Rooney opens her insightful 
analysis of the trail’s proceedings by listing the names and “basic biographical details” of the 
defendants in an effort to “avoid abstracting the individuals indicted under the Black Panther 
Party’s organization apparatus and concomitant mythology embraced by the prosecutor” (23). 
Embracing Rooney’s ethos, I will quote her description of the defendants at length: 
  
 Lumumba Abdul Shakur was a 26 year old working in the Bronx at an antipoverty agency 
 called the Elsmere Tenants Council; Richard Moore (aka Analye Dharuba), a 24    
 year old painter, who, while out on bail, in fact fled to Algiers in the middle of the trial;   
 William King (Kwando Kinshasa), was a thirty year old subway-station worker and U.S.   
 veteran; Michael Tabor (Ceteweyo), a 22 year old artist, and addicted to substances at the  
 time of his arrest, who, while out on bail, also fled to Algiers in the middle of the trial,   
 which became publically known during the trial; Ali Bey Hassan, was a 31 year old   
 community worker; Alex McKeiver (Abayama Katara), an 18 year old high school   
 student and president of his school’s Afro-American History Club; Clark Squire, a 32 year 
 old involved in drug and robbery related legal allegations already; Afeni Shakur, 22 years  
 old and wife of Lumumba Shakur; Curtis Powell, a 33 year old biochemist working at   
 Columbia Presbyterian Hospital; Robert Collier, 32 year old director of the Tompkins   
 Square Community Center in Manhattan’s Lower East Side; Walter Johnson (Baba   
 Odinga), a 24 year old born in Antigua; Lee Roper (Shaba Om), 19 years old; and Joan   
 Bird, a 20 year old student at Bronx Community College (23).  
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For Abu-Jamal Mumia, these thirteen people, who remained incarcerated over the twenty-six-
month duration of the trail, constituted “almost the entire Harlem-Bronx chapter of the Black 
Panther Party” which was the “leadership” of New York City-area Panthers (in Wahad et al, 23).  
 Over the course of the Panther 21 trail, Joseph A. Phillips, who presided over the case on 
behalf of the District Attorney Frank Hogan’s office, engaged in a concerted attempt to prove that 
the Black Panther Party had developed an elaborate bombing campaign aimed at “police 
precincts, schools, [and] department stores” across New York City, and the New York Botanical 
Garden (Wahad et al, 23). The District Attorney sought to construct the Panthers as a “fairly large 
group of fanatical, well-disciplined, well-trained urban guerrillas” who were engaged in an 
insurrectionary offensive aimed at the American public (Zimroth in Rooney, 23).  
 The District Attorney’s case relied mainly on the testimonies of undercover officers who 
had infiltrated the party. One of these officers, Gene Roberts, claimed that, as part of his 
orientation into the party, he had been invited to a screening of The Battle of Algiers, after which 
party-member Lumumba Shakur had told him that the Panthers intended to carry out a series of 
terrorist attacks based on sequences in the film in which Algerian women plant bombs in the 
French quarters of Algiers (Rooney, 23). On November 9th, 1970, despite objections from the 
defence, Phillips screened The Battle of Algiers for the jury - claiming that the film demonstrated 
the extent to which the Panthers had been “influenced by African terrorism” (quoted in Churchill, 
103). Phillips furthermore asserted that the film was “required viewing” for Black Panther Party 
membership, and the “blueprint” for the Panther’s alleged terrorist conspiracy (quoted in 
“Terrorism Film in Panther Trial”, 9).  
 It is important to note that this screening took place just over a year after the first 
advertisements with the Allied Artists-endorsed tagline, “blueprint for revolution” had circulated 
in the American press. Phillip’s direct evocation of the rhetoric used to promote the film reveals 
the extent to which The Battle of Algiers’ American promotion was implicated in the 
development of a culture of fear surrounding black-American organizing. It furthermore suggests 
that the District Attorney’s office sought to knowingly play on, and indeed amplify, sensationalist 
rhetoric regarding the party that had already been well-established within American mainstream 
media by the time of the trial. Indeed, Ward Churchill asserts that the trail was accompanied by 
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“a veritable blizzard” of publicity, most of which “concentrated on the [alleged] coordinated acts 
of terror”, rather than the proceedings of the trial itself (102). Much of the mainstream press 
coverage of the trail released over the Fall and Winter of 1970 focused on the screening of The 
Battle of Algiers, and rehearsed the District Attorney’s claims that the Panthers’ large-scale 
terrorist plot had been inspired by watching the film.   38
 Furthermore, while presenting the film to the jury, Phillips reproduced discourses 
surrounding black-American spectatorship of the film that had previously been forwarded by 
figures such as Breslin, Morgenstern, and Ebert. Phillips explained to the jury that the film 
outlines “a philosophy, a theory of revolution” that positions “terrorism” as “productive”, and 
which suggests “that you should and can put bombs in public places” (quoted in Kempton, 272). 
While he assured the jurors that the film would not “make a terrorist out of anyone who is 
sophisticated”, he compelled them to “appreciate the effect that this film is going to have on 
uneducated minds” - adding that the jurors had listened to recorded conversations between the 
defendants, and as such had an understanding of their limited levels of intelligence (quoted in 
Kempton, 272).  
 Despite the Office of the District Attorney’s concerted efforts to convince the jury of the 
Panther’s terrorist plot, Churchill notes that “it took the jury just ninety minutes to reach ‘not 
guilty’ verdicts in all 156 of the charges against the thirteen defendants who ultimately stood 
trial” (103).  The verdict was undoubtedly due, in part, to the fact that undercover agent Gene 
Roberts eventually conceded that he had falsified much of his testimony. As historian Frank 
Donner has noted, near the end of the trail Roberts testified that: 
 Lumumba Shakur had never had any dynamite to his knowledge and never gave Roberts   
 orders to do anything but community work...there was never any agreement he knew of to 
 place explosives at any particular department store; no one had ever agreed to place any   
 explosives at the railroad sites; he did not recall anyone being assigned to bomb anything.  
 For example, see: Asbury, 1970; Donald, 1970; Flynn, 1970; Flynn, 1970; Martin, 1970; Oelsner, 1970; Oelsner, 38
1970; “Panther Jury May See Film”, 1970; “Panther Jury Shown Film Over Objections”, 1970; and “Terrorism Film 
In Panther Trail”, 1970. The trail is furthermore mentioned in the previously discussed Time magazine editorial, 
“Bombing: A Way of Protest and Death”. 
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 (in Rooney,  17)  
However, regardless of the outcome of the trail itself, allegations that the Panthers had studied 
The Battle of Algiers in an attempt to develop a campaign of domestic terrorism aimed at the 
American public persisted. In an essay on Pontecorvo’s oeuvre published in the Summer 1971 
edition of Sight and Sound magazine, David Wilson claimed that the “ambiguous overtones” of 
The Battle of Algiers caused “militant blacks” to read the film “less as a message for the Third 
World than as a training manual for urban guerrilla tactics” (160-161). More significantly, in her 
oft-cited Filmguide to the Battle of Algiers published in 1973, Joan Mellen claimed that The 
Battle of Algiers had been “misunderstood, particularly by the Black Panthers” who did not 
“[recognize] that the terrorist tactics carried out by Ali La Pointe and the others were the means 
not to victory, but to temporary defeat”, and indeed “used it as a manual for urban guerrilla 
warfare” (63).  
 
Building an Anti-Colonial Popular Consciousness: The Battle of Algiers in Black Panther 
Party Praxis  
The Black Panthers did mobilize the film over the course of their organizational lifespan, albeit in 
radically distinct ways than those imagined by the critics, journalists, and scholars who promoted 
the “blueprint” mythology. A closer look at how the party actually used the film can help to 
elaborate on the disparities between the vision of the Black Panther Party that has been 
propagated over the course of The Battle of Algiers’ American circulation, and the realities of the 
political organization on the ground.  
 It is, of course, difficult or potentially impossible to account for the entirety of the Black 
Panther Party’s operations over the course of its brief but complex organizational history. Several 
historians have emphasized the significant level of autonomy individual party chapters operated 
with and, as such, neither a small sampling of party activity in a handful of locations, nor the 
directives outlined by party leadership, can be used to make substantive claims about the party’s 
operations as a whole (Jeffries, 2007; Jeffries, 2010; Jeffries, 2018; Lazerow, 2007; Lazerow and 
Williams, 2008; Malloy, 2017; Martin, 21012; Peniel, 2010). Historian Sean A. Malloy cautions 
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that “to speak of a singular Black Panther Party is in some ways misleading, as there were often 
significant divisions between the party’s national headquarters and local chapters as well as 
within and between its leadership and grassroots supporters” (3).  However, available evidence 
on the party’s operations works to debunk many of the assumptions and claims embedded in the 
mythologies surrounding their mobilization of the film.  
 The first, and perhaps the most glaring disparity between myth and reality is the overall 
significance of The Battle of Algiers to the party’s development and operations. Nicholas 
Harrison provides some initial outlines of this problematic gap in his 2007 guest-edited issue of 
Interventions, dedicated to a reconsideration of the film’s legacy. Harrison suggests that “the 
extent of [the film’s] inspiration role” to the Black Panther Party “has often been overstated, not 
least by the film’s publicists” (338). He points to the fact that the film is only mentioned a single 
time in the 2001 anthology on the party edited by Kathleen Cleaver and George Katsiaficas, 
Liberation, Imagination, and the Black Panther Party.  
 While Harrison tempers his claim with the assertion that he has not “researched [the 
issue] thoroughly” (338), further investigation supports his initial hypothesis. In Judson L. 
Jeffries’ seminal three-part historical survey of the Black Panther Party’s on-the-ground 
operations in American cities the film is only referred to once, in a testimony that is discussed at 
length below. The film is not mentioned in the anthology Look for Me in the Whirlwind: From the 
Panther 21 to 21st Century Revolutions, a collection of works produced by defendants of the 
Panther 21 trial. Nor is it directly referenced in any of the published autobiographies or 
biographies produced by former Panther members that are currently available, save for a passing 
reference in Sam Durant’s edited anthology of writings by or about former party Minister of 
Culture Emory Douglas, Black Panther: The Revolutionary Art of Emory Douglas.  In this text 39
Douglas briefly mentions the film, claiming that black-Americans felt an “intense identification” 
with the film’s depiction of the FLN (61). Douglas, however, does not suggest that the film was 
studied by party members in any capacity. Perhaps most tellingly, the film is not referenced a 
 This includes Angela Davis’ Angela Davis: An Autobiography, David Hillard’s Huey: Spirit of the Panther, Hillard 39
and Lewis Cole’s This Side of Glory: The Autobiography of David Hillard and the Story of the Black Panther Party, 
Bobby Seale and Stephen Shames’ Power to the People: The World of The Black Panthers, Bobby Seale’s Seize the 
Time: The Story of the Black Panther Party and Huey P. Newton, and Assata Shakur’s Assata, An Autobiography. 
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single time in any of the issues of the party paper, The Black Panther - Intercommunal News 
Service produced between 1967 and 1973. This relative absence of any direct references to The 
Battle of Algiers in this large selection of sources reveals that the film played a much smaller role 
in the party’s ongoing operations than the “blueprint” mythology has suggested.  
 Furthermore, within the body of historical research and materials currently available on 
the party, the instances in which The Battle of Algiers is referenced outline a very different 
history of engagement than those that have been routinely forwarded in promotional discourses, 
cultural criticism, and academic research on the film. It should be clearly stated that over the 
course of this research, I have found no evidence to suggest that the party developed or 
implemented any directives in which the film was to be systematically studied to develop 
guerrilla warfare tactics or terrorist plots. Rather, the film was primarily used as a vehicle for 
public education about the realities of colonialism and imperialism, and the fostering of 
internationalist consciousness.  
 In a 2005 interview with Lewis Cole, former Chief of Staff of the Black Panther Party, 
David Hillard described mobile screenings of The Battle of Algiers organized by party chapters in 
Harlem, Oakland, and San Francisco:  
 
 […] we had a truck that we had cut the side out of and put a screen into it - sort of a   
 mobile motionpicture theater, if you can imagine it. On the side is this screen that we   
 put. Like a bakery truck, a bread truck? […] We would pull up in the parking lot, and we   
 would turn on our amplifiers and start making speeches, and when people crowded   
 around at five or six when it's beginning to be dusk, we would say, ‘Stick around. We're   
 gonna show you some film.’ We would show the community ‘The Battle of Algiers.'   
 We’d show them, and we would do this mobile sort of propagandizing  (332) 
In a 1972 interview with Secheba, “the official organ of the African National Congress of South 
Africa” - a liberation party which was then operating clandestinely in exile, Huey P. Newton 
corroborates Hillard’s description of mobile film screenings and elaborates on their role within 
the party’s praxis (Newton, 197). Newton described the screenings as part of a broader public 
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education initiative (197). He asserted that the party understood that “part of [its] role as a 
vanguard [was] educating the people […], orientating them and providing an understanding of 
the social forces that [were] in operation and the dialectics at the time” (202). For Newton, 
mobile film screenings provided a particularly accessible mode of knowledge dissemination that 
proved useful in the party’s attempts to “raise the consciousness” of working-class and sub-
proletarian black-Americans who were “tied up […] in their survival from day to day” (202). 
More specifically, Newton asserted that the film-medium provided an effective means by which 
the party could emphasize “the international nature of the struggle” (204). While Newton does 
not name The Battle of Algiers specifically in this interview, he notes that “we have films of the 
revolution that took place in Algeria”, and that “the community is very impressed with that kind 
of thing because they can easily see the relationship between the way the French treated the 
Algerians and how we are treated in this country” (204). 
 Thus, the Black Panther Party used The Battle of Algiers not as a pseudo-manual for 
urban guerrilla warfare, but rather as a vehicle for popular education on various struggles against 
imperialism and the fostering of internationalist political consciousness. Newton and Hillard’s 
testimonies furthermore suggest The Battle of Algiers was only one of many films shown in this 
capacity. Hillard describes organizing mobile screenings of “American documentary films” (332). 
Newton furthermore closes his interview with Secheba by stating that the party “would like more 
information about the struggle in Southern Africa”, and specifically “film footage” (204). He 
assures the interviewee that “any pictures or film footage you can get to us […] will be shown 
inside the Black community, the Chinese community, the Indian community, [and] the White 
community” (204).  
 The testimonies of Hillard and Newton suggest that, despite their militant endorsement of 
armed struggle, the Black Panther Party’s engagement with The Battle of Algiers paralleled that 
of many other political organizations, unions, or student-groups who screened the film for the 
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purposes of popular education and consciousness-building.  Indeed, in many instances, the party 40
collaborated with other university- or community-based political organizations on events which 
incorporated screenings of The Battle of Algiers into their programming.  
 The film’s Detroit premiere marked a collaboration between the local chapter of the Black 
Panther Party and the Organization of Arab Students at Wayne University, the Young Socialists 
Alliance, the People Against Racism, and DRUM (the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement) 
(Stark, 36; Stark, 3). The screening was organized at the Studio I theatre as a benefit for both the 
Huey Newton Defense Committee and the GI Civil Liberties Defense Committee in October of 
1968 (Stark, 36). In May of 1970, the Black Panthers collaborated with the Black Students Union 
at Yale University to host a four-day Black Student Revolutionary Conference. An estimated 
500-600 students attended the conference, during which The Battle of Algiers was screened 
alongside filmed interviews with Emory Douglas and Bobby Seale, the latter of whom was 
incarcerated during the time of the conference (Coltman, 10). Conference programming also 
included public lectures by David Hillard, Artie Seale, Elbert ‘Big Man’ Howard, and Ray 
‘Masai’ Hewitt, and workshops which “dealt with such topics as revolutionary action on campus 
and in the community” and “revolutionary nationalism [versus] cultural nationalism” (Coltman, 
10). The conference concluded with a rally at New Haven’s Beaver Pond Park to commemorate 
the birth of Malcolm X (Coltman, 10). Similarly, in March of 1971, the party participated in a 
 Historian Pamela Pennock has outlined how the Organization of Arab Students organized community-based 40
screenings in Dearborn and Detroit for “diverse working-class immigrant communities who hailed from Lebanon, 
Palestine, and Yemen” in cooperation with “radical Black labor groups such as the League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers” alongside films about Palestine produced by the grassroots film-collective Newsreel (Pennock in 
Daulatzai, 60). Cynthia A. Young furthermore outlines the film’s screening as part of a 1974 film festival organized 
by Local 1199, the Hospital Workers Union, an organization which Young describes as “one of the most successful 
and highly visible unions in the United States” who “crafted a highly effective coalition between Old Leftists and 
U.S. Third World Leftists” throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Young, 38, 81-82). The film was furthermore screened 
by many university-based black students’ organizations throughout the period, including: the Black Students 
Conference in El Paso organized by the National Association of Black Students in March of 1970 (“Student Group to 
Meet Here”, 18); the National Association of Black Students Convention at the University of Texas in October of 
1970 (“NABS Sets Convention for UT”, 6); the Organization for Concerned Black Students’ National Black Culture 
Week at Highlands University in February of 1971 (“Black Culture Week in Progress”, 1); The Black Festival 
organized by the Black Progressives at Indiana University of Pennsylvania in March of 1971 (“Black Festival Due 
on Campus”, 30); The Black World Film Festival and Symposium at Rutgers College in May of 1971 organized by 
the college’s Department of African and Afro-American studies (“Rutgers Program Slates”, 48); The Black Unity 
Convention in Dayton Ohio in August of 1971 (“3-day Black Unity Convention Slated, 7); The Black United 
Students of Akron University’s E-Dul A-Dag (Coming Together) Week in November of 1971 (“BUS To Present 
Films, Singers”, D20); and the The Third Annual Black Week sponsored by the University of Pittsburgh’s Black 
Action Society in November of 1972 (“Being Black A State”, 2)
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public screening of the film organized by the New Black Generation, a student-group at C.W. 
Post College in Greenvale, New York. After the film, party-members addressed the crowd on the 
party’s new directives and programs, alongside members of local chapters of the Young Lords 
and the Puerto Rican Students Union (“The Calendar”, 69). The public and collaborative nature 
of these events contradict the vision of the party promoted over the course of The Battle of 
Algiers’ initial waves of circulation as a primarily clandestine and fanatical terrorist network.  
 There is also evidence to suggest that the party screened The Battle of Algiers at some 
community-based meetings that were organized to recruit new members. In Jeffries’ survey of 
on-the-ground Panther activity across America, Bill Elders, a Detroit-area member of the party, 
describes attending a screening of the film organized by the Panthers for “about forty to fifty 
people [from] the community” (141). After the screening party members gave attendees a “sales 
pitch” to join the party (Jeffries, 141). Similarly, in her contribution to the 2005 anthology The 
Black Panther Party (Reconsidered), Oakland-based party member Regina Jennings described 
The Battle of Algiers as the chapter’s “orientation theme” (261). While in certain respects these 
testimonies support undercover agent Gene Roberts’ claim that he had attended a Panther-
organized screening of the film when he first infiltrated the party, they furthermore point to the 
absurdity of the idea that these pseudo-public events were explicitly organized as a means of 
developing guerrilla warfare tactics or insurgency methods.  
 Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that the party leadership studied the film 
systematically for any purpose, let alone for the development of party directives concerning 
terrorist activities. As a political organization whose membership was deeply invested in the 
development of sophisticated analyses of the racialized dynamics of capitalism, and political 
praxis, the Black Panthers looked to a range of sources that greatly exceeded the level of 
historical or theoretical knowledge afforded by viewing The Battle of Algiers. As Jennings notes, 
while the film provided a useful tool in the “orientation” of new members, the Panthers “[studied] 
the revolutions of Africa and Cuba” and “the Red Book of Chairman Mao” (261). In the Secheba 
interview, Newton furthermore outlines that the “most important inspiration for the Black 
Panthers” has been the theoretical works and actions of “Fidel and Che, Ho Chi Min and Mao 
and Kim Il Sung, but also the guerrilla bands that have been operating in Mozambique and 
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Angola, and the Palestinian guerrillas who are fighting for a socialist world.” (201). The depth 
and complexity of the Black Panther Party’s political education programs has also been described 
by Bobby Seale in his autobiography Seize the Time. Seale writes:  
  
 …members had to go to political education classes. Included was one hour of field   
 stripping of weapons, safety and cleaning of weapons in the home, etc. Then we had one   
 or two hours of righteous political education and study. The third area was work,    
 coordinating various activities, and understanding the political significance of various   
 actions we took… (202) 
For readers familiar with the party’s history, it may seem somewhat absurd to attempt to prove 
that the Black Panther Party developed political education programs or theoretical analyses which 
involved more than watching a single film. However, the anti-Panther rhetoric produced over the 
course of The Battle of Algiers’ circulation in the COINTELPRO-era regularly attempted to 
delegitimize the party to such extremes that this cursory rehearsal of basic facts about the party’s 
infrastructure becomes necessary. These brief testimonies of Jennings, Newton, and Seale provide 
a sobering reminder that the Black Panther Party constituted a remarkably far-reaching and well-
organized grassroots political infrastructure, one which was furthermore enacted by subjects with 
nuanced theoretical understandings of the relationship between (neo)colonialism, class struggle, 
and the racial politics of the United States.  
 
Conclusion  
Unfortunately, despite the efforts of many scholars, activists, and former party members to 
provide access to knowledge about the party’s legacy, the “blueprint” mythology has persisted 
into the contemporary moment. Much of the news media and cultural criticism produced in the 
wake of the Pentagon’s 2003 screening of The Battle of Algiers rehearsed the claims made 
throughout the COINTELPRO-era.  In his New York Times coverage of the screening, Michael 41
 The claim was also rehearsed in the coverage of Pontecorvo’s death in October of 2006. See, Povoledo, 2006 and 41
Bernstein, 2006 for examples. 
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Kaufman claimed that the film was “required viewing […] for radicalized and revolutionary 
wannabes” (WK3). While Kaufman does not name the Black Panther Party specifically, his 
characterization of anti-war activists of the late 1960s as “revolutionary wannabes” betrays a 
level of condescension consistent with the COINTELPRO-era rhetoric which sought to construct 
leftist political organizations as naive and misguided.  
 Christopher Hitchens, on the other hand, was both more explicit in his condemnation of 
the Black Panther Party, and more antagonistic in his rhetoric in his 2004 think-piece on the film 
published in Slate magazine. Hitchens recalled watching the film in American theatres during the 
time of its release, claiming that “in the audience […] there were some idiots who fancied the 
idea of trying ‘urban guerilla’ warfare inside the West itself” (“Guerillas in the Mist"). He goes on 
to asset that the “film had a potent toxic effect of the Black Panthers, Weathermen, Baader-
Meinhof, and Red Brigade types” (“Guerillas in the Mist”. He concluded his article by suggesting 
that “all that needs to be said about that ‘moment’ of the Left is that its practitioners ended up 
dead or in prison, having advanced the cause of humanity by not one millimetre” (“Guerillas in 
the Mist").  
 Hitchens’ conflation of these four distinct sectors of a broadly defined Euro-American-
based “radical” left, and his blanket dismissal of The Black Panther Party as effectively useless 
could be isolated to his status as a well-known leftist-turned-neo-conservative pundit. However, J 
Hoberman expressed a similar, if less overtly embittered, vision of the party in his 2004 article 
for the American Prospect on The Battle of Algiers. In this article, Hoberman claimed that the 
film was a “Panther primer” and a source of “Black Panther fantasy” (64). Despite the fact that 
Newton himself described its use-value to the Panthers in terms of its ability to teach the black-
American public about anti-colonial struggles occurring outside of their immediate context, 
Hoberman asserts that the Panthers studied the film because it “offered invaluable instruction in 
the language of comminqués, organization of cells, placement of terrorist bombs, and use-value 
of cop killing” (64). Hoberman does not support these claims with references to either materials 
produced by the party, or historical research conducted on its organizational legacy. Instead, he 
grounds his specific vision of the party in a vague description of the Panther 21 trial, and a 
citation of Morgenstern’s alarmist Newsweek article (64). Hoberman later reproduced these 
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claims in his book Dream Life: Movies, Media, and Mythology of the Sixties.  
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, much of the review journalism produced to promote the film’s 
2004 theatrical and DVD box-set re-releases by Rialto Pictures, Janus Films and the Criterion 
Collection organized in response to the Pentagon screening also rehearsed the ‘blueprint’ 
mythology.  What is undoubtedly more problematic, is the extent to which these claims have 42
persisted in the realm of academic film studies. Several scholars have reproduced the rhetoric of 
distributors, journalists, and cultural critics responding to the film, not only claiming that the 
Panthers systematically studied The Battle of Algiers, but furthermore describing the rationale 
behind the party’s imagined engagement with the film.  
  In The Transparent Illusion: Image and Ideology in French Text and Film, Rebecca Pauly 
emphasizes the film’s “popularity with the Black Panthers as an example of urban guerrilla”, 
claiming that the party embraced the film because it contained “a lot of valuable technical 
information about the organization of a terrorist movement: its pyramidal structure, ways of 
carrying out attacks, avoiding detection, etc.” (33).  Alan O’ Leary and Neelam Srivastava have 
similarly claimed that “the Black Panthers used scenes from [The Battle of Algiers] for tips on 
how to organize their own urban guerrilla operations” (257). Stephen J. Whitfield went as far as 
to imply that the Harlem chapter of the Panther 21 had indeed concocted a “conspiracy to bomb 
five department stores in mid-Manhattan” - a “plot [which] was presumably an effort to actualize 
The Battle of Algiers” (257). He rationalizes his claim by asserting that The Battle of Algiers 
“was, after all, a film that showed how revolutionary cells might be organized, how bombs might 
be placed in public settings, and how policemen might be murdered to accelerate a turbulent 
cycle of terrorism and counter-terrorism” (256).   
 Thus, despite the fact that all members of the Panther 21 were acquitted of all charges, 
and Gene Roberts ultimately conceded that he had falsified much of the information in his own 
testimony, the accusations made against the Panther by the American government over the course 
of the trial have continued to shape and distort the Party’s legacy. This suggests that while the 
District Attorney was ultimately unsuccessful in his attempt to incarcerate the entire Harlem 
chapter of the party, the trial itself remains a useful contribution to the COINTELPRO-era 
 See A.O, 2004; Gross, 2004; Matthews, 2011; Qureshi, 2016; and Rainer, 2004.  42
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initiatives to construct the party as a “violence-prone” terrorist network  (Churchill, 103).  
 Furthermore, following in the footsteps of Wilson and Mellen, many scholars have 
rehearsed the “blueprint" myth in an effort to assert that the Black Panther Party was misguided 
and naive in their attempts to develop public bombing campaigns which, in reality, didn’t exist. In 
his 2004 interview with Saadi Yacef, Gary Crowdus claimed that “during the Sixties and 
Seventies, The Battle of Algiers was frequently screened by revolutionary organizations around 
the world” including the Black Panthers, before suggesting that it was “rather naive and 
ahistorical for these organizations to try and apply the unique Algerian experience to their own 
situation” (36). Yacef responded by confirming Crowdus’ claim, suggesting that “one has to be 
very naive to try to adapt [the Algerian experience] to another group’s situation” (36). O’Leary 
and Srivastava similarly concluded that the fact that the film’s “precise depiction of guerrilla 
struggle […] was studied by groups like the Black Panthers” for “tips on how to organize their 
own urban guerrilla operations”, reveals the extent to which “violence on screen can be, and often 
has been taken out of its complex ethical and political context” (257). While Thomas Reigler 
conceded that it was “difficult to determine if there was any direct nexus between viewing The 
Battle of Algiers and the evolution of insurrectionary strategy/tactics”, he still concluded his 
analysis of the film by asserting that when “insurgent groups […] looked up to the movie as a 
model to follow, they committed a serious mistake: Western Germany as not Algeria, nor were 
the black Ghettos of the United States” (60). Riegler then directly quotes Mellen’s assertion that 
the film was “misunderstood, particularly by the Black Panthers who have used it as a manual for 
urban guerrilla warfare” (Mellen in Riegler, 60).  
 What is particularly striking about this discursive and methodological phenomenon is the 
fact that these claims have routinely been made without any evidence to suggest that researchers 
have engaged with any of the theoretical writings, speeches, manifestos, communiqués, news 
media, or films that have been produced by, or in collaboration with, the Black Panther Party. Nor 
have these scholars felt the need to engage with any historical research that has been produced 
about the party over the last thirty-plus years. As was the case with much of the journalism and 
cultural criticism produced in the wake of the film’s re-release, film scholars’ claims about the 
party have often been left unaccompanied by citation, or supported by references to Joan Mellen 
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(who in turn offers no citations to support her claims about the party), Morgenstern’s Newsweek 
review, news media coverage of the Panther 21 trial, the testimonies of Glen Roberts and/or the 
District Attorney given during the trial, or each other. In this respect, despite the party’s concerted 
efforts to control their own media-image, and forward internationalist and anti-colonial analyses 
of American race-politics to a mass audience through the publication of a breadth of materials 
(including a newspaper that was published weekly over a period of thirteen years), they have 
since been effectively silenced by many film scholars researching The Battle of Algiers.   43
 Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this rhetorical trend is the extent to which journalists 
and film scholars are willing to position Pontecorvo, and indeed themselves, as figures who are 
more enlightened about either the historical realities of imperialism, or questions of political 
praxis in the context of anti-colonial political organizing, than either the leadership or more 
broadly defined membership of anti-colonial political organizations themselves. Irene Bignardi 
has claimed that, despite the fact that Gillo Pontecorvo never intended the film to function as a 
“cinematic manual of the techniques of urban guerrilla warfare”, “The Battle of Algiers was 
viewed this way by some, even to the point of being studied by the Black Panthers for 
educational orientation” (14-22). Fabrizio Cilento has suggested that “the black Panthers 
apparently misunderstood Pontecorvo’s message when they made the viewing of Algiers an 
important element in the orientation of new members, extrapolating some sequences as a manual 
for urban guerrilla [warfare]” (91). Nancy Virtue has similarly asserted that “by carefully 
cataloguing FLN guerrilla tactics in his film, Pontecorvo was not trying to teach their application 
in other circumstances” before citing Yacef’s claim that the Black Panthers, amongst others were 
“naive” in their attempts to “adapt” the Algerian situation to their own (322). She then concludes 
her discussion of the naiveté of “leftwing revolutionary groups” by asserting that “quite often, a 
tactic that has been replicated is one that has already lost its effectiveness” (322).  
 Despite operating in an academic context, film scholars have routinely mimicked the 
discursive strategies employed by Allied Artists over the course of the film's initial waves of 
American release. In both cases, the material histories of anti-colonial revolution and political 
 The legacy of the Panthers’ attempts to directly engage with, and at times, strategically mobilize their 43
representations in American news media, is discussed at length in Jane Rhodes Framing the Black Panthers: The 
Spectacular Rise of a Black Power Icon. 
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organizing are reduced to a malleable backdrop, one which can be distorted and re-worked in 
order to hyperbolize the cultural or political caché of a single film-object. Whether this has been 
done in an effort to increase the exchange value of The Battle of Algiers as a cultural commodity, 
or to emphasize the film’s cultural, political, or historical significance as an object of study, these 
processes have been more or less consistent in the degree to which they have worked to reify and 
mystify the on-the-ground realities of anti-imperialist political organizing as they have occurred 
in both the United States and abroad. Ultimately, this history of reification points to the extent to 
which marketing techniques that have buttressed the film’s distribution and exhibition have 
influenced popular and scholarly conceptions of historical reality, and in turn, the extent to which 
the realities of anti-colonial revolutionary politics have been distorted and mediated to generate 
publicity for the film.  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Conclusion 
It is apparent that the many discursive trends that characterized The Battle of Algiers problematic 
uptake in the post-9/11 era have antecedents in its earliest waves of American circulation. As 
such, the film’s Islamophobic afterlife in the War on Terror cannot be so straightforwardly 
characterized as a misappropriation of a piece of radical political cinema on the part of the 
contemporary film critics, scholars, or indeed the intelligence (and undoubtedly the public 
relations) branches of the Pentagon. Rather, the reactionary discourses which characterize the 
film’s more contemporary waves of American reception constitute a re-working of the marketing 
strategies and protocols of interpretation that have characterized the film’s initial entry into, and 
circulation within, American art-cinema markets.  
 Echoes of American film-critics’ constructions of the film’s Algerian characters as 
“fanatical” and “fierce-eyed” can be isolated in Cahiers critic Marie-José Mondzain’s suggestion 
that the film “not only tells the story of a subjugated people’s fight against the power dominating 
them, but also represents the ideology of sacrifice, an ambiguous panegyric to puritanism, and a 
questionable relationship to morality”, and as such, bears “the mark of Muslim 
fundamentalism” (in Harrison, 24). Indeed, claims that the film could function as a source of 
inspiration to, or recruiting tool for, radical Islamic terrorists similarly recalls the anxieties around 
the supposed threat that colonized subjects pose to American national security that characterized 
the Allied Artists’ “Blueprint for Revolution” promotional campaign. Furthermore, the 
Pentagon’s re-reading of the film as an allegory for the American military’s counter-insurgency in 
Iraq recreate the discursive dynamics that characterized the film’s promotion and reception in 
relation to the American invasion of Vietnam. Thus, in part, The Battle of Algiers’ consistent 
visibility within American art-cinema markets is not simply a testament to the film’s enduring 
relevance as an anti-colonial statement. It simultaneously points to the film’s consistent ability to 
function as a highly-visible, and accessible, cultural commodity that can be mobilized in the 
service of America’s own imperialist projects.  
 The Battle of Algiers’ ability to continually function as a source of knowledge regarding 
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geopolitical conflicts far outside the purview of its creators has in part stemmed from the 
discourses that have been used to promote the film amongst American audiences. Nicholas 
Harrison has asserted that, “it is easy, it seems, for a spectator to emerge from The Battle of 
Algiers with an [sic] euphoric sense of the historical impetus of the Algerian’s final victory and 
little or no sense of the uncertainties surrounding the historical status of the ‘battle’ as such, 
within the film or outside it.” (403). While this particular power of the film has regularly been 
attributed to its pseudo-documentary aesthetics, and proximities to the historical realities of the 
Algerian War of Independence, in the American context, it has also been the result of marketing 
campaigns and critical protocols of interpretation which have avidly promoted the film as an 
“eyewitness” experience of history itself. These discourses have routinely advocated for 
interpretations of the film and, by extension, Algerian political history, in ways which have 
erased, marginalized, or otherwise distorted the issues of national sovereignty and colonial 
violence that the film’s various creators sought to address. They have also worked to emphasize 
the film’s potential allegorical functions, allowing its supposedly exceptional techniques of 
cinematic realism to be mobilized according to the multiple and shifting gazes of American 
imperialism.  
 An analysis of The Battle of Algiers’ initial waves of American promotion and reception 
furthermore problematizes many of the discourses that have facilitated the film’s political 
canonization in both American film cultures and English-language academic film studies. The 
continued critical and scholarly affection for The Battle of Algiers has undoubtedly stemmed in 
part from the real historical and political interventions that the film has made in a global context. 
To a certain extent, the film’s canonization is inspired by and reflects the actual political 
contributions it has made as a text birthed out of leftist internationalist solidarity, and as one of 
the first texts produced in a post-revolutionary and post-colonial context to receive large-scale 
global distribution. However, this legacy, like most political interventions, is complex and laced 
with contradictions. This research has sought to outline the extent to which the film’s American 
canonization has also been facilitated by promotional strategies that have been rooted in the 
reification and distortion of the historical realities of anti-colonial revolution, internationalist 
Third Worldist solidarity movements, and black-American political organizing. In many 
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instances, the film’s embrace within academic film studies has worked to reproduce and 
institutionalized altogether imaginary constructions of anti-colonial struggle that have been 
generated by private-sector actors as part of the film’s marketing campaigns.  
Ultimately, the political canonization of The Battle of Algiers in the American context has 
occurred primarily because the film visualizes something that many people have never 
experienced, know very little about, and have indeed been pushed to feel equally inspired by and 
afraid of: revolutionary politics.  Given the often-clandestine nature of anti-colonial struggle, the 
American canonization of The Battle of Algiers has opened up a discursive space in which the 
historical realities of decolonization and Third Worldism could become mythologized, mystified, 
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